THE EMERGENCE OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM 1878–1939

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PREFACE

IN this work no attempt is made to survey the whole field of Jewish history between 1878 and 1939. This would have involved a work of twice the length, and would have contained much material of little practical value to those whose task it will be to rebuild the world after the war.

Instead of this general survey, the three problems have been chosen which will certainly need international planning and international action for their solution—Palestine, the Jewish minorities, and antisemitism as a political weapon.

Even though many good things were done as a result of the settlement at Versailles, yet it must be admitted that its proposals in the Jewish field have not led to the solution of the Jewish problem. The Minority treaties imposed on Poland and Rumania failed to secure either the prosperity or even the security of the Jews of these countries. The Palestine Mandate has made possible the establishment of half a million Jews in Palestine, but it has not solved the problem of their relations with the Arabs. Moreover, as a result of the deliberate propaganda of the Nazis, antisemitism has been spread throughout the world, and the most stable-seeming Jewish communities are conscious of increased hostility in the environment in which they have lived, possibly for centuries. On these three subjects the world has to make a fresh start. It is therefore with these three subjects that these studies deal.

On each subject a treatment has been adopted which is designed to bring out, as clearly as possible, the problems which will face the world after the war. In the section dealing with the National Home I shall probably appear to many readers to be contradicting myself in the tone of the different chapters. In the first two, they will say, I am 'anti-Zionist', in the third 'pro-Zionist'. I believe this contradiction is inherent in an objective study of the evidence. I cannot accept *in toto* the usual Zionist hypotheses about the promises made by the British Government during the last war, or their explanation of the events which led from the Balfour Declaration to the 1939 White Paper. On the other hand I do not agree with those who, reading largely as I do the political history of these years, see the solution in a halting of the growth or even a further restriction of the National Home. The result is I have left a paradox, because that appears to me the only factual description of the present position.

In considering the Jews of eastern Europe, I have begun with an account of the Jews of Rumania before 1914. For it was the Rumanian situation which both Jewish and other peacemakers had in mind when they tried to plan something better for the larger Jewry of the new Poland, and the other Jewish inhabitants of eastern Europe. In the Polish chapter I have given a number of statistical appendices, in order to give some detailed picture of the actual structure of an eastern-European Jewry. The figures are from the census taken immediately after the war so that they show the situation before nationalism or economic crisis produced special modifications. This section is followed by one on the Jews in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. is bound to play an important part in the future of eastern Europe, so that a consideration of the Communist solution of the Jewish problem becomes apposite to that of all the relics of these Jewries.

The fourth section, that dealing with antisemitism, is included in order to show that it ought not to be included—i.e., that the battle against antisemitism in its modern form is not a real part of the Jewish problem, but an aspect of the general problem of protecting progressive democracy against the assaults of various forms of reaction.

This volume brings the story down to 1939, because it is still too early to get into perspective the disastrous events which have befallen Jewry during the years of war. It will be some time still before the sequel can be written. It is, however, the general intention of the author that such a sequel should be written, as soon as the material is available. A brief survey of the developments from 1939 to 1944 is to be found in *International Affairs* for January 1945, and to this the reader is, at the moment, referred.

The book was planned at the very beginning of the war, and most of it was already written by 1942. It was not possible then to foresee the delays there would be before its publication, or the extent to which the Jewish situation would be modified by the developments of the war. Nevertheless, as a record of the period with which it deals, it contains nothing which I would wish to withdraw. There are, however, points which subsequent events would have caused me to emphasize but which at that time seemed of minor importance.

In the story of Part One, the claims and counter-claims to antiquity of residence in Palestine which have been prominent recently would have led me to emphasize more that at the time when Zionist colonization started in Palestine (1882) and equally when the decision to refuse alternatives was taken (1903) there was no reason to expect trouble along these lines. The Arab

Nationalist movement, which dates from almost the same period, was not strong in what was then the southern part of Syria; and neither Jews nor Arabs can be blamed for not foreseeing what would happen some decades later. The slogan of the early Zionists: 'the people without a land for the land without a people' did not at that time appear pretentious or improper.

I think also I would have emphasized more strongly that the promises made during the last war to both sides were promises to assist a situation to emerge. They were not, for example, similar to the promises to recognize Poland or Czechoslovakia. However Jews or Arabs may have interpreted them, it is clear that the British were thinking of something akin to the Mandatory system for all important parts of the Arab world, at the time when they spoke of Arab freedom; and it is equally clear that they thought that definite decisions about the emergence of a Jewish state could only be taken in the future. And I would have emphasized, even more strongly, the difficulties such a situation created for a day-to-day Administration.

In Part Two I chose Poland as the sole illustration of the working of the Minority Treaties and the development of Jewish life in eastern Europe during the inter-war years. Any other choice would at that time have appeared absurd. But to-day Polish Jewry is represented by less than a hundred thousand unhappy survivors, and the main Jewries of eastern Europe are Hungarian and Rumanian. To deal with the latter country would have meant little more than a change of names and figures. The situation was identical, only more serious, for the efforts made by Rumanian governments to deal honourably with their Jewish subjects were certainly much slighter than those made by the Poles. But in Hungary the situation was somewhat different; for in that country the main emphasis of Jewish policy was based on a claim to assimilation, and to recognition as 'Magyars of the Israelite persuasion'. No other substantial eastern-European Jewry was making a similar claim. This would have involved a more serious discussion of the limitations of assimilation than then appeared necessary. Assimilation can only be based on mutual acceptance of it as a desirable objective; and there was no sign of this coming true in the Hungarian situation. This is important in relation to the small surviving groups of Jews on the European continent. They are too few for us to attempt to recreate the apparatus of minority treaties, even if these had not shown themselves to be futile; but it is still important to realize that individual equality before the law is only satisfactory in countries such as Britain or Holland, because it is willingly accepted by the majority as due to Jewish fellow-citizens, and

willingly accepted by the Jews as giving them a framework within which any special privileges they may require (Sabbath, schechita, etc.) will be reasonably and willingly accepted. One other consequence of having dealt with Poland rather than with Rumania and Hungary is that it throws into relief the complicity of many high-ranking Roman Catholics with the parties of violent antisemitism. A study of the two other countries would have revealed that the same was at least equally true of the Orthodox Church of Rumania, and that the Protestants of Hungary could not be wholly exculpated.

In the last section of the book, that dealing with antisemitism, had I foreseen the utter economic chaos of Europe, I would have added another section emphasizing the immense value to anti-semitic agitation of conditions of economic instability and distress. These matters will naturally find their place when it is possible to produce the second volume.

In a study like the present, wandering over many fields, it is inevitable that I have touched on questions on which other Chatham House workers are engaged. For the ready assistance which they always gave to my queries I am grateful, and take this opportunity of thanking them. In particular I owe a special debt of thanks to Mr. Harold Beeley for the advantage I have gained from innumerable discussions with him on every aspect of the subject.

Barley JAMES PARKES
January 1946

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INTRODUCTION

THE SITUATION OF THE JEWS BEFORE 1914

THE Jews are neither one of the most numerous nor one of the smallest of the peoples of the world. Their dispersion makes it impossible to give exact figures, but in 1939 they numbered between sixteen and seventeen million. Like other Western peoples, their numbers had increased enormously in the nineteenth century. In 1800 they amounted perhaps to four, in 1914 to rather more than twelve, million. Jews are to be found in almost every country of the world, in communities numbering from a few hundred to several million members. So far from there being a 'Jewish race', Jews are the least homogeneous of all identifiable peoples. From the standpoint of Jewish history they can be divided into three main groups: the *Sephardim* or descendants of the Jewish population of medieval Spain and Portugal, the *Ashkenazim* or descendants of the Jewish communities ranging from the North Sea to the Crimea, and *indigenous communities of varying racial origin* in many parts of Northern Africa and Asia. They can be divided into three groups also from the standpoint of their social and political development. In the Americas, the British Empire, and in western Europe they had entered into the rights of citizenship at various periods during the nineteenth century; and they had since shared in the social and commercial developments of those communities; in Africa and the East there were small nuclei of wealthy merchants, while the masses were poverty-stricken and depressed. But more than half of the whole Jewish population lived in a vast community north-east of the Carpathians, between the Black Sea and the Baltic, where they possessed no political, and limited civic, rights, and were, for the most part, untouched by Western nineteenth-century ideas. Thus the word 'Jew' covered people who differed as much in cultural level and outlook as do 'Christians' of New York and Abyssinia. They belonged to many different 'races', and ranged from black to white. There was a certain recognition of kinship between these different groups, but it was religious and not national, and served only as a basis for charitable and educational activities on the part of the more prosperous Jewries in favour of the more impoverished or primitive.

In western Europe Jews have had a continuous record of existence since Roman times; but from the decline of the Roman

civilization until the French Revolution they were excluded from the main stream of European life, and lacked both the political and the civil equality which they had enjoyed in the Roman Empire. These they recovered first in France as a result of the Revolution, then in other countries at various periods during the nineteenth century. With the rapid progress of industrial and commercial developments during this period these western-European Jews had become a prosperous and largely middle, or lower-middle, class community by the end of the century. History had made them town dwellers and, as the nineteenth century was in any case a period in which the whole trend of life was towards the towns, few Jews took advantage of their new freedom to seek rural occupations. Three factors determined their choice of careers; as among other peoples, many young Jews tended to take up occupations traditional among their people, and to follow in the footsteps of their parents; social difficulties made those occupations attractive in which a man was independent from the beginning of his career; and the same reason, backed by a certain restless and adventurous spirit, caused Jews to turn to those new developments of nineteenth-century life in which a hierarchical tradition had not had time to develop to their disadvantage.

Tradition was mainly responsible for the number who were to be found in different branches of industry, commerce, and finance, in law, in medicine, and, lower in the social scale, in peddling and in various intermediary occupations between the peasant and the urban market. The association of Jews with finance dates back to the early Middle Ages, when, as the property of various princes, they had been employed as sponges to draw revenue out of the prince's subjects by their usury. From then onwards they had a continuous experience of various forms of public and commercial finance; in the period immediately preceding their emancipation almost every German princeling had his 'court Jew'; and it was by their association with the wealthy Elector of Hesse that the Rothschilds took the first step towards the creation of their fortune. The ramifications of their financial experience quickly led them into the industrial and commercial developments of the century.

If the traditions imposed by their European background had familiarized Jews with finance, their own Jewish tradition was responsible for the number who turned to law and medicine, once the doors of the universities were open to them. Rabbinic religion, with its emphasis on intellectual analysis and the complexity of its legal code, provided an admirable background for the legal career; and Jews had been so famous as doctors since

the earliest days of their European sojourn that even popes and emperors who would not accept Jewish subjects made exceptions for their physicians.

A further attraction in the professions of medicine and law lay in the fact that the practitioner was mainly dependent on his own skill for his success or failure. Christians who studied in these faculties might more easily become judges, surgeons in State hospitals, or university professors; but there was ample scope for Jews, who were more or less excluded both from the civil service and from university chairs, in the private practices of both professions.

Tradition and the possibility of independence were similarly responsible for the number of Jews who were to be found in retail trade, among dealers in agricultural and rural produce (a relic of the necessity of the moneylender's knowing how to dispose of unredeemed pledges, and produce or property falling into his hands by the default of his debtor), and among pedlars.

The main occupations towards which they were drawn by their novelty were journalism and entertainment. Both of these developed enormously during the century; both required imagination, initiative, and a willingness to take risks—three qualities in which the Jews excelled—and in none of them was there a traditional hierarchy into which Jews would have found it difficult to penetrate. They founded such important papers as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Berliner Tageblatt* and Jewish journalists were common on the staffs of many of the great dailies and weeklies of Central Europe. A similar situation existed in all branches of the theatrical and musical professions and, when the cinema appeared, Jews were among the first to realize its possibilities.

One result of this triple background in the choice of occupation is easy to see. Though Jews formed less than 1 per cent. of the population of western and central Europe, they were so unevenly distributed occupationally that, provided one looked at occupations where they were to be found, they appeared to have acquired an importance out of all proportion to their numbers. A man who became 'Jew-conscious' soon found the Jews suspiciously conspicuous. The bearing of this fact on the growth of antisemitism is obvious.

Needless to say the sudden impact of modern Western civilization on a people which had for centuries been made to live apart from the main streams of ideas flowing around them, produced all kinds of problems in the Jewries of these countries. Orthodoxy remained the official basis of community life, an orthodoxy nominally, and to some extent actually, unaffected by secularism or

religious modernism. But in eighteenth-century Berlin a small group of Jews had already begun a movement to introduce their fellows to the new developments in the civilization of the world around them, and this movement gradually spread. The Hebrew Bible was translated into German; synagogue services were modernized; secular education was encouraged; and Jewish minds were prepared for the coming emancipation. In France matters took a somewhat different turn, and it was from outside that pressure was brought to bear on Judaism to modernize itself so as to conform to a new civic status already granted. Napoleon summoned an assembly of Jewish notables in 1806, and a second gathering in 1807, which he named 'the Great Sanhedrin'. Its functions were to ensure that the Jewish citizens of France accepted their responsibilities as citizens—particularly, so far as Napoleon was concerned, in providing recruits for military service. It is probably the fact that the urge to absorb new ideas came to them from within that made the German Jewish community the unquestioned cultural leaders during the period. The English and French communities provided less striking manifestations of Jewish culture, but surpassed the German in political and social activities.

The first initiative in these latter activities came from the establishment in England (before political emancipation) of 'The London Committee of British Jews' which came to be 'The Jewish Board of Deputies'. From modest beginnings the Board came to assume a steadily increasing moral responsibility on behalf of the less fortunate Jews elsewhere. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the President of the Board of Deputies, Sir Moses Montefiore, was the most outstanding Jewish leader in the world, and he undertook many missions as far afield as Russia, Syria, and Palestine on behalf of persecuted Jews. In this work he was joined by Adolf Crémieux, the outstanding leader of French Jewry. In 1860 French Jews took the further step forward of founding the Alliance Israélite Universelle, to afford political protection to their downtrodden brethren of eastern Europe and elsewhere and, even more important, to assist in their education and enlightenment. Anglo-Jewry followed with the foundation of the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1871. The first steps in this path had been taken by the two leaders when Sir Moses Montefiore founded a school in Palestine (1835) and Adolf Crémieux two schools in Cairo in 1840.

In the next fifty years the Alliance built up a network of schools throughout North Africa and the Turkish Empire, as well as in eastern Europe; and these schools were of great importance in the regeneration of the Jewish communities in those

areas. It was their good fortune that several important communities of Jews lived either in the French colonies or in the regions in which France considered that she had a *mission civilisatrice*, regions in other words where the French Government was willing and able to lend its diplomatic or official support to the educational and cultural work of the Alliance. In French Morocco were over a hundred thousand Jews, in Algiers and Tunis, a hundred and fifty thousand; while in Syria and Egypt, regions in which French culture predominated, were another hundred thousand. Of these communities the Egyptian alone contained a fair proportion of prosperous members, and a fair level of modern education. Most of the Jews of North Africa and Syria still lived completely separated from, and despised by, their Moslem neighbours. A few wealthy merchants stood out from a mass of deep and increasing poverty.

Conditions in the other communities of Asia and Africa were somewhat similar. The Abyssinian community aroused special interest because of its ancient history, and the fact that it was a black community of local origin which had professed Judaism for more than two thousand years. But all the African communities together only totalled 8 per cent. of the Jewish population of the world, and their influence on the general Jewish question was negligible.

If the cultural leadership of Jewry lay with Germany, and the political with France, the centre of religious orthodoxy lay in those provinces of imperial Russia which had once been Poland and Lithuania, and it was only slowly that Western Jews ceased to draw their rabbis from the great centres of Eastern orthodoxy, and built up their own theological colleges in which some concession was made to 'modern' ideas of order and belief.

At the end of the nineteenth century a series of events in Russia modified profoundly the position of all the western communities. In 1881 the Tsar Alexander II was assassinated. The murder had nothing to do with the Jews, but the Government needed a scapegoat. Already before his death, the imperial enthusiasm for reform which had led to the emancipation of the serfs was giving way to a stern determination to resist the inroads of modernism into the autocracy of Russia. After the accession of Alexander III, and during the reign of his successor, the last Tsar, Nicholas II, reaction was in the saddle. Such reforms as were granted were too trifling and came too late to save the empire from its final collapse; but in all the thirty years of conflict with reform, it was intermittently necessary to have some victim on whom to turn the indignation or discontent of the population. The Jews were the obvious choice, and it was the consistent

policy of the Government to claim that all demands for change, all complaints against the traditional order, all defects in the social structure, were due in some way or other to the machinations and wickedness of the Jews. Nor did this policy stop at words. The people were encouraged to 'let off steam' on their Jewish neighbours, and pogroms provided the safety valve of the decaying empire. Beginning in 1881, in the summer following the assassination, they continued sporadically until 1905, and broke out with still greater violence in the period of civil war which preceded the stabilization of the Bolshevik régime in 1920. These recurrent massacres sent tens of thousands of refugees between 1881 and 1914 to the countries of western Europe and America; and their coming inevitably created new situations and posed new problems to both Jew and Gentile in the countries in which they arrived. The Jewries described in the preceding pages had had a long period of preparation for the ultimate achievement of civic equality. The Jews of Russia passed directly from inequality in a semi-feudal autocracy to full equality in western constitutional democracies, where the privileges and the responsibilities of their position were alike strange to them.

While many Jews of Western Europe had taken an increasing share in the life around them from the seventeenth century onwards, their eastern neighbours were living in very different conditions. The community which formed a kind of bridge between the two was that of Austria-Hungary. While in all the Western countries so far considered there were less than a million Jews altogether in, say, 1850, Austria-Hungary already possessed more than that number within her own territories, and the number had risen to well over a million and a half by the end of the century. This population fell into two clearly distinguishable groups. In Vienna, Budapest, and Prague, and in the west of the dual monarchy generally, there were small Jewish communities indistinguishable from their neighbours in Germany. But the great mass of the Jewish population was to be found along the northern provinces, in Austrian Poland, in Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Russia, and in Bukovina. Here, apart from a small élite in the provincial capitals, the Jews lived a life which had scarcely altered for centuries. Secular education was practically unknown; the Talmud, and endless commentaries on the Talmud, provided at once their religion and their recreation; they understood only Yiddish or Hebrew; they were separated from their neighbours not only by political inequality, but in dress, and in the manner of their daily lives. A Jew of Vienna might pass unrecognized, and even his friends might be unaware of his origin. A Jew of Galicia, of Marmorosh, or of

Cernauti, could be identified at sight by a complete stranger. Although politically subjects of a Western Power, socially and culturally they were part of that great eastern-European Jewish community which spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea and, for the most part, owed allegiance to the Governments of Russia and Rumania.

Although they were undoubtedly extremely backward from a modern standpoint, and abnormal in their social distribution, it would be a mistake to regard eastern-European Jews either as parasites or as degenerates. They performed essential services to the communities within which they lived; but unhappily those services, though essential, were incapable of expansion as the Jewish population grew, and were not such as to develop the noblest qualities in human society. In consequence the life of these Jewish communities was artificial, and they continued in their backward existence more as a result of external political compulsion than in response to local economic needs.

For centuries before the Russian pogroms sent tens of thousands of Jews fleeing westwards, a great Jewish reservoir had been slowly filling in the area which after the partitions of Poland became the western territories of the Russian empire, and were known as the Jewish Pale. The first settlements were made in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by fugitives from the march of the Crusaders across Europe; they were followed by the victims of expulsions, of ritual murder accusations, of the hundred and one reasons which made Jewish life intolerable in western Europe as the Middle Ages proceeded. In the kingdom of Poland they were welcomed as a middle class between the peasants and the landowners; and the favourable conditions which they were granted encouraged others to follow them. As they gradually spread eastwards they mingled with other extensive Jewish settlements which had spread into the Ukraine from across the Black Sea, from the steppes of the Volga and from the Crimea. These settlements were made up of people whose religion was Judaism but whose ethnical origin was Slav, Tartar or Hittite. Into the heart of Russia neither group could penetrate, for rigid laws excluded them. Hence the belt of Jewish settlement grew more and more crowded. They could not move eastwards; few desired, or were able, to return westwards. By the nineteenth century more than half the Jewish population of the world lived in the western provinces of Russia, with an overflow in the northern provinces of Austria-Hungary and Rumania. Russian Jewry was a vast artificial accumulation still living under restricted, inhuman conditions. It had become Russian, not through any desire of Russia to possess Jews, but as a conse-

quence of the partition of Poland, and of Russia's other acquisitions in the south-west of her territory. Except to a chosen few in the liberal professions or among the wealthier merchants, she barred all access to her inner provinces to this vast Jewish population; and within the Pale of Settlement they had all the duties and none of the privileges of citizenship. They were constantly harried by petty officials and by the Administration of St. Petersburg, and though occasionally a brief and superficial effort might be made to 'do something about the Jewish problem', on the whole the nineteenth century saw their condition deteriorate. They were compelled to provide conscripts for the army under brutal conditions which shocked Jewish feelings to their depths; their economic activities were constantly hampered; they paid heavier taxes than the rest of the population; and they had little freedom of movement. After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 their lot became worse. The possibility of murder or the destruction of their property, and a whole range of activities familiar under the name of 'pogroms' were added to administrative tyranny. The result was the annual exodus of Jews from Russia to all parts of the world, an exodus which was only arrested by the outbreak of war in 1914.

In Rumania an effort had been made by the Western Powers to ensure that the Rumanian principality, when elevated to the rank of a kingdom and formally recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, should grant equality to all her Jewish residents, but the clauses which were inserted in her constitution were never observed, and the Jews of Rumania were little better off than their neighbours in Russia.

A few small groups among these millions of eastern European Jews were occupied with agriculture—largely as a result of spasmodic Russian efforts to turn them from their 'parasitic' life. Most of the remainder eked out a meagre existence as artisans, pedlars, innkeepers, small shopkeepers, and intermediaries between the peasants and the outside world. They bought and sold agricultural produce; they provided the peasant with such articles as he could not make for himself; they lent him money during the period between sowing and harvest; they gave him credit at their village shops. It is foolish to call this a 'parasitic' existence, but it was neither materially nor morally beneficial. The constant indebtedness of the peasants to Jews made it easy to stir up pogroms; and few had the wisdom or courage to point out that the blame lay with the poverty and ignorance of the peasants and not with the class through whom alone they were able to carry on at all.

Lastly, there was a small group which had risen by talents of

hand or brain to enjoy liberty of residence and activity anywhere in the Empire. Skilled artisans, merchants paying more than £20 in taxes, and scholars comprised this Jewish élite. Some of them played a considerable part in the growing industrialization of Russia; some gained distinction in the liberal professions; some shared the adventurous life of the revolutionaries and reformers whose numbers increased steadily during the last years of the Empire.

While the characteristics of eastern-European Jews were similar, whether they lived under Russian, Austro-Hungarian or Rumanian rule, it was almost entirely Russian Jews who filled up the communities of the West in the years from 1881 to 1914; life was not particularly encouraging for Jews of the other two countries, but at least they were not subjected, like their Russian fellows, to the periodic threat of violence and destruction. Some idea of the size of the migration can be gathered from the fact that in this short space of thirty-three years more than a quarter of the Jewish population of the world was suddenly displaced—and displaced not merely geographically but flung in the short space of a railway journey or sea voyage from the Middle Ages into the modern world. The Jewish population of the United States rose from less than a quarter of a million to over two millions; that of Great Britain was trebled from 100,000 to 300,000; while Holland, France, and Germany each received between twenty and thirty thousand of these immigrants.

It is out of this colossal displacement of population that many of the problems arose which have confronted the Jewish communities of the twentieth century. There was inevitably a sharp cleavage in outlook between the older settlers of the West and the poorer but much more numerous new-comers. The ambition of the western Jews of the nineteenth century had been to achieve complete assimilation with the majority of the population. Some carried this to the extent of abandoning Judaism, and seeking baptism in the predominant Christian community; but even those who retained their loyalty to Judaism saw in it only a personal matter, which demanded from the majority no greater concessions than would be granted to the adherents of any religious minority.

The movement for assimilation was a natural outcome of the general feeling of the nineteenth century. It was 'liberal', 'democratic', 'up-to-date', 'sensible'—in fact it conformed to all the shibboleths, good as well as bad, of the time. It is the fashion to-day to proclaim the ideal a complete mistake, for the classic country of assimilation was Germany, and Germany has turned on her Jews more brutally than any country in their

history. But if it was the assimilated Jews of Germany who fell victims to the rage of National Socialism, it was the assimilated Jews of the West who were able to raise the funds to help them as refugees, to assist their entry into countries of temporary or permanent settlement, and to arouse for them a great measure of sympathy among the non-Jewish population. And what was true in 1933 was still more true in 1881. It was to the countries where assimilation had given a reasonable prosperity and influence to Jewish communities that the victims of Russian persecution naturally turned. When assimilation was carried among individuals to the point of wishing to veil entirely their membership or origin in the Jewish community, it was a movement which merited the contempt which it received from the new-comers. Where it was the renewal of Jewish experience by willing absorption of the culture, the social and economic life, and even the freedom of religious discussion and inquiry, of countries whose level of civilization was at least as high as their own, Jewish communities could not but profit from it, and their Judaism likewise.

But the idea of assimilation meant little to the new-comers. In any case it is a movement which can only flourish when there is goodwill on both sides. The desire of the Jews to assimilate in England and France had been met by the desire of Englishmen and Frenchmen that they should. The Russians had not desired the Jews to assimilate—except on rare occasions or among groups of reformers—and the level of Russian civilization around the ghettoes of the Jewish Pale of Settlement was not such as to attract the Jews to copy it. The first comers feared rather than admired the busy Western world around them. They settled in compact masses; they often lived for years without acquiring more than a few words of the language, and the majority made little attempt to acquire naturalization in their new country. But as time went on a new ideal appeared among the eastern Jews, both in eastern Europe and in the countries of the West where they had settled, the idea of Jewish nationhood, and of the right, indeed the need, of Jews to be *Jews*, not just Israelite citizens of England, France or the United States. By the time this idea had spread to the West there existed a generation, educated in the schools of their new country, familiar with its language and imbued increasingly with its political traditions and ideas. Hence arose the conflict between assimilation and nationalism which has torn Jewry ever since. The embodiment of the national idea in Zionism, and its recognition by the Balfour Declaration, made the conflict more bitter, even though the events from 1933 onwards have made many assimilated Jews accept the

value of the National Home as a place for the settlement of refugees.

Just as the Jews of the nineteenth century were influenced by the emergence in their surroundings of nationalism, so they were influenced by the emergence of the working-class movement, and the philosophy of Socialism. In the West, the participation of Jews in the Socialist Movement did not amount to anything abnormal. The overwhelming majority of them supported the various *bourgeois* parties, with a natural tendency to incline rather to the liberal or radical elements in countries where the conservative group was tinged with antisemitism. But it was different in the East. There the overwhelming proportion of Jews belonged to the proletariat, and had even less reason to approve the existing order of society than had the bulk of the Gentile proletarians. For they possessed a tradition and an education which their fellows lacked, and could more sensitively appreciate the humiliations to which the mere fact of having been born Jews exposed them at the hands of their social superiors and rulers. The first Jewish Socialist newspaper appeared in 1877, and before the end of the century there were strong Jewish working-class parties in Russia, especially in Russian Poland. Most of them disliked, or at least viewed with suspicion, the national Zionist idea, regarding it as an escapist movement which refused to face the necessity of bettering the condition of Jews in the countries where they were living. This sentiment was reciprocated by the Zionists, who considered that the Socialists refused to face the fact that the condition of the Jews could not be bettered except in a National Home; and the two parties never co-operated in any programme except during the war of 1914–1918.

The fact that the Jewish proletariat possessed a higher standard of education than the masses around them, and that the immense majority of Jews could read and write, led to their assuming disproportionate prominence in the leadership of many sections of the Socialist Movement. Apart from the Bolshevik group of Socialists, in which there were few Jews until the years immediately preceding 1914, Jews came to be prominently associated with the leadership of Socialist Movements as far west as Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was a natural but erroneous assumption that the proportion of Jewish leaders corresponded to the proportion of Jewish followers, and it soon became a commonplace among the enemies of the Socialist Movement to say that it was a Jewish conspiracy against the existing order. This belief was to assume dangerous proportions in the years following 1919, with the dissemination of the forged *Protocols of*

the Elders of Zion which described in apparently convincing detail 'the Jewish plot against society'.

The outbreak of war in 1914 found the Jews in a most unhappy situation. Jewish soldiers were inevitably serving in the armies of both sides. In the second World War over a million Jews fought, but all were on the same side. Further, in 1914, many of the recent immigrants from eastern Europe were still unnaturalized, for naturalization was expensive and difficult, and in countries with conscription it implied military service. This the Russian immigrants hated with the greatest bitterness, for the conditions under which it had been forced on them in Tsarist Russia were horribly brutal and monstrously unjust. In Britain, France, and America, there was also considerable distress among this section that they were asked to fight as the allies of the Russia which had oppressed them and compelled them to emigrate. In 1939–1945 no Jews were fighting for the Axis and its satellites, and there was no question but that the Jewish future was bound up with the victory of the United Nations. Yet in spite of the difficulties and uncertainties which surrounded them in 1914 the youth of the old-established Jewries joined up with the armies of their fellow-citizens, and actually a higher percentage of German and British Jews were to be found in the armies of these two countries than their proportion of the population would demand.

PART ONE

THE PALESTINE MANDATE AND THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME

'*It is impossible, we believe, for any unprejudiced observer to see the National Home and not to wish it well. It has meant so much for the relief of unmerited suffering. It displays so much energy and enterprise and devotion to a common cause. In so far as Britain has helped towards its creation, we would claim, with Lord Balfour, that to that extent at any rate, Christendom has shown itself "not oblivious of all the wrong it has done." But we would ask all sympathisers with the National Home, in Europe or overseas, not to underestimate the difficulties which confront it. It does no service to brush them aside, to say that all will be well if we wait a little longer, still less to assert that there would be no real difficulty at all if the Mandatory Power would do its duty by the Mandate. At each successive crisis in Palestine those idle hopes have been raised, and those hasty charges made. The best service which well-wishers of the National Home can render it is to recognize frankly that the situation in Palestine has reached a deadlock and to bend their minds to finding a way out.*'

Report of Royal Commission on Palestine, p. 124.

Chapter One

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND THE PROMISES TO THE ARABS

1. *The Background*

ALTHOUGH the political necessities of the moment may explain why the British Government was able to find time, during the most difficult period of the 1914–1918 war, to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the Jewish question, yet the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 has a long history, both Jewish and British, behind it.

As early as 1839 the British Government decided to establish a vice-consulate—soon raised to a consulate—at Jerusalem, an action which it was the first of European powers to take. In the initial instructions to the Vice-Consul, Mr. W. T. Young, Lord Palmerston laid down that it would be part of his duty 'to afford Protection to the Jews generally'.[1] In 1841 various further actions were taken indicating British interest in the Jews of the country. In particular, Palmerston extended British interest to all Jews residing in the Turkish dominions, and secured some recognition by the Porte of this position.[2] In taking this action he apparently envisaged the possibility of extensive Jewish settlement in the area; for he told the British ambassador in Constantinople to urge on the Porte 'that it would be highly advantageous to the Sultan that the Jews who were scattered through other countries in Europe and Africa should be induced to go and settle in Palestine, because the wealth and habits of order and industry which they would bring with them, would tend greatly to increase the resources of the Turkish Empire, and to promote the progress of civilization therein'. At the same time, in a letter to British Consuls and Consular Agents, he spoke of the protection 'of Jews who are settled, or who may hereafter settle, in various parts of the Turkish Empire, especially in Palestine'. It was also with the approval of the Government that the Anglican Church despatched an English convert from Judaism to be the first Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, with the avowed intention of carrying on missionary work among the Jews in the country. But the Government's interest took the somewhat incongruous forms of arranging that the Bishop should arrive with naval honours on a battleship, and of informing its

[1] *The British Consulate at Jerusalem*, documents edited by A. M. Hyamson and published by the Jewish Historical Society, No. 2.
[2] ibid., Nos. 23a–26.

Consul that he was to lend no support whatever to the Bishop's conversionist activities.[1] During the rest of the century official and unofficial interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine continued to be manifested in England; and in 1903, when the Turkish refusal to give any satisfactory guarantee for their stability appeared to endanger the future of Zionist settlements in Palestine, the British Government officially offered the Zionist Organization alternative territories, first on the Sinai–Egyptian border, and then in an area which was at that time included in Uganda, but was subsequently transferred to British East Africa.

The hints of Palmerston were based on the fact that the Powers had just dispossessed Muhammad Ali of Syria, and were uncertain what provision to make for the future of the country. It was actually suggested by the British Consul in Syria that the part which had been Palestine should be restored to the Jews. But no practical Jewish interest in the suggestion could be aroused at that time. An emotional and religious interest in Palestine had existed ever since the dispersion of the people, and there has never been a period when there was no Jewish population of Palestine—in 1840 it was estimated at some 10,000. But this religious sentiment, deep-seated though it was, did not easily clothe itself in the forms of political settlement. Nearly half a century was to pass before the Russian calamity, and the flare-up of antisemitism in western Europe, were to create the Jewish political movement which formed the background for the Balfour Declaration. That movement was a double one, and the two sides need to be distinguished. On the one side is the piecemeal colonizing movement on Palestinian soil and on the other is the international and political Zionist Organization. The cultural and spiritual aims of these two groups were the same, but their policies were often at variance; and the experience of each has contributed both to the problems and to the progress which the last half-century can record.

The beginnings of colonization in Palestine antedate the foundation of the Zionist Organization. The first conference of the latter was held at Basle in 1897, but it was in 1882, the year after the first pogroms in Russia, that the first Palestinian settlement was established and named Rishon-le-Zion. The colonists and their supporters were mainly interested in planting as many Jews as possible in Palestine, and made the best of whatever political or economic conditions they found there. The first pioneers possessed little except enthusiasm, and tried to reproduce in Palestine the agriculture of their native Russia or

[1] *The British Consulate at Jerusalem*, documents edited by A. M. Hyamson and published by the Jewish Historical Society, No. 30.

Rumania. Within two years of their arrival most of them were destitute, and the whole vision would have faded had not Baron Edmond de Rothschild come to their aid with subsidies in 1883. In 1885 a second Russian group, the 'lovers of Zion', also started subsidizing colonies. By this date there were 22 settlements with some 5,000 inhabitants, but they were not economically independent.. They could not have lived without outside aid, given at that time with munificence rather than discrimination, and a good many of their experiments could not have been undertaken on any other basis. Vineyards, for example, were planted extensively although they could not sell their wine at an economic price. Many of the colonists lived the lives of 'planters', and all their manual work was done by cheap Arab labour. Some improvement, from the standpoint of efficiency, took place in 1899, when the Baron handed over all his interests to the care of the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA). Later, in 1924, a special Palestinian body, the PICA, was created to carry on this work. About the same time a beginning was made with non-agricultural enterprises. A soap factory was built at Haifa, a machine works and other factories at Jaffa. Schools, hospitals, and other aspects of the life of a self-contained community began to appear.

In 1905 settlers of a new type arrived in the country, members of the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion), the Zionist Socialist Organization. From the beginning they agitated for sounder economic conditions; and in 1909 the first of the famous communal settlements was founded at Dagania. By 1914 about 12,000 Jews were actually living in the colonies and owned 104,500 acres, while the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to over 80,000.

Such progress ensured the whole-hearted support of the Zionist Organization in the sense that it gave them the stimulus of an example actually before their eyes of what might be achieved. But the leaders of the Organization were disturbed by the fact that the whole of this growth lacked the security of any guarantee for its future from the Ottoman Government.

In the very year of the first settlements the Turkish Government announced that it would welcome Jewish settlers in the neighbourhood of Aleppo and in Mesopotamia, but that it could not accept them in Palestine because they might be tempted to put forward claims to the country. In consequence, Jews were officially only allowed to enter Palestine as tourists and for a period of three months. A few years later, when it was evident that this stipulation was not being observed, Jews of Russia, Austria, and Rumania—the three countries whence nearly all the immigrants came—were absolutely forbidden to own land.

All this meant that the whole growth of the work depended on a series of evasions and an elaborate system of bribes. A brief period of consistent and efficient hostility would have not merely endangered, but possibly closed down every colony.

It was this insecurity that the Zionist leaders found intolerable; and from the very beginning, Theodore Herzl, the Founder and President of the Organization, was continually attempting to secure for his plans official recognition and the protection of the Powers. He tried on a number of occasions to secure a firm charter from the Turks, but the price ultimately asked, £10,000,000, was far beyond his reach at that time. At the time of his death in 1904 the question of security was still unsolved. It was this dilemma which led the British in 1903 to offer an alternative area for settlement, first in the Sinai Peninsula and, when that proved impracticable, on 6,000 square miles on the plateau of Nasin Gishiu in the highlands of East Africa. The offer was seriously considered by those who agreed with Herzl that international recognition afforded the only possible foundation for a stable and dignified enterprise. But it ran counter to the whole emotional background of Jewish nationalism. When the pro-colonists, or 'practicals', secured the rejection of the British offer, some of the followers of Herzl, or 'politicals', led by Israel Zangwill, left the Zionist Organization and founded the Jewish Territorial Organization, to look for a home where the complications associated with Palestine would not arise. Though the organization had no success in this sphere, and ultimately collapsed, the idea still survives in the Freeland League. But since its decision on East Africa, the Zionist Organization has remained irrevocably and exclusively dedicated to settlement in Palestine.

When the Young Turks successfully revolted in 1908, it was hoped that they would establish a modern Government with which it would be possible to negotiate, but they proved both more hostile and more efficient than the officers of Abdul Hamid. The Zionist idea contradicted their ambition to Turkify their whole Empire; and in 1914 all Jewish settlers who were enemy subjects were ordered either to accept Turkish nationality or to leave the country. Nearly all the Jewish population was affected for they came either from Russia, or from Rumania which joined the Allies in August 1916. The colonists stood firm, but of the labourers and urban population the majority emigrated to Egypt under conditions of considerable difficulty.

After the death of Herzl, the Zionists failed to find a leader capable of carrying on his political campaign, and the Organization fell more and more under the control of the 'practicals' as opposed to the 'politicals'. Parties within it began to take shape;

on the right were the Mizrachi, the Orthodox group who insisted on the maintenance of a religious emphasis on the work; in the centre were the 'General Zionists' who had been the main supporters of Herzl; and on the left, in increasing numbers, were the Socialist representatives of Poale Zion and similar movements.

2. *Negotiations* 1914–1917

While power had passed from one emphasis to the other, the original programme enunciated at the First Congress at Basle in 1897 was never abandoned, and it was on the basis of this programme that in 1914 Zionist leaders began to consider their attitude to any possible solution of their problem after the war. The Basle programme had laid down these points:[1]

> The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.
>
> The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:
>
> 1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonisation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
> 2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
> 3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
> 4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

The three key-men of the Zionist organization in 1914 were Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Mr. Nahum Sokolow who were in England, and Dr. Tschlenow who represented the Russian interest. The three met in London at the end of 1914, and discussed the position with Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. They also saw Herbert (now Viscount) Samuel, one of the few prominent British Jews who viewed their cause with sympathy. In December of the same year Weizmann had an interview with Balfour, to whom he had first explained the ideals of the movement six years previously. Thus in the first year of the war all the characters who were to play a dominating part in subsequent developments met in friendly discussion.

The year 1915 passed without any decisive action being taken. The Government were not hostile, but Asquith who was still Prime Minister was unsympathetic. They disliked the idea of assuming responsibility for Palestine themselves, but recognized that it would be against British interests to allow it to fall defi-

[1] Quoted in *The History of Zionism*, N. Sokolow, vol. i, p. 268.

nitely into the hands of another European Power. Some members of the Government even toyed with the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth as a solution.

The year 1916 was a year of much greater activity. Sufficient interest had been aroused in British Government quarters for Sir Edward Grey to decide to sound Russia on the subject. This he did in a memorandum drawing the attention of the Russian Government to Jewish interests in Palestine. The reply was vaguely benevolent, and stipulated only for the recognition of Russia's rights to protect the interests of the Orthodox Church in the country. On the Jewish side the Zionist leaders had decided to concentrate mainly on gaining British support, but they were also concerned to get the approval of different Governments both for their aims and their policy. By October they had made such progress that the British Government were persuaded that their activities were favourable to British and Allied interests, and allowed them to make use of the Foreign Office Codes for certain of their correspondence—an important matter when secret discussions had to be carried on with leaders in a dozen different countries at once, and when contacts with individuals in enemy countries might at times be desirable. In consequence of this official interest they submitted, in the same month, their first definite proposals. Without allotting any specific responsibility to Great Britain, they asked 'for a new administration of Palestine, and for a Jewish resettlement of Palestine in accordance with the aspirations of the Zionist Movement'. To secure this there were to be:

(*a*) Recognition of a separate Jewish nationality or national unit in Palestine, and
(*b*) the establishment of a Jewish chartered company for the resettlement of Palestine by Jewish settlers.

These proposals met with no immediate response. But in December 1916 Asquith resigned, and Balfour became Foreign Secretary in Lloyd George's Coalition Government. In the beginning of February 1917 Sir Mark Sykes, an expert on the Near East, was officially deputed to attend a meeting of Zionist leaders to discuss their proposals. In the following month, owing to difficulties created by the French and Italians about the future of Syria and Palestine (the Sykes-Picot Agreement, though already signed, was still secret at this time), Balfour suggested a possible British-American guarantee for the country. In collaboration with Sykes—who brought in M. Picot to represent the French interest—the Zionists then formulated a definite programme, and in the summer it was submitted to Balfour at his request.

It was much more elaborate than any previous plan, and laid down five points:[1]

1. international recognition of the right of the Jewish people to Palestine;
2. the Jewish population of Palestine must be fully recognised as a Nation, and be granted full autonomy, with control of language and taxation;
3. a special Chartered Company should be established with rights of pre-emption and concession over both public and private property, and with precedence for certain contracts; immigration should be free and naturalisation facilitated;
4. the whole historical territory of Palestine must be a single administrative area;
5. the Holy Cities must be made extraterritorial.

The matter was considered by the Cabinet in August 1917, and it brought to a head all the opposition of the non-Zionist element in the Anglo-Jewish population, an element which was represented in the Cabinet itself by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. Hostility had been gathering momentum for some time. The non-Zionists had much better social connexions than their opponents, and had done their best to counter the progress made by them in official quarters in 1916. In May 1917 leaders of the British Jewish community, convinced both of the seriousness of Zionist ambitions and of the danger involved in them, sent a letter to *The Times* denouncing the whole idea of a separate Jewish nationality, and the need for a National Home. The letter aroused a storm of rage, and ink flowed freely for some time. Though it is doubtful what would have been the attitude of the Anglo-Jewish community as a whole, had it been able to vote on the issue, it is certain that the signatories carried weight in official quarters; and, with the assistance of Montagu and in the absence of Balfour in the United States, they secured the rejection of the Zionist proposals.

3. *The Publication of the Declaration*

The international situation, however, did not allow the matter to rest there. Events in three countries made inevitable a fresh examination of the position of the Jews.

The Tsarist régime had broken down in the early spring of the year, and Russia was rapidly drifting out of the war. The Tsars had always claimed a protective interest in the Holy Places, for the bulk of the Christian population belonged to the Orthodox Churches; and they could not admit the possibility of their con-

[1] Quoted by N. M. Gelber in *Zehn Jahre Balfour Deklaration*, p. 30.

trol by a Jewish State. After the February Revolution it was less certain what would be the attitude of Russia to Zionist hopes; and at the same time, the possible influence of the Jews, who had been emancipated in June by Kerensky, became a much more important factor in the general Russian situation. It was felt that a decisive gesture by the Allies might persuade the Jews of the country to throw all their weight on to the side of continuing the war against Germany.

Events in Germany were also attracting the attention of both the British and the Zionists. With precisely the opposite motive (i.e. to make the Jews of Russia favour peace), Germany was beginning to urge on her Turkish ally the need of making some concession to the Jews; and in September she officially pressed the claims of the Jewish community in Palestine to some form of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty, and to freedom of immigration within the capacity of the country.

Finally there was the great Jewish community of the United States to be considered. While Zionism was not a powerful movement in the United States before 1914, by 1917 it had won such important supporters as Justice Brandeis (who made a great impression on Balfour during his official visit in the summer of that year), and President Wilson was known to be sympathetic to it. It is frequently asserted that the main purpose of the Balfour Declaration was to win the support of wealthy American Jews. There is little evidence for this in the situation at the time, for most of the American supporters of Zionism belonged to the poorer and more recently immigrated section of the community, while the wealthier section of American as of British Jewry tended to oppose the whole idea. Public opinion, however, had to be considered as well as finance, and it was evident that a gesture of goodwill towards the Jews would meet with general public approval.

As a result of these considerations, as well as out of sincere belief in the Zionist aims, Balfour seems to have had little difficulty in persuading the Cabinet to rescind its decision to reject the Zionist proposals. French agreement had been secured, American approval was certain, Russia had ceased to be a factor after the October Revolution of Lenin had made her withdrawal from the side of the Allies inevitable; and on 2 November Balfour wrote his historic letter to Lord Rothschild, asking him to communicate to the Zionist Organization

> the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:
>
> 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their

best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

The actual terms of the letter were decided at a Cabinet meeting, and the draft finally approved was written by Mr. L. S. Amery and presented to the Cabinet by Lord Milner.

Germany made a quick attempt to counter the value of the Declaration to the allied cause by 'elucidating', in a sense almost exactly parallel to it, a vague general statement which had been made by the Turkish Government, and which had merely mentioned 'Turkey's historic friendship for the Jews'. But it was too late, and in any case the German declaration not only lacked any effective confirmation from the Turks, but any Turkish statement made at that time would have been weakened by the fact that southern Palestine was already in Allied hands and that Allenby was advancing victoriously on Jerusalem.

The wording of the document is important. In the various Zionist drafts the ambitions of both *the politicals* and *the practicals* had always been clearly expressed, the one desiring the Jewish claim to the country to have the status which international approval, and the stability which international guarantees, would give, and the other seeking mainly the right of free immigration and adequate local self-government. Neither international guarantees nor freedom of immigration are explicitly mentioned in Balfour's letter. Three points that *are* mentioned assumed considerable importance in the light of subsequent events. Zionist opinion, when the probable wording of the Declaration was made known to them, pressed for the phrase '*the establishment of Palestine as the National Home*'. The phrase finally adopted, 'the establishment in Palestine of a National Home', expressed approval of a much more moderate programme. In words it recognizes no more than the right of the Jews to share the country with others, and leaves the political character and future development of the National Home completely obscure. But the Arabs on their side criticize the latter because they are referred to simply as *existing non-Jewish communities*, and only their *civil and religious rights are assured*. It is in fact a document which, rather vaguely, promises to assist an undefined situation to emerge, and says as little as possible as to what the possible consequences may be for any of the parties involved.[1]

[1] Compare the terms of the Hogarth Declaration quoted on p. 17 *seq.* The differences seem to confirm the idea that at that time the plans or ideas of the British Government lacked any precision.

Although it did not convey everything for which they had hoped, the Declaration was received everywhere by Zionists as an epoch-making move forward, and as a solid basis for post-war progress and development in the country. In the following months it was ratified by the main Allied Powers, so that it stood as an international and not merely as a British war-aim. The plan was already familiar to the Governments concerned; it was endorsed by France on 14 February 1918, by Italy on 9 May and by President Wilson on 31 August in a statement of approval rather than an endorsement, since the United States was not at war with Turkey. The aims of the Zionists had also been communicated to the Vatican by Mr. Sokolow in the spring of 1918, and received the general approval of the Pope in an audience given to Mr. Sokolow on 10 May.

As a formal recognition of the fact that the British Government considered the Declaration to be a definite statement of policy on which they intended to act, an official Zionist Commission was constituted, and arrived in Palestine in the spring of 1918. The Chairman of the Commission was Dr. Weizmann, and Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore (later Lord Harlech) was attached to it as Political Officer in order to give recognition to its official standing. The Commission was accepted by the British Government as the official representative of the Zionist Organization, and empowered to act as an advisory body to the British authorities in Palestine (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, South, known as OETA 1) in all matters relating to Jews or affecting the establishment of the National Home. The specific tasks of the Commission were:[1]

1. To form a link between the British authorities and the Jewish population of Palestine.
2. To co-ordinate the relief work in Palestine, and to assist in the repatriation of exiled and evacuated persons and refugees.
3. To assist in restoring and developing the Colonies and in organizing the Jewish population in general.
4. To assist the Jewish organizations and institutions in Palestine in the resumption of their activities.
5. To help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.
6. To collect information and report on the possibilities of the further development of the Jewish settlement and of the country in general.
7. To inquire into the feasibility of the scheme of establishing a Jewish university.

[1] Quoted in Sokolow, vol. ii, p. 140.

With the arrival of the Commission a new phase of the Zionist programme may be said to have opened, and the continuation of the story from that point is considered in the following chapters.

4. *The Arabs: Negotiations with Husayn*

So far as the Jews were concerned, the Balfour Declaration was accepted in perfect good faith that it was within the power of the British Government to make the promises to them which they had in fact made. They were informed in the spring of 1917 that an agreement existed between Great Britain and France on the subject of the Middle East, but they were not shown its text. The agreement in question was that between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot which, they were informed, was compatible with their plans. And indeed the Balfour Declaration is so vaguely worded that it might be considered compatible with almost any administration of Palestine under any sovereignty. But they were told nothing of British commitments to the Arabs, which in the result have proved much more difficult to reconcile with the promises made to the Jews.

The relevant part of the story of British relations with the Arabs begins with an exchange of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner at Cairo, and Husayn, Sherif of Mecca.[1] The British were anxious to secure the co-operation of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in their attack on Turkey, and they entered into relations with the Sherif to this end. In a letter of 14 July 1915, the Sherif, as a condition of his raising the standard of revolt, asked for British recognition of the Arab claims to independence in a region extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and including the districts of Mersina and Adana in the south-eastern corner of Asia Minor. McMahon replied, suggesting that it was premature to define actual frontiers (30 August). To this Husayn riposted that the frontiers for which they were to fight were of the essence of the whole matter (9 September); and McMahon, convinced that some decision must be taken, wired for instructions from London. The reply which he was authorized to make, dated 24 October, was as follows (the text given is the revised translation issued by the British Government in 1939):

> The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

[1] Cmd. 5957, p. 8.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

(i) subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

(ii) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

The remaining clauses are of no particular importance for present purposes, for it is on the quotations given above that the whole controversy turns.

The Sherif in his reply (5 November) accepted the exclusion of Mersina and Alexandretta, but claimed that the vilayets of Aleppo and Bayrut and their coasts were purely Arab vilayets. While McMahon did not deny this explicitly he reminded the Sherif (14 December) that Great Britain was bound to consult France, whose interests were involved, before coming to a decision; and he promised a further communication. This was not sent, for on 1 January 1916, Husayn stated his desire to avoid causing difficulties between England and France, and postponed the question until the end of hostilities. But at the same time he made it doubly clear that he did not accept the French claims to 'Bayrut and its coasts' by saying that it was 'impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions'. All that McMahon replied to this was to hint that it was unlikely that Franco-British relations after the war would be any less close, or that the British would then be in a position to oppose France's interests (25 January 1916).

It will be observed that throughout the correspondence Palestine is never explicitly mentioned. The Arab members of the Committee set up to examine the correspondence at the St. James's Conference in 1939 assumed that the phrase *the Holy Places* referred to the Holy Places in Palestine and implicitly excluded any other interest in that country. But there is no evidence that it is the Palestinian, primarily *Christian*, Holy Places to which McMahon refers; and it is much more probable that the reference is to Mecca and Medina rather than to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth, since the letter is not only addressed to a Moslem, but to the actual Guardian of the Moslem Holy Places. But even apart from this hypothetical reference the Arabs insist that the silence of McMahon must be taken as

acceptance of the claims which Husayn, in his original letter, certainly made to the country.

This belief was strengthened rather than diminished by the terms in which the British Government first rejected it. In the statement of policy which Mr. Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued in 1922 the following words are used:[1]

> That letter [of 24 October 1915] is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the Vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

A glance at a map will convince anyone that it is not surprising that Arabs have always regarded this extraordinary geographical *tour de force* with amazement and contempt; and, in fact, the British members of the Anglo-Arab Committee mentioned in the previous paragraph had to admit that the Arab 'contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo" have greater force than has appeared hitherto'; and further, while they still asserted that Palestine was excluded from the area claimed by the Sherif, that 'the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time.'[2]

In actual fact the embarrassment of the British Government arose out of its deliberate choice in 1922 of this phrase from the McMahon correspondence, a choice presumably due to the change in the political situation between 1915 and 1922. In so far as the original language of McMahon is concerned, the phrase which they selected in 1922, and to which they have since tenaciously clung, is not the phrase which refers to Palestine. McMahon made two reservations. He cut out entirely Mersina, Adana, and the coastal region west of Damascus, etc., on the grounds that they were not purely Arab. Within the region remaining after these excisions he accepted the Arab claims, but again subject to two reservations—British treaties with Arab chiefs, and *regions in which Britain could not act without detriment to France*. To understand what McMahon meant by the second exception, it is first necessary to know what *was* claimed by

[1] Cmd. 1700, p. 20. [2] Cmd. 5974, p. 10.

France on 24 October 1915. For a long period before 1914 France had regarded this part of the world as coming within her general sphere of influence. French was the language of the Europeanized section of the population in both Syria and Egypt, and the Christian population of Lebanon were regarded as being under French protection. While British interests were largely based on the relation of the territory in question to imperial communications, and were consistent with the ambitions of the Arabs for independence (provided that such independence was not exploitable by some European power in a sense hostile to Britain), France's ambitions were more concerned with national prestige, with a long French tradition, and with the acquisition of territory. Already in 1914 the French Foreign Minister Delcassé informed Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, that French ambitions were not confined to coastal Syria and Palestine; and, although she recognized that she would have to share the administration of the Holy Places with other Powers, France considered that her general rights in Syria extended down to the Egyptian border. Moreover, she claimed portions of south-eastern Asia Minor, and the hinterland of Syria as far as the Persian frontier. In March 1915 she reiterated this claim, and in June of that year the British substantially accepted it. This, then, was the situation while Husayn and McMahon were negotiating; and on this basis it is easy to understand the reticence of McMahon. He certainly knew the extent of French ambitions. But to state explicitly that Great Britain was not prepared to help Arab independence except in the Arab peninsula and, to some extent, in Iraq would not be likely to win over Husayn. Moreover, as Great Britain was not likely herself to accept the whole of French claims when the time came to make definite decisions, it would have been impolitic to define them precisely. Husayn was probably equally familiar with French ambitions, and made his own position perfectly clear by rejecting them *in toto*—again without precise definition—but postponing action on his rejection until after the war. To this McMahon could do no more than he did—warn Husayn that it was unlikely that Britain would be able to exert pressure on France at the conclusion of hostilities.

Although McMahon warned Husayn that the British were unlikely to resist French claims, in actual fact an immediate result of the correspondence was that in November 1915 Sir Edward Grey ordered that negotiations should be opened in London with M. Georges Picot, representative of the French Government, with a view to sorting out British and French ambitions in the Near East. In the opening discussions M. Picot

still insisted on the concession to France of the whole Syrian coast-line down to the Egyptian frontier. But in the end these demands were modified and, as a result of the discussions then initiated, the Sykes-Picot agreement was finally drawn up in May 1916. By this agreement France received British recognition of very far-reaching demands in the northern part of the area under discussion. But she abandoned her pretensions to the southern part of Syria, and accepted the British claim to the Port of Haifa and a stretch of territory adjacent to it; and both agreed to establish an international administration of Palestine, to be set up after consultation with Russia and the other Allies *and with the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca.* Although the phrases describing the future of Palestine are general, it is probable that the negotiators were thinking of the Holy Places in the country rather than the political future of the mainly Arab population. It may be that the previous silence of Husayn implies a recognition that these religious interests would necessitate special treatment. But there is no evidence that he would have considered acceptance of such treatment as tantamount to a complete abandonment of his interest in the political future of the Arab population.

It has been claimed that McMahon's exclusion of an area on the grounds of French interests remained valid even if the French subsequently abandoned their claim to it. This may be legally correct, but it is not obvious to the ordinary reader; and though the British consistently refused to publish the correspondence until 1939, both the letters and the Sykes-Picot Agreement were well known in various versions to the Arabs long before that date. It is not surprising that they saw nothing in the letters which suggested that the reversion of a territory abandoned by France fell to Great Britain and not to the Arabs, or that the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement seemed to them to have a general, and not merely religious, application to Palestine.

No precise or definite decision about Palestine was, in fact, taken between 1915 and the publication of the Balfour Declaration, and, early in January 1918, Commander Hogarth, Head of the Bureau for Arab Affairs in Cairo, was instructed to visit Husayn and inform him both of the proposed administration of Palestine and of the publication of the Balfour Declaration. In this way it might be reasonably claimed that—provided Husayn were satisfied—the conditions of McMahon and of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were fulfilled.

The actual formula concerning Palestine which Commander Hogarth was instructed to deliver began as follows:[1]

[1] Cmd. 5964, pp. 3 *seqq.*

So far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to another, but—

(*a*) In view of the fact that there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs and Holy Places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special régime to deal with these places approved of by the world.

(*b*) As regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

Hogarth gives an official and an unofficial summary of the King's reply. He recorded officially that the King assented, 'saying that brain which could formulate this could devise form of administration to safeguard all interests. He lauded Great Britain's action in case Omar Mosque, comparing Caliph Omar's abstention from Christian shrines in Jerusalem. If we could draw up (similar statement) with omission of reference to political administrative control, he would publish it to all Islam.' To this Hogarth adds a note that 'the King left me in little doubt that he secretly regards this as a point to be reconsidered after the Peace, in spite of my assurance that it was to be a definite arrangement. He compared ourselves and himself (in his habitual homely way) to two persons about to inhabit one house, but not agreed which should take which floor or rooms! Often in the course of our conversations he spoke with a smile of accounts which he would settle after the war, pending which settlement he would press nothing. I doubt if he has any fixed plan or foresees his way; but I have no doubt that in his own mind he abates none of his original demands on behalf of the Arabs, or in the fullness of time, of himself.'

There is no evidence that Commander Hogarth communicated the actual text of the Balfour Declaration to the King. But he was instructed to transmit its general idea in the words:

Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and, further, as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal.

In this connection the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside.

On this subject Hogarth gives his usual double comment. Officially he stated that the 'King seemed quite prepared for formula and agreed enthusiastically, saying he welcomed Jews to all Arab lands. I explained that His Majesty's Government's resolve safeguarded existing local population.' To this he adds that 'the position in regard to this matter is, I think, very much the same as in the preceding case [the administration of Palestine]. The King would not accept an independent Jew State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows little or nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine and his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews.'[1]

Husayn's acceptance of Hogarth's message represents the high-water mark of agreement between British and Arabs over the future of Palestine. Two facts prevented it from being more than a temporary phase in the situation: Palestine was only part of the picture, and Husayn did not directly represent Palestinian opinion. The notes which Hogarth made of the attitude of the King reveal that Husayn had abated none of the claims which are explicit in his letters to McMahon. While he recognized that it was impossible at that time to upset the Franco-British accord he steadfastly withheld any statement which might be interpreted as acceptance of French ambitions in Syria. And he did this now with knowledge of the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. For at the end of 1917 the Russian Government discovered it in the imperial archives, and published it, primarily in the hope of embarrassing its imperialist makers.

Its publication inevitably caused a storm of indignation in Syria, where France, with her well-known ambitions, was intensely unpopular except among the Christian minority and a small educated group. The whole nationalist element regarded her with suspicion, and she had not even acquired any rights or favours by military feats. The defeat of the Turks was being effected by British and Arab troops, and the small French and Italian detachments with the forces played no role of any importance, being attached only for prestige purposes, and to turn a 'British' into an 'Allied' army.

[1] In this Hogarth would appear to be correct. In an article which Husayn wrote in March 1918 in *Al Qibla*, the newspaper which he controlled, he called on the Arabs of Palestine 'to welcome the Jews as brethren and co-operate with them for the common welfare', and he urged them to imitate the Jews in their remarkable work for the restoration of 'their [i.e. the Jews'] sacred and beloved homeland'. *Documents relating to the Palestine Problem*, published by the Jewish Agency, 1945, p. 16.

5. *The Arabs: The Anglo-French Declaration and the Declaration to the Seven*

On the 3 October 1918, Faysal entered Damascus as conqueror. His personal qualities and the fact that he was there as the visible embodiment of an *Arab* victory, ensured him the support of the bulk of the population, while at the same time his presence considerably enhanced the British reputation for friendship to the Arabs. Much of the effect of this was undone a fortnight later when Allenby was obliged to agree to the transference of the administration of the coastal region of Syria from British to French military detachments, although the latter still nominally remained under his supreme control. Some attempt was made to counter-balance the unpopularity which this and similar acts created, by an official Franco-British Declaration, issued on 7 November 1918 by the Military Command, in which it was unequivocally stated that:[1]

> The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.
>
> In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognising these as soon as they are actually established.
>
> Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.

There is ample evidence that the Arabs considered that this Declaration superseded the Secret Treaties, but it quickly became evident that neither Britain nor France so regarded it. In fact, Clemenceau came to London in December to persuade Lloyd George to confirm the old Agreement, and the only modifications the latter proposed were to claim Mosul and Galilee for the

[1] Cmd. 5974, pp. 50–51.

British sphere of influence, and a British, instead of an international, administration of Palestine.

From then onwards France remained completely intransigent on the Syrian question, and did her best to create a party in the country which would be hostile to Faysal and friendly to her own interests. The former object was perhaps easier to achieve than the latter, but even here little success was obtained. It was to the King of as united a nation as could be expected that France presented an ultimatum eighteen months later, demanding that Faysal should unconditionally accept a French Mandate. This was on 14 July 1920. Faysal replied by a formal acceptance of the ultimatum, while privately hoping to appeal to the British for assistance in securing its modification. But on 25 July Damascus was occupied, Faysal deposed, and the French administration established in the city. All pretence was abandoned that the French were in occupation in accordance with the wishes of the population, and a policy of force was adopted to secure French rule.

British ambitions in Syria, as revealed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, were modest and openly strategic. They wanted to occupy the port area of Acre-Haifa, and to ensure that the Government of the Sanjak of Jerusalem could not entertain hostile intentions against the Suez Canal. There is no sign at that date (1916) of their wanting themselves to control the Government of Palestine. Nor does the Balfour Declaration explicitly necessitate that they should do so. The reconstitution of a separate Palestine with approximately its Biblical frontiers, and the translation of an international into a British administration, seem to have been almost an accidental by-product of the British conquest of the country, of the invention of the Mandate system, and of the pressure of the Zionist Organization.

The substitution of a British Mandate for an international administration need not necessarily have prejudiced the British position in the eyes of the Arabs. But this was on one condition only. It had never previously been suggested that anything more was involved in Palestine than an international administration whose *raison d'être* was the safeguarding of existing Holy Places. The emergence of a new *Holy Place* for contemporary world Jewry created an entirely new situation. In so far as Husayn and his family were concerned it might be claimed that the situation was honourably met by the Hogarth message, and the later treaty between the Amir Faysal and Dr. Weizmann which is discussed in the following chapter. But a fundamental alteration of the demographic and economic picture of Palestine was a matter which intimately affected the existing local population

and could not be settled solely by a distant dynasty, however powerful or popular.

When the Balfour Declaration became known in the Middle East, it still further intensified the anxiety felt about Allied intentions. Seven prominent Arabs, living in Cairo at the time, pressed the British Government for a precise definition of their aims, and the British reply, known as the *Declaration to the Seven*,[1] resulted. It is important because part of it unquestionably refers to Palestine. But even in this statement an element of vagueness occurs. It was made in June 1918, when British forces were in occupation of the southern part of the country, roughly on a line from Jerusalem to Jaffa. In this area the British Government stated that they desired to establish a Government *only with the consent of the governed*. To the peoples still under Turkish rule (i.e. including the population of Northern Palestine) they promised *liberty and independence*. From the Arab point of view the two phrases doubtless meant the same thing, and it would be rash to assume that the variation in language implied any deliberate variation in intention of the British. But it is also hard to believe that the latter had realized the difficulties that might arise in reconciling either phrase with their agreement with the French or their promises to the Zionists.

The Declaration to the Seven has not the same solemn formality as the Balfour Declaration, but neither had the Arabs the necessary influence in London or elsewhere for securing so solemn an endorsement of their ambitions. It was, however, a valid Declaration of the British Government and was confirmed by the Anglo-French Declaration of November of the same year. Moreover, both were received in the same good faith by the Arabs to whom they were addressed, as was the Balfour Declaration by the Jews. For the contradiction between them neither Jews nor Arabs could be blamed, but only the British. In law, the Balfour Declaration, at least since its inclusion in the text of the Mandate, might appear to override them; but the technicalities of legal procedure are ill suited to the settlement of such questions. The plain fact is that contradictory promises of equal importance to the people concerned were made by the British authorities, and that in each case they were accepted in good faith by the recipients.

The identification of France with the policy expressed in the

[1] *Declaration to the Seven*. Cmd. 5964. It is sometimes suggested that this Declaration was not known before 1939, but its existence, if not its full text, was known in 1924 to the author of the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. See vol. VI, p. 132. It was not used in Arab propaganda presumably because they were satisfied to rest their claims on their interpretation of the more formal Husayn–McMahon correspondence.

Declaration to the Seven, and the joint Anglo-French proclamation of 7 November of the same year, appeared to solve that part of the problem which dealt with Arab-Allied relations. In the early months of 1919 the Arab-Jewish relationship also appeared near solution. While the Amir Faysal was in Europe as leader of the Arab Delegation, an Agreement was signed on 3 January between him and Dr. Weizmann which expressed the most cordial friendship between the two peoples.[1] A similar expression of friendship was exchanged on 3 March between the Amir and Felix Frankfurter,[2] leader of American Zionists at the Peace Conference. These acts, however, did not lead to any decisive result. Both the Arab and the Zionist Delegations were heard at a formal sitting of the Conference, but the main leaders were too busy to take any final action. Faysal's main interest was Syria, and he proposed the postponement of any decisive action in Palestine, a proposal which suited Lloyd George and the other leaders. The Zionists wanted a phrase passed which would have added to the Balfour Declaration the words that political, administrative and economic conditions were to be established for the National Home which would ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous commonwealth; but this involved too precise a consideration of the position for time to be given it.[3]

The Peace Conference disbanded without solving the problem. The French persisted in their plans for establishing their hegemony over Syria, and Faysal maintained his declaration that it was only if full Arab claims elsewhere were met that he could implement his Agreement with the Zionists. For although it was evident that the matter lay outside the powers of the Jews to influence, he had inserted in the Agreement of 3 January the statement that he desired co-operation with them only on the following condition:[4]

> Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated 4 January 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

[1] The text of the Treaty is given on pp. 33 *seqq.*

[2] The text of the exchange of letters of Faysal and Frankfurter is given by F. F. Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate*, vol. ii, pp. 58 *seqq.*

[3] Dr. Weizmann's Report on his reception is reprinted in *The New Judaea*, vol. xxi, Nos. 1–2, for October–November 1944. It was on this occasion that he used the famous phrase that Palestine should become as Jewish as England was English.

[4] This is the text as given by G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 439.

Chapter Two

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MANDATE

1. *Problems inherent in the Mandate*

IN July 1937 a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the cause of the disturbances in Palestine, stated in a pregnant phrase that 'the present difficulties of the problem in Palestine were all inherent in it from the beginning. Time has not altered, it has only strengthened them.'[1] This statement illustrates the basic difficulty involved in presenting the history of the period between the two wars in Palestine. However much the face of the country might have altered, whatever increase might have taken place in its wealth or population, the basic problem of Palestine in 1939 was as unsolved as it was when it was posed by the developments of the last war, the Peace Treaties and the Mandate. The political history of Palestine was little more than the record of the continuous repetition of the same event. It is a maxim of political philosophy that an *imperium in imperio* is always a danger to the stability of a political society. In Palestine there were two *imperia* profoundly influenced, if not controlled, by two different *imperiis*, supposed to be governed by an administration which in turn was subordinate to two masters, one of whom had authority without contact with the country, and the other of whom had the power of legal or moral condemnation without any executive responsibility.

The Zionist settlers looked naturally to the World Zionist Organization for their inspiration, their decisions, and their support. The Arabs similarly looked to the supreme Moslem Council, the Higher Arab Committee, or the Moslem-Christian Committee, and felt themselves to be an integral part of both the Arab and the Moslem worlds. Their natural advisers and supporters were other Arab States and Moslem groups. And the British Administration had to carry out the orders of a Colonial Office in London and a British Parliament, both somewhat remote from the actualities of the situation, and the latter often ignorant of the effects on the local population of its decisions. Finally the British Government in its turn had to report annually to the Mandates Commission of the Council of the League of Nations, which examined into its Administration from the standpoint of its conformity with a document drawn

[1] Cmd. 5479, p. 62.

up, or at least authorized, by the Council of the League of Nations; but neither the Mandates Commission nor the Council had any executive responsibility for amending what they criticized or carrying out any suggestions they might make. And as the Mandate was supposed to be temporary the British could take no steps to secure the permanent loyalty of the country to themselves. It would be difficult to produce political harmony out of such extraordinary ingredients in any part of the contemporary world.

It is not difficult to recount the actual progress of events from the British conquest of Palestine in 1917–1918 to 1939; but these events mean little in themselves, or rather they have three different meanings when looked at from the standpoint of Arabs, Jews, or the British. Difficult though it may be to achieve, the first essential is to try to look at the history of Palestine as it would have appeared through the eyes of typical representatives of these three parties during the period 1919–1939. An attempt is made to do this in the following paragraphs. Except for the passages in italics, they must, therefore, not be read as the opinion of the author, nor as being, in his view, always founded on fact. It must also be borne in mind that in some respects the war has modified the situation.

It is fairest to begin with Arabs, for they formed nine-tenths of the population of the country at the beginning of the period. From the Arab point of view, 'Palestine' is not a natural term nor are its present frontiers of any historical significance. The 'Palestinian' Arabs consider themselves to be southern Syrians and they wanted to form part of an autonomous Syria. The Commission which was sent out by President Wilson (nominally an Allied Commission, but Britain and France sent no representatives) in 1919 to consult the wishes of the inhabitants was perfectly clear on this point. They found no evidence whatever of a desire for a separate Palestine.

Up to 1914 a good deal of power lay in the hands of the native Arab landlords, and a good deal of profit could be made under the Turkish Administration. The fellaheen were, by common agreement, extremely backward. They were easily roused into being fanatical Moslems, but too lacking in political sense to be called 'Nationalist'. In the towns, however, and among the students, there was a growing group of Arab Nationalists who had been affected by the political ferment which was universal in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Promised independence by the British, or at least believing that they had been promised it, they viewed without serious

misgivings a certain measure of British political control—or, as they would call it, advice—especially in their foreign relations. For they did not believe that the British had any desire to dominate their internal affairs or colonize their actual territory; and many of them must have recognized that some sort of foreign control would have to be accepted to safeguard the Christian Holy Places. But, whatever restrictions they realized to be likely, none of them had envisaged the establishment of a Jewish National Home in the country. None of them had been consulted about it; and they tended to infer—rightly or wrongly—the attitude of the British Local Administration to this invention of London from the fact that General Allenby refused to allow the Balfour Declaration to be officially published in the country.[1] They therefore took no action against the idea of a British Mandate as such, but from the very beginning they refused to discuss the possibility of their accepting the BalfourDeclaration or the text of a Mandate which was based upon it. They have never wavered from this standpoint, and they have in consequence refused to accept any political proposals for their participation in the government of their country which would involve them in recognition of Jewish rights under the Balfour Declaration.

The agreement which was drawn up between Faysal and Dr. Weizmann was not countersigned by any Arab leader coming from Palestinian territory; nor was any such leader consulted by Faysal before he signed it. Moreover, they were, at any rate up to 1939, unmoved by Jewish promises that they had no desire to dominate the country or to diminish Arab rights. Even were they reassured as to the sincerity of these Jewish expressions they would still have maintained that they were meaningless. A limitation of definable political ambitions might indeed be possible, but it could not satisfy them because it is impossible to limit the penetrating but indefinable consequences of the presence of a large minority with whom they could not hope to compete in economic, social, or political experience. They were convinced that the presence of the Jews must inevitably mean ultimate domination by the Jews. There is no comparison between the wealth of the Arab world and the reputed wealth of the Jewish world; there are not Arabs in touch with every British constituency capable of exercising pressure on their Members of Parliament. However sincerely Jews might think or speak otherwise, the Arabs were convinced of their inability to hold their own against the rising flood of Jewish immigration.

During the progress of the twenty years before 1939 they saw,

[1] In actual fact this official silence was due to correct observance of the limited rights of a military occupation.

as they at least considered it, the failure, both of their British friends and of those Arabs who counselled moderation and co-operation, to stem the tide of the Jewish advance. The inevitable result was the passage of power to the extremists. It is regrettable, but natural, that the methods by which extremists in such a country should assert their views should be rebellion, violence, and murder.

Commissions had constantly supported their grievances; they felt that British residents in Palestine and even individual members of the Administration were largely of their point of view; but with Parliament and the Colonial Office they felt that they had no influence, since any measure in their favour was immediately cancelled under the influence of Zionist propaganda. Only with the Macdonald White Paper and the Land Regulations did they begin to feel that justice was being done to them, and even here they feared that in one way or another Jewish influence would undermine the tardy security apparently given them.

From a Western standpoint Arab Nationalism may possess few attractive and many regrettable features. It is almost entirely political, and the amount that Arab Nationalists have done for education or social welfare has been exceedingly small. Moreover it has frequently been true that the most vociferous Nationalist leaders have been only too willing to make much profit for themselves by selling their own land to Jews. But in spite of such blemishes in our eyes it still remains an essential part of the understanding of Palestine to see how, up to the war, the situation appeared to an increasing majority of the Arab population.

The Jewish population equally regard Palestine as their country. It is a great mistake, as has been explained in the previous chapter, to consider that the Balfour Declaration 'gave it to them'. They regard the Balfour Declaration only as a valid international acceptance of their claim, not as establishing or creating it. From the standpoint of the British Government which drew up the actual wording of the Declaration there was an important distinction between the phrase 'the establishment *of* Palestine *as* a National Home for the Jews' and 'the establishment *in* Palestine *of* a National Home for the Jews'. But it is doubtful whether the distinction means anything to the mind of a Zionist. They do not desire to oppress or expel the Arabs, but they regard Palestine as their National Home without any further qualification.

The Zionists were anxious that Great Britain should be the Mandatory Government for various reasons. There was an historic British interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine, and the

British had neither cultural nor territorial interests similar to those of the French in Syria. Politically they were only interested in the country as a bulwark of Imperial communications through the Suez Canal. The Zionists thus felt that their interests and those of the British were admirably consistent with each other. Great Britain would obtain a far more satisfactory bulwark to her communications from a strong, Westernized Jewish Palestine than she could hope to see so long as the country remained in Arab hands. The Jews were perfectly prepared to accept responsibility for military service in order to protect the interests both of themselves and Great Britain. They thus saw no reason why Britain should not support all their ambitions and encourage all their efforts to strengthen their position in the country.

In April 1918 a Zionist Commission arrived in Jerusalem, and it may legitimately be said that Jewish disappointment began from that day. The Commission regarded the military Administration as a temporary executive, whose duty it was to listen to their wishes, co-operate with them in their plans, and see that no hindrance was put in the way of carrying out the Balfour Declaration. They asked for nothing but rights which had been guaranteed them by the Allies; they were prepared to do everything at their own cost, and with their own people; and they were conscious of having no hostile feelings towards the Arab inhabitants of the country. They could not understand how the military Administration could regard them with disfavour, and in some cases with hostility. As the Civil Government came to be established they were shocked to find that many of the previous officials to whom they objected were still employed, and that the same attitude existed among many of the new officials. The first High Commissioner was himself a Jew and one who had submitted the first memorandum on Zionism to the British Cabinet. But Sir Herbert Samuel seemed to them to be primarily anxious to conciliate Arab opinion. In 1921 there were disturbances, and they were pained at the lack of sympathy which the Government attitude seemed to show. It was the Arabs and not themselves who had broken the peace, but they felt that the Commission appointed to examine into the causes of the trouble held them to be ultimately responsible by their mere presence in their own country, and failed to understand the nature of the international guarantee which had been given them. They were refused the right to protect themselves with their own arms and at their own expense, and yet the Government did nothing, or too little, to protect them.

In 1922 the Churchill White Paper restricted their right of

entry to the economic capacity of the country to absorb them.[1] They accepted. In the following year, the text of the Mandate made it clear that, contrary to their expectations, their right of settlement would not extend to Trans-Jordan.[2] Again they bowed to the decision. When fresh rioting broke out in 1929 they again preserved their discipline, but if any unhappy Jew lost his head under the provocation, he was treated on an equality with the Arabs who had begun it. Again a Commission reported and again the Commission tended to lay the blame upon their presence in the country. Following the Commission's report the Government sent an expert to survey possibilities of further agricultural settlement, and the expert reported that there was little room for new settlers until extensive changes had taken place in the agricultural policy of the Government and the Arabs. And even then the expert believed that the number of settlers who could be accommodated would be strictly limited. In a brusque White Paper the Government declared that it accepted the expert's report. This time a storm arose throughout Zionist and, to some extent, non-Zionist Jewry. The Government issued a lame explanation of their policy, with some apology for their brusqueness, and reasserted their intention of carrying out the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists accepted the statement and again promised their loyal co-operation. Four years later trouble broke out again, and in consequence, in 1937, political considerations were added to economic as factors determining the flow of immigration. Again they protested, but again they consented to co-operate. Their situation in the world was growing increasingly desperate. Hitler was in power in Germany and the flood of refugees had begun. Palestine assumed an even more important place in their plans than it had ever done before. For several years immigration had soared and soared. The British Government seemed to realize at last the need for generosity. But the reaction of the Arabs, expressed in violence, showed that they still had power to change the situation. Bit by bit immigration was curtailed. A Royal Commission recommended the partition of the country. The Jews were prepared to consider it, while the Arabs merely continued violence.

Finally, in spite of their reasonableness, in spite of their loyalty, in spite of their overwhelming need, the door was slammed in their faces. Pitiful shiploads of hunted fugitives, coming to Palestine as a last resort, were brutally turned away. Some sank with tragic loss of life. The British Government, which had yielded to almost everyone else in the world, was adamant where these unhappy victims of persecution were concerned. Those

[1] Cmd. 1700, p. 19. [2] Cmd. 1785, pp. 10, 11.

who succeeded in landing were, if caught, hustled into detention camps, and their numbers were deducted from the immigration schedules. The whole magnificent vision of a National Home, built by their own efforts and entirely by their own resources, was imperilled, even destroyed, by the blindness and lack of imagination of the Power with whom they most desired to be friends and to whom they were certain that they could be invaluable allies.

Throughout, the only weapon which they had used against decisions which meant life or death to tens of thousands of their people had been the persuasive power of the written or spoken word. They argued ceaselessly, and it appeared that men were more irritated by their arguments than they were affected by the rebellions, the murders and the destruction wrought by the Arabs. It is not surprising if twenty years of such frustration turned the minds of some of the younger generation towards those who proclaimed that Britain listened only to the man who used bomb and rifle as his arguments.

Throughout the whole period a basic cause of misunderstanding has been the deep divergence of attitude between Jews and British on the nature of the promises made by the latter. From the Jewish standpoint the international ratification of the Mandate made it override all previous promises which might be in conflict with it and left the Administration with no other task than its integral fulfilment. From the British standpoint, both the ideas of 'fair play' and the practical consideration of what is workable need to be taken into account in the carrying out of any legal and formal document. The Jewish arguments against the validity of the promises made to the Arabs have had no practical effect on the British; and their demands for the fulfilment of the Mandate have always been weighed against the immediate consideration of any difficulties—unforeseen by the composers of the Mandate—which fulfilment might involve. It is the conflict between a people with little experience of administration, but a long and bitter experience of the need to cling to rights once they have been won, and a people unaccustomed to consider their political actions by their conformity with a written statute, but with a long experience of practical administration in many fields.

Thirdly, there are the British to consider, both in Jerusalem and in London. The function of a good Administration is to administer, and it was obvious to every British official in the first military Administration that the country in which he was working was an Arab country. And it must be remembered that from the standpoint of the Mandatory Government in Jerusalem,

Palestine never ceased either to be a primarily Arab country in itself, or to be an evident part of the general Arab world. The Arabs still formed 70 per cent of the population in 1939, were much more dependent on the Administration, and were politically more and more affected by, and liable in turn to influence, Arab or Moslem opinion elsewhere.

The 'Occupied Enemy Territory Administration', which was in control when the Zionist Commission originally came to Palestine, was composed largely of army officers. It is not surprising that they and, to some extent, their successors in the Civil Administration found it much easier to understand—and be understood by—the Arabs, whether peasants, middle class, or land-owners, than the eastern-European Jews who formed the bulk of the Zionist officials and immigrants. The relations between these Jews and British officials were new to both parties; the establishment of a National Home involved actions for which they could turn to no precedents; and it is not surprising if Jews and officials often found each other difficult to deal with. Officials were constantly irritated by the attitude of the Jews; Zionist reports were more in the nature of propaganda documents than Government Blue Books; and the Zionists on their side often found the Administration cold and unsympathetic. The British Government in England and the Mandate itself both clearly put the advancement of the National Home in the forefront of the picture, and expected the Administration in Jerusalem to make its main task the furtherance of this project. But to expect any Administration to regard the actual country which it is administering, and the bulk of its inhabitants, as merely of secondary interest, is to ask it to be a bad Administration. Zionists have constantly complained that the British in Palestine hold the scales even between themselves and the Arabs. It is really a tribute to their desire to carry out the duties laid upon them by London and Geneva that they should so do. So long as the clash between Jews and Arabs continued, so long would it be impossible to expect more of the actual Administration of the country. If there were to be a change it could not be from them that it should come, for an Administration carries out rather than creates policy.

Finally, the Administration was effectively debarred from whole fields of creative action by the fact that it was only a *temporary* Administration, existing, under the terms of the Mandate, until the country could govern itself. Its 'subjects' were not British subjects. It could not set up the Crown as a symbol of loyalty, or attempt to make itself the uniting force between the rival nationalisms. No tradition could grow around

it. It had no flag, its language had no exclusive official standing, the traditions it established had no roots. It could build for no future in which it would play a part.

The position as it was seen by the Houses of Parliament and the Colonial Office was a very different one. There is no doubt that many leaders in public life, in Parliament and outside, were genuinely inspired by the greatness of the vision involved in the restoration of the Jews to their ancient homeland. The idea had recurred all through nineteenth-century British political history. The project was indeed a magnificent one, and the idea that the British should be involved in it had both religious and practical appeal. But even those who regarded the world from a more pedestrian standpoint could not ignore the problem, for they were subjected to constant pressure, and the ambitions and difficulties of the National Home were frequently brought to their attention by skilful propaganda. In many urban constituencies a local Zionist Organization made it its duty to bring before its Member the problems and possibilities of Zionism. And the World Zionist Organization maintained an office in London, one of whose main tasks was the transmission to the British Government, by every means in its power, of the wishes of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the resolutions of the biennial World Zionist Congress.

It is not surprising that the British Government and the Colonial Office constantly reiterated their intention to carry out the Balfour Declaration. For the case which was put forward by the Arabs was a singularly unconstructive one, which made little appeal to the bulk of the British Members of Parliament; and the material which the Arabs put out was full of such wild exaggerations that it did little to further their cause. It was the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission in 1937 *that for the first time made the Government take seriously the fact that the Mandate had proved unworkable and that Arab opposition could not be brushed aside. But it was only at the St. James's Conference at the beginning of* 1939 *that they faced the fact that their promises to the Arabs were far more definite, and their exclusion of Palestine from these promises far less definite, than they had hitherto claimed. Even so it is doubtful whether the Macdonald White Paper and Land Regulations would have been accepted by Parliament had it not been for the party discipline of which the Government made use to secure their passage. It was the first time that Parliament faced their responsibility for finding a new solution to the Palestine problem and it is interesting that at the conclusion of the debate on the White Paper over* 100 *Government supporters abstained from voting.*

When the Zionist Commission arrived in the spring of 1918, it found a great deal of work waiting to be done. Its terms of reference have already been given in Chapter I,[1] and its official character described. The Jewish population had been reduced by the Turks to little more than 50,000 and many of the Jewish settlements had been stripped bare or destroyed. Its first task was therefore relief, and the rescue of Jewish refugees from Judaea still in Egypt; the northern settlements were still in Turkish hands and nothing could be done about them until later.

Three actions of the Commission indicate the Jewish conception of the National Home. In 1918 three preparatory assemblies were called in Jaffa in order to create a democratic organ for the management of Jewish affairs. At these meetings arrangements were made for the calling of a Constituent Assembly in October 1920. This Assembly elected the first Va'ad Leumi, or Jewish National Council, a body which has been recognized as the representative organ of Palestinian Jewry ever since. The second action of the Commission was the laying of the foundation stones of a Hebrew University on Mount Scopus outside Jerusalem. This took place on 24 July 1918. The third was an address by Dr. Weizmann, given under the auspices of Sir Ronald Storrs, Military Governor of Jerusalem, to the Moslem and Christian leaders in Jerusalem, in which he denied that the Zionists were seeking political power, and asked for common progress towards a joint autonomy.[2]

As a proof of Zionist goodwill towards the Arabs Dr. Weizmann, on 3 January 1919, signed a 'treaty' of friendship with the Amir Faysal, who was officially regarded as the representative of the Arab people. Legally this document could bind neither the Palestinian Government nor the Arabs, since Dr. Weizmann was not a plenipotentiary of the British Government, and the Amir had no authority over Palestine. But in so far as their respective peoples were concerned, both parties to the treaty were men occupying the highest positions. The text is in English with a postscript in Arabic, and runs as follows:[3]

> His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the

[1] See p. 12.
[2] Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, Nicholson & Watson, 1937, p. 400.
[3] Antonius, p. 437.

closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I

The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in their respective territories.

Article II

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

Article III

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of 2 November 1917.

Article IV

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.

Article V

No regulation nor law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with the free exercise of religion; and further the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall for ever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Article VI

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

Article VII

The Zionist Organisation proposes to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will place the aforementioned Commission at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will use its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

Article VIII

The parties hereto agree to act in complete accord and harmony in all matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

Article IX

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at LONDON, England, the THIRD day of JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NINETEEN.

(*Translation*)

Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated 4 January 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

FAISAL IBN HUSAYN (*In Arabic*)
CHAIM WEIZMANN

From the same period date two letters exchanged at Paris between the American Zionist leader, Dr. Frankfurter, and the Amir, which express similar sentiments of friendship.[1]

In July 1920 the provisional Military Administration came to an end, and Sir Herbert Samuel arrived as High Commissioner of the first Civil Administration. In August official immigration began and by December over 8,000 new settlers had arrived and 3,000 residents had returned from Egypt and elsewhere. In the two following years the number of new settlers was approximately the same, and by the end of 1922 the National Home had risen almost to 80,000.

In October 1920 Land Registries were reopened, and it became possible legally to purchase land. At that date Jewish landholding amounted to 137,000 acres, of which 5,600 belonged to the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*) which had been created in 1904 for this purpose.[2] By the end of 1922 some 30,000

[1] Andrews, vol. ii, p. 58.

[2] The Jewish National Fund purchases land in the name of the Jewish people, and leases it to those who work it. No land which has come into its hands may be alienated. This is the first complaint of the Arabs against it. The second is that it is a condition of the leases granted by the Fund that only Jewish labour should be employed. The reason, however, is clear. Zionism was attempting to transform urban youth into genuine peasantry. The older Zionist settlements had employed Arab labour for the heavy and lower-paid work, and it was to prevent the extension of this system that the regulation was introduced. In actual fact, very few paid labourers at all work on the land of the J.N.F. and many Zionist leaders would be ready to abandon this condition in the J.N.F. leases.

acres of new land had been acquired. Of these, 12,500 were owned by the National Fund.

Industry also developed during these first years, and over £P600,000 was invested in industrial projects before the end of 1922. Most businesses were small, but an important flour mill, an oil factory, and a cement factory were established at Haifa which, with its growing harbour (and since 1934 with the terminus of the Iraq Oil Line), became the most important industrial centre in the country. In Jaffa and around Tel Aviv other factories were built; and beginnings were made with the Palestine Electric Corporation which was to supply nearly the whole country with electric light and power from its three stations, on the Jordan, at Haifa, and near Tel Aviv. The first steps were also taken to provide the growing Home with industrial and agricultural credits by means of loan banks and trust companies.

Social welfare was dealt with both by a vigorous Labour Organization, the Histadruth, and by the development of the medical work of American Women Zionists (the *Hadassah*), which had already been working during the war, and which began to cover the country with the network of hospitals and clinics which have made Palestine unique in the Middle East, and have indeed provided it with better services than are available in many parts of Europe. In education there was similar activity. Primary schools were established in the growing colonies, and a Technical College at Haifa catered for industry, as did an Agricultural Institute at Tel Aviv for land settlement. As the crown of the system, the Hebrew University quickly developed into an important research centre. The first faculties to be established were those of chemistry, micro-biology, and Oriental studies, faculties whose results in the fields of culture and of science might best serve the National Home.

It is not surprising that the White Paper of 1922 was already able to describe the Jewish National Home in the following words:[1]

> During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with

[1] Cmd. 1700, p. 19.

its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride.

Meanwhile, the Government had also been active in its own field. The Military Administration had made a good beginning, but it was precluded from any fundamental reorganization of the country by the nature of its authority. A start was made with the essential task of surveying and recording the ownership of the land. The system of taxation was regularized, and help was given to the peasantry by the reduction of tithe. Loans were also made to them to the extent of nearly half a million pounds, to enable them to replace their losses during the war. Law was codified; the Moslem Courts were recognized and Moslem funds which had previously been confiscated by Constantinople were restored to their original purposes. The railways and roads, which the war had left in a bad condition, were put in order and many miles of new road were opened. An attack was made on disease, especially on eye diseases and malaria; and the Government co-operated with the Jewish organizations in this work.

Yet all this work was begun on a curiously vague basis. The Peace Conference had decided that the Arab territories should not be returned to Turkey, and a 'Mandate' for Palestine was allotted to Great Britain in 1920; but no treaty had yet been signed with Turkey, and no definite constitution for Palestine was in operation. Both these latter events took place only in 1923. Apart from the fact that this position was irregular by international law, it involved the serious disadvantage that it left the Arabs extremely uncertain of their precise status. The Jews had their charter in the Balfour Declaration, and the Zionist Commission had in 1921 been transformed into a permanent body, the Palestine Zionist Executive, which had a definite status in the country and direct access to the Government both in Jerusalem and, through the central office of the Zionist Organization, in London. The Arabs had nothing equivalent in either centre of British authority.

Official British feelings about the future development of the country at this period may be gauged from the report of an inter-

been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine.*

The Legislative Council of 1923 was to be a development of the Advisory Council of 10 official and 10 nominated members which the Civil Administration had created on its formation. Of the nominated members 4 were Moslems, 3 were Jews, and 3 were Christian Arabs. During the early years of the Samuel Administration this Council functioned satisfactorily, and this appeared sufficient evidence to justify the belief that experience would dissolve the fears of the Arabs, and lead to real co-operation between the various parties in the country.

3. *The Formulation of Arab Opposition*

But it has to be admitted that all efforts to satisfy the Arabs were unavailing. The attitude they adopted on first hearing of the Balfour Declaration was never modified. In July 1919 a Syrian Arab Congress, attended by Arabs from the southern parts of the country, i.e. Palestine, had already laid down what was to be the permanent Palestinian Arab point of view, in the two following resolutions:[1]

7. We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common.
8. We desire that there should be no dismemberment of Syria, and no separation of Palestine or the coastal regions in the west or the Lebanon from the mother country; and we ask that the unity of the country be maintained under any circumstances.

A gathering of Palestinian Arabs at about the same time expressed its opposition to the National Home even more strongly.

There was a small outbreak of violence in Jerusalem in 1920, and in the spring of 1921 there were serious riots in Jaffa which

[1] Quoted in Antonius, p. 441.

were followed by attacks on several Jewish settlements. The casualties on both sides were considerable, most of the Jews being the victims of the Arabs, and most of the Arabs victims of the military police. The Commission which was appointed to inquire into these disturbances, and which was presided over by Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, was convinced that alarm at the National Home was the real cause of these riots.[1] Apart from such an explanation they considered that their duration was inexplicable; for the rumours and reports which started the actual violence were not only false, but could have been proved to be false by the simplest inquiry on the part of the Arabs. The outbreak could only be understood when it was related, not to precise Jewish behaviour on 1 May when the rioting started, but to the feelings generated by the policy of the Jewish leaders of the National Home. These feelings had been re-expressed by the third Arab Palestine Congress at a meeting in March 1921 which demanded that[2]

1. The Principle of a National Home for the Jews be abolished.
2. A National Government be created which shall be responsible to a parliament elected by the Palestinian people who existed in Palestine before the War.
3. A stop be put to Jewish immigration until such time as a National Government is formed.
4. Laws and regulations before the War be still carried out and all others framed after the British occupation be annulled, and no new laws be created until a National Government comes into being.
5. Palestine should not be separated from her sister States.

These demands were communicated at once to the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Churchill, accompanied by a long memorandum emphasizing Arab loyalty to, and friendship with, Great Britain, and the despair which had been created by the betrayal of their friendship. Neither the memorandum nor the demonstration of violence had any effect upon the Colonial Office, and in February 1922 a Palestine Arab Delegation visited Great Britain to present their complaints in person to the British Government. Mr. Churchill received the delegation and put into their hands a draft Order in Council which embodied a scheme for the Government of Palestine. He asked for their detailed criticisms, but the Delegation retorted that they could not criticize details as the only satisfactory scheme would be one which would provide for the creation of a National Independent Government in accordance with the spirit of Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the

[1] Cmd. 1540, conclusions, pp. 50 *seqq.*, *passim.*
[2] Quoted from Andrews, II, p. 75.

Covenant of the League of Nations. Mr. Churchill's reply was not only to reassert the pledge given to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration, but to make it quite clear to the Arabs that it was the existence of that pledge which prevented the realization of their hopes. Nobody at the time seems to have realized the inevitable conclusions which the Arabs would be bound to draw from so frank an explanation, or that all real hopes of Arab co-operation with the policy of the Mandate were from that moment doomed to frustration. The sentence quoted on a previous page, by which Jewish hopes were also limited, offered no satisfactory compensation. Mr. Churchill's actual words were as follows:[1]

> The position is that His Majesty's Government are bound by a pledge which is antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they cannot allow a constitutional position to develop in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the Principal Allied Powers, which may make it impracticable to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies.
>
> For this reason Mr. Churchill is unable to accede to the second of the six requests [the demand for a National Government] made by your Delegation at the close of your letter under reply. If your Delegation really represents the present attitude of the majority of the Arab population of Palestine, and Mr. Churchill has no grounds for suggesting that this is not the case, it is quite clear that the creation at this stage of a national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British Government to the Jewish people. It follows that the Principal Allied Powers, concerned as they were to ensure the fulfilment of a policy adopted before the Covenant was drafted, were well advised in applying to Palestine a somewhat different interpretation of Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant than was applied to the neighbouring countries of Iraq and Syria. His Majesty's Government are ready and willing to grant to the people of Palestine the greatest measure of independence consistent with the fulfilment of the pledges referred to.

4. *The Issue of the Mandate*

In the same year the text of the Mandate for Palestine was issued.[2] The preamble to the document might have been written in 1917, for it ignored the whole series of events on the Arab side which had made their attitude transparently clear between 1919 to 1922. No mention is made in it of any promises to the Arabs, and there is no attempt even to put them on a parity with the Jews. It is not necessary to quote all the clauses of the Mandate; those which are important for the understanding of

[1] Cmd. 1700, p. 6.

[2] Cmd. 1785.

the Jewish and Arab positions are in the Preamble and the following articles:

Preamble

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 2 November 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 7

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

Article 11

. . .

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

Article 15

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 22

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or

money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

The Preamble is interesting in that it not only recites the Balfour Declaration, but adds a phrase which was missing in the Declaration; it recognizes the historical Jewish connexion with Palestine as the ground for *re*-constituting the National Home. But it will be observed that it makes no mention of any promises made to the Arabs. The second Article makes the *political* development of Palestine dependent upon the Jewish National Home, thereby reaffirming Mr. Churchill's statement to the Arabs already quoted. The fourth Article, although on a careful reading it does *not* entitle the Zionists to participate in the *government* of the country, yet gives them such a privileged position in its *development* that it is not at all unnatural that the Arabs, or indeed anybody else, should be unable to distinguish the exact point at which 'advising', 'co-operating', 'assisting', and 'taking part' cease and practical governing begins. The sixth Article has been constantly brought up by Jews in their complaints against the restrictions imposed on immigration and land purchase; in the same way the eleventh is constantly cited by the Arabs who claim that it unfairly introduced an unjustifiable favouritism in the placing of contracts. The Rutenberg concession, although granted to a public company and not to the Agency, still excites Arab indignation.

But the Mandate was not only a disappointing document from the standpoint of the Arabs. It created a situation—perhaps inevitably—which rendered the task of the Administration as difficult as it could possibly be. For it definitely precluded the Government from becoming itself a centre of loyalty and moral authority sufficiently important to embrace the two rival loyalties of Jews and Arabs within a larger whole. This was perhaps inevitable since the Mandate was supposed to be temporary. But it is to be noticed that it provided for no national flag, anthem, or holidays; it gave the Government no effective control of religious administrations in a country where religion is easily used for political ends; and above all it allowed each community control of its own schools, so that education became a factor making for permanent division rather than for gradual unity and consolidation. It is true that on paper the Administration could prevent religion and education from undermining public order. But this negative power in practice meant only that it could use force in the last resort.

The Mandate came into operation on 29 September 1923, and it is unfortunate that it was only after the issue of this basic

document, which formed the organic law of the country and which could only be modified with the consent of the League of Nations, that the Colonial Office, now presided over by the Duke of Devonshire, suggested that the Arabs might be mollified if an Arab Agency were set up parallel to the Jewish Agency. Not unnaturally the Arabs regarded this as so inadequate as to be insulting. The Jewish Agency had the sacred and unalterable character of inclusion in the Mandate of the League of Nations; the Arab Agency was to be created, and could presumably be abolished, merely by the British Government.

While there is nothing in the Mandate to conciliate Arab feelings the mere fact that a decision had been taken, and that the constitution of the country was now established, must have made many Arabs feel that the game was lost, and that it would be wisest to make the best of things. It was a number of years before the extremists again felt sufficiently powerful to menace public security; but they obtained the rejection of the Legislative Council proposed in 1923, and official Arab co-operation with the Government was withheld thereafter. The Arab members of the existing Advisory Council resigned, and the Government was unable to replace them. Yet an Arab Moderate Party came on the scene, and the extremists did not hold a Congress between 1923 and 1927. Thus it was not unnatural that Sir Herbert Samuel, on retiring from office in 1925, should have been able to give an optimistic picture of the country, and to have felt that the worst was now over and that the actual impartiality of the Administration, together with the visible evidence of the good intentions of the Zionists, had dispelled the exaggerated feelings of the Arabs in the earlier days. But together with a good administration Samuel had unwittingly bequeathed to his successors the Administration's greatest enemy—Haj Amin el Husseini, whom he had appointed Mufti of Jerusalem in 1922. Haj Amin had been convicted of inciting the Arabs to riot in 1921; he was at the centre of the disturbances in 1929 and from 1933 onwards.

Samuel was succeeded by Lord Plumer, and the prestige of the great Field-Marshal was enough to ensure the peace. This period of tranquillity may also owe something to the fact that in 1926 the National Home suffered its first severe economic crisis. Immigration had mounted steadily, and in 1925 reached 33,801; but in 1926 it fell to 13,081. In that year, 7,365 left the country, and actually in 1927 there were more Jews leaving the National Home than entering it; for immigration only amounted to 2,713, while 5,071 emigrated elsewhere.

Although there was grumbling about the economic situation,

the Arabs must have felt that after all their main fears were unjustified and the problem was going to solve itself without their participation. But in 1928 the tide turned and although there was still a steady flow from Palestine, the number of new arrivals exceeded the departures by ten, and in the following year net immigration stood at 3,503. Lord Plumer left in 1928 and was succeeded by Sir John Chancellor. The same year trouble began again. This time the ostensible reason was religious. The Arabs were inflamed by the circulation of a story that the Jews had designs upon the Moslem sanctuaries on the site of the ancient Jewish Temple. It is significant that in this case, as in the case of the riots of 1921, the story which actually caused the rioting was entirely fictitious. Nobody has ever been able to produce evidence that responsible Jews have had any such designs, but a year of agitation stirred the peasantry to frenzy, and in 1929 occurred riots more serious than in 1921.

5. *The Riots of* 1929 *and their Consequences*

It is not necessary to describe the riots in any detail. Following the precedent of 1921, the Government appointed a Commission to inquire into their causes, and to suggest methods of preventing their recurrence. The Commission was presided over by Sir Walter Shaw, late Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements. But before it had started its work the Colonial Office, on 4 September 1929, announced that the Government had no idea of reconsidering either the British tenure of the Mandate or the policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration. This official view that Arab grievances had no substantial basis perhaps explains the statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in a speech made at the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations on the day preceding the Colonial Office's announcement, when he said that 'this was no conflict between Moslem and Jew', but 'simply an uprising of lawlessness and disorder'. It is not surprising that the Commission found itself unable to agree with the Prime Minister although, obedient to the Colonial Office, it did not go into the question of the Mandate and the Declaration. But it stated quite clearly that it was dealing with no casual outbreak of lawlessness. In its analysis of the causes it passed right away from the religious incidents at the Wailing Wall, with which the outbreak had begun, to Arab indignation with their political condition. 'There can, in our view,' reported the Commission, 'be no doubt that racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future, was the

fundamental cause of the outbreak.'[1] The economic fear of the Arabs it emphasized again in a subsequent paragraph:[2]

> In pre-war days the Jews in Palestine, regarded collectively, had formed an unobtrusive minority; individually many of them were dependent on charity for their living, while many of the remainder—in particular the colonists—brought direct and obvious material benefits to the inhabitants of the area in which they settled. The Jewish immigrant of the post-war period, on the other hand, is a person of greater energy and initiative than were the majority of the Jewish community of pre-war days. He represents a movement created by an important international organisation supported by funds which, judged by Arab standards, seem inexhaustible. To the Arabs it must appear improbable that such competitors will in years to come be content to share the country with them. These fears have been intensified by the more extreme statements of Zionist policy and the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrants not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future.

One of the real difficulties inherent in the situation was brought out in another conclusion of the Commission that:[3]

> Though Jewish immigration and enterprise have been of great advantage to Palestine, the direct benefit to individual Arabs, which alone is likely to be appreciated, has been small, almost negligible, by comparison with what it might have been had the pre-war methods of settlement been continued.

It is easier for an individual Arab to consider his individual misfortune than to reflect objectively on the general situation in the country. No serious examination of the facts of Jewish immigration can escape the conclusion that the *country*, and consequently the general Arab population, have benefited enormously from Zionist activity. But the Commission adds a timely reminder that the political value of this general conclusion can be too easily limited by *individual* fears and disappointments in a situation of political ferment. Finally, the Commission came as near as it dared to raising the fundamental issue by recording that:[4]

> From the beginning the two races had no common interest. They differed in language, in religion, and in outlook. Only by mutual toleration and by compromise could the views of the leaders of the two peoples have been reconciled and a joint endeavour for the common good have been brought about. Instead, neither side had made any sustained attempt to improve racial relationships. The

[1] Cmd. 3530, p. 150. One member of the Commission, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Snell, while not wholly denying this, thought that a number of other factors were of greater importance than they appeared to his colleagues.
[2] Cmd. 3530, p. 151. [3] Ibid., p. 152. [4] Ibid., p. 153.

Jews, prompted by eager desire to see their hopes fulfilled, have pressed on with a policy at least as comprehensive as the White Paper of 1922 can warrant. The Arabs, with unrelenting opposition, have refused to accept that document and have prosecuted a political campaign designed to counter Jewish activities and to realise their own political ambitions.

The two most important practical recommendations were: firstly, that a clear statement of the policy of the Government was essential, and secondly, that a scientific survey of the land must be made so that it might be discovered how much was available for settlement.

In presenting the report of the Commission to Parliament, the Government issued a statement of policy in which they announced that Sir John Hope Simpson had been asked to make a land survey immediately. Further political decisions were delayed until that survey was completed.

Sir John Hope Simpson, who had had previous experience with the settlement of Greeks consequent upon the exchange of population with Turkey, reached Jerusalem on 20 May 1930. He was given very little time for his inquiry, with the result that many of his detailed facts and figures have been subsequently challenged. But these do not affect the main argument of his report, which was presented to the Colonial Office on 22 August, and which affirmed that there was little land available in Palestine for further agricultural settlement until radical improvements had been made in the existing system of Arab cultivation. The Government again presented the report to Parliament simultaneously with a statement of policy, the Passfield White Paper, which in rather a 'schoolmasterish' tone criticized many Zionist activities, especially the National Fund leases and the Histadruth. Its main announcement was that Jewish immigration figures would be issued after consideration of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment.

In order to understand the storm of indignation which this White Paper produced throughout the Jewish world, it is necessary to realize the extent to which British and Zionist views had diverged since 1917. In 1917 British as well as Jews had envisaged the possibility of Palestine being transformed into a Jewish State. The Jews have maintained this hope throughout, even when they have recognized that the process might take generations. But the Churchill statement in 1922 proclaimed the practical abandonment by the British of any idea that the Jews should, through British action, ever dominate the Arabs. The Jews have accepted this statement officially, but have still maintained the hope that immigration would ultimately give

them numerical superiority in the country. They have discovered that 'economic absorptive capacity' is elastic, and that the more Jews who come, the more possibilities are opened for yet more to come. In the publication of the Hope Simpson Report the British Government appeared to take a step still further away from the Declaration by declaring that they saw no possibility of enough Jews entering the country for them ever to become a majority. It was the realization that the policy initiated by Lord Passfield condemned the National Home to be a permanent minority in the country, as well as the brusque language in which Lord Passfield announced it, that led to the violent outburst of Jewish indignation, and to the resignation of Dr. Weizmann and other leaders of the Jewish Agency. There was a storm of British indignation also when the report was debated in the House of Commons, and finally the Prime Minister laid before Parliament a letter which he had written to Dr. Weizmann explaining the Passfield White Paper, a letter which was accepted by the Jewish Agency as reopening the possibility of co-operation with the British Government. But though the latter reaffirmed their determination to carry out the Balfour Declaration the letter could not, of itself, change the facts which Sir John Hope Simpson had revealed.

And yet on the surface the immigration of the next five years appeared to be a striking refutation of Sir John's thesis that opportunities for the entry of agricultural labour were limited. For just as the world was plunging into the worst depression which it had known, Palestine began a boom of prosperity which continued to produce an ever-increasing revenue for the Government and increased prosperity for the National Home. It appeared as though there was no limit to the rule that immigration produced employment. The higher the numbers that came, the greater the demand by the Jewish Agency for certificates for new labour immigration. But in fact a very high percentage of this immigration was urban rather than rural, and, though agricultural settlements increased steadily throughout the period, the figure did not exceed Sir John's estimate of a possible absorption into agriculture of 20,000 families. Moreover, a very large number of immigrants were absorbed into the building trade and into citrus-growing. Of these it is evident that the first cannot continue indefinitely; there comes a point at which an adequate number of houses has been built and the trade is bound to decline. Likewise it has been the experience of all countries which have rapidly expanded crops similar to Palestine citrus that the elasticity of the world market is a dangerously unknown factor. Yet, in spite of these indications of something

artificial in the Palestinian boom, there is no doubt that a very real measure of solid prosperity was achieved in these years and that the Palestine economy was stabler than some of its critics thought. There was a permanent contribution made to the character of the National Home in the large number of refugees from Nazi Germany who contributed to the high total of immigration. Many were able to come with considerable amounts of capital. Investments in land, in citriculture, in industry, and transport, amounted to £2,835,000 in 1932, and in 1933 to £5,630,000.

6. *The Disturbances from* 1933 *to* 1939

The immigration for 1933, which officially amounted to 30,327, and which was supplemented by a considerable illegal immigration, roused Arab fears to a new intensity. Their alarm was not lessened by the fact that the Jewish Press, expressing its enthusiasm at the arrival of shipload after shipload of immigrants, began to calculate the point at which Jews would become the actual majority of the country. In the spring of 1933, the Arabs declared a boycott of the Government, and refused it co-operation in the fields where it still existed. In October there were riots in Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and it is significant that these riots were directed entirely against the British Government and ignored the Jews.

Yet such was the situation in Europe that this fresh evidence of insecurity in Palestine had no effect on immigration. The Nazi régime in Germany and the growth of antisemitism in Poland made the risks in Palestine appear trifling. In 1934 it rose to a new official total of 42,359, and again there was a good deal of illegal immigration to be added. The Arabs replied by various legal or illegal measures, such as attempting to prevent Arab land-owners selling to Jews, but these efforts had only limited success in their own fields, and did nothing to curb immigration. For in 1935 it rose once again to the astonishing figure of 61,854.

On 25 November 1935 the five Arab parties united to present Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had succeeded Sir John Chancellor as High Commissioner in 1931, with three demands: the creation of a democratic Government; the prohibition of the sale of Arab land to Jews; and the cessation of immigration. To the second and third of these demands the High Commissioner could make no response so long as the policy of the British Government was the maintenance of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. To the first he replied that he was authorized by the Colonial Office to put forward a proposal to form a Legislative Council

consisting of 28 members, of whom only 5 would be officials, 11 would be nominated, and 12 elected; of these 23, 11 would be Moslems, 7 Jews, 3 Christians, and 2 representatives of commerce. The whole would be presided over by a president who would be some impartial person not connected with Palestine. The Arab leaders were disposed to accept the proposal. The Zionist Congress and the Jewish Agency reluctantly but categorically rejected it. In February and March 1936 it was debated in both Houses of Parliament and was equally categorically rejected as endangering the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration. The Government spokesmen found no supporters among those who spoke in the House of Lords and only two in the House of Commons. This treatment by the British Parliament of a scheme proposed by the British Government, endorsed by the Administration of Palestine and accepted by the Arabs, seemed to the last-named yet one more example of the power of the Zionist Organization to sabotage any effort to satisfy Arab aspirations.

Their indignation was stimulated by the fact that in the same month France negotiated a treaty with Syria which (had it been ratified by the French Government) would give that country complete independence in three years; while Britain was at the same time negotiating a similar treaty with Egypt. On 20 April 1936 the Arabs declared a general strike. It was observed throughout the country, and was accompanied by violence which rapidly assumed the proportions of a rebellion. The Arab leaders declared that they would continue the strike until the Government accepted the three main points of their programme, the cessation of Jewish immigration, the prohibition of land sales, and the creation of a democratically elected National Government. A month later a conference of 150 leaders extended the strike into a campaign of full civil disobedience, including a boycott of the Jews, and refusal to pay taxes to the Government.

The reply of the Government to the steady increase of violence throughout the country was twofold. It issued an Order which allowed the imposition of collective fines on towns and villages in or near which rioting had occurred, but where the actual culprits could not be discovered. This action was at first declared illegal by the Palestine High Court, but the Court's decision was overruled by further legislation of the Government. In the second place the Government was granted emergency powers, although it turned out to be extremely reluctant to use them. It probably felt that additional severity would only lead to further rioting. At the same time, Sir Arthur Wauchope made three offers to the Arab leaders in the hope that these would

induce them to call off the strike and restrain their followers from acts of violence. Some time previously there had been a proposal to send an Arab Delegation to London to discuss the situation with the Colonial Office. This had not materialized, owing to the inability of the Arabs to agree on the membership of the Delegation. The High Commissioner offered to suspend the labour schedule of immigration until the Delegation had discussed the matter with the Colonial Office. If no Arab Delegation went to London, he proposed that a British Parliamentary committee should come to Palestine to discuss matters with the Arabs there. Thirdly, he suggested a combined British-Arab-Jewish Committee to examine the absorptive capacity of the country. Still further to appease the Arabs the Colonial Secretary, Mr. J. H. Thomas, made an announcement in the House of Commons on 18 May that, though the British would not yield on the fundamental issue of the maintenance or abolition of the Mandate, the Government proposed to send a Royal Commission to Palestine as soon as disorder had ceased. The Royal Commission would examine the whole question of the Administration of the country and make proposals for the future.

The seriousness of the situation was emphasized by the fact that at the end of June the Mandatory Administration received a letter signed by 137 of its own senior Arab officials and judges, declaring that in spite of their loyalty to the Administration they were so largely in sympathy with the causes which had led to the Arab strike that they could not urge on their fellow Arabs its abandonment until the burning question of Jewish immigration was regulated in accordance with Arab sentiment.[1]

During all this time more and more troops were coming into the country, but disorder and bloodshed continued unabated. Finally, on 11 October 1936, after 125 days of violence, the official strike came to an end, largely through the intervention with the Arab Higher Committee of the Governments of neighbouring Arab powers. The official cessation of the strike encouraged the British Government to make arrangements for the departure of the Royal Commission, which was to be presided over by Earl Peel. But it announced that it would not leave for Palestine until order was completely restored. This intention it was not able to maintain; and sporadic disorder was still continuing when the Royal Commission arrived in Jerusalem on Armistice Day 1936. The Commission was boycotted by the Arabs from the very beginning, and it was only in the last days before it left Jerusalem that a few Arab leaders consented to come before it. But they came to make carefully prepared speeches, emphasizing

[1] Cmd. 5479, App. II, p. 401.

in the most exaggerated terms the claims and grievances of the Arabs. There was no general examination of Arab witnesses and no opportunity to hear anything except the extremists' case.

Although the Commission had been unable to go into the question with the Arabs, this ultimately made little difference to its knowledge of the situation. The Arab case was neither subtle nor difficult to understand. The result was that it was able to draw up the most complete and comprehensive survey of the Palestinian situation which had yet appeared. But it did not attempt to examine the fundamental question of the compatibility of the Balfour Declaration with the promises made to the Arabs during the war. It drew attention to the fact that the Arabs considered that various promises had been made to them, and that they cited the McMahon correspondence in support of their contention, but it also stated that it had not itself seen the McMahon correspondence and did not consider it part of its duty to examine it.

The conclusion to which the Royal Commission came was unexpected. Their Report admitted that there were a number of points on which the Administration might have acted with greater wisdom or greater energy, but it expressed a serious doubt whether faults of the Administration, to which it drew attention, were the real cause of the breakdown in government. Even if it was not prepared to condemn the terms in which the Mandate was issued in 1923, it stated quite categorically that the Mandate had become unworkable by 1936. Not wishing to terminate the Report with this entirely negative conclusion, the Commission went beyond its terms of reference to assert that the only way to secure peace in the future seemed to be the partition of the country between the two sections of its population. It tentatively suggested a frontier which would leave the hill-country and the south in the hands of the Arabs, and the Maritime Plain from Tel Aviv northwards, together with the hill-country of Galilee and the 'Emek' or Valley of Esdraelon, in the hands of the Jews. Jerusalem itself, and certain other cities, were to be left as temporary or permanent Mandates of Great Britain.

The Royal Commission's Report was published in July 1937. Violence had continued sporadically all through the intervening months. But the publication of the Report led to an immediate increase in the ferocity of the rebellion.

In spite of the unrest in the country, the Zionists were able to continue to make progress. Although the figure of over 61,000 immigrants for 1935 was not maintained, 29,727 entered the country in 1936 and more than 10,000 in each of the succeeding

years up to the war. A number of new agricultural settlements were founded, and the general Jewish economy, though seriously affected, satisfactorily weathered the difficulties of the long period of continuous disorder. The Administration not unnaturally considered that this disorder made it wise to cut down immigration severely. In the spring of 1937, it proposed at first the issue of only 770 certificates of which 620 were offered to the Jewish Agency. The Agency took the unprecedented step of refusing to accept the certificates issued to it, and published the fact that it had itself applied for 11,250 after careful research into the needs and possibilities of the country. The official immigration in that year actually amounted to 10,536. This conflict of opinion reveals not only the optimism which has throughout characterized Jewish activities in Palestine, but also the gravity of the Jewish situation elsewhere. In spite of a casualty list running into hundreds, in spite of the destruction of trees and crops, life in Palestine still appeared infinitely more desirable to thousands of Jews in Europe than life under the Nazis or in Poland. Moreover all through the disorder, and even up to the present time, the stream of illegal immigration has continued to the full limits of the possibilities of secret entry.

The partition of Palestine, which the Royal Commission proposed as the only solvent of the Arab-Jewish controversy, stirred widespread emotions. To many people the idea of the partition of the Holy Land seemed almost sacrilegious. To the Zionists, and indeed to many Jews who opposed the political ambitions of the Zionists, it seemed fantastic to have Zionism permanently separated from Zion. As for the Arabs, they almost unanimously rejected it.

The Government, however, at the same time as it published the Report of the Royal Commission, issued a White Paper in which it supported the Commission's conclusions in the following paragraphs:[1]

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, by direction of His Majesty, have considered the unanimous Report of the Palestine Royal Commission. They find themselves in general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Commission.
2. As is fully recognised by the Commissioners in their historical survey, His Majesty's Government and their predecessors, since the obligations of the Mandate were accepted, have taken the view, which the tenor of the Mandate itself implies, that their obligations to Arabs and Jews respectively were not incompatible on the assumption that in the process of time the two races would so adjust their national aspirations as to render possible the establishment of a single commonwealth under a unitary government.

[1] Cmd. 5513.

3. In spite of many discouraging experiences during the past seventeen years, His Majesty's Government have based their policy on this expectation, and have taken every opportunity of encouraging co-operation between Arabs and Jews. In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission they are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. His Majesty's Government propose to advise His Majesty accordingly.
4. His Majesty's Government therefore propose to take such steps as are necessary and appropriate, having regard to their existing treaty obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international instruments, to obtain freedom to give effect to a scheme of partition, to which they earnestly hope that it may be possible to secure an effective measure of consent on the part of the communities concerned.

The hasty acceptance of the conclusions of the Commission aroused a storm of indignation in Parliament, and after a heated debate an amendment was accepted by the Government which instructed them to bring the partition plan 'before the League of Nations with a view to enabling His Majesty's Government, after adequate inquiry, to present to Parliament a definite scheme, taking into full account all recommendations of the Government White Paper'.

The Mandate Commission of the League was equally disturbed by the proposal. The report of its meeting, as issued by the League Secretariat, remarked rather dryly that the Royal Commission had in fact made the Mandate unworkable by the mere act of stating that it was unworkable. The Commission was prepared to accept the idea of partition, but insisted that it would be impossible to create two new states without an adequate period of apprenticeship during which the Mandatory would still have to assume responsibility for order and good government. With its capacity for emphasizing the legal aspects of a question at the cost of the practical, the Mandates Commission blamed the Administration simultaneously for failing to realize that the gravity of the situation demanded the establishment of martial law, and for restricting Jewish immigration during the rebellion to the figure of 1,000 a month instead of allowing it to rise to the full absorptive capacity of normal times, whatever the opposition of the Arabs.

If the British Parliament and the League of Nations were disturbed by the partition proposal, it was to be expected that still

more emotion accompanied its discussion before the Zionist Congress. After heated debates, many of which were held *in camera*, the Congress authorized Dr. Weizmann, President of the Zionist Organization, to discuss whatever concrete proposals the British Government might put forward. But it insisted that no decision should be taken in favour of partition until the matter had been submitted to a special meeting of Congress. It is not surprising that the debates were violent. In spite of everything against it the proposal had the attraction that it offered the Jews the possibility of controlling their own immigration within the area of Palestine in which, in fact, most Jews were already settling under existing conditions. On the other hand it was Zionism without Zion, and the State proposed by the Royal Commission had a frontier which it would be exceedingly difficult to defend against a hostile Arab neighbour.

The conflict in the Zionist Congress was repeated again at the meeting of the Jewish Agency. The non-Zionist members of the Agency, led by Felix Warburg, refused to lend their support in any way to the idea of a separate Jewish State. Their interest had always been anti- rather than non-political, and in a Jewish State they saw a dangerous enemy to their whole conception of the position of the Jews in the world. Thanks largely to the statesmanship of Dr. Weizmann a split in the Agency was avoided, and a resolution was drawn up which skilfully combined all the irreconcilable standpoints involved.

Finally the matter came before the League itself. The Council withheld its opinion until it had before it a definite scheme of partition. In the Sixth Commission of the Assembly the matter was debated, and again a definite opinion was deferred. The Moslem States who were members of the League rejected it on the part of the Arabs, and a number of other States were equally hostile to it out of concern for its effect upon the Jews.

While these political discussions were going on, the situation in the country itself continued to deteriorate. On 19 October 1937, the Administration at last took action against the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee, but the Mufti escaped to Syria and directed from there operations which steadily increased in violence all through the autumn and winter of 1937 and for the greater part of 1938.

On 27 April 1938 a new Commission arrived in Palestine, presided over by Sir John Woodhead. Working from the basis of the scheme of partition proposed by the Royal Commission, it examined on the spot the problems involved. After some months of work it came reluctantly to the conclusion that no possible frontier could really be satisfactory. The proposal

which appeared to offer the fewest disadvantages still involved the creation of three separate Mandated Territories, a Jewish State in two bits, and an Arab State, all within the frontiers of one small country. It is not surprising that the publication of the Woodhead Report gave the *coup de grace* to partition as a possible solution of the problem.

Following their usual precedent of issuing a statement of policy together with their publication of a Report, the Government announced that, in view of the failure of the Woodhead Commission to produce a practical scheme of partition, it proposed to call a conference in London of Arab and Jewish representatives to re-examine the whole question of future policy. If the conference failed to agree upon a line of policy the Government finally announced that it would make its own decision and enforce it.[1]

7. *The Macdonald White Paper and Land Regulations*

The first discovery which was made by the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, was that it was impossible to hold a *single* conference with the Jews and Arabs, for the latter absolutely refused to meet the former. It was therefore arranged that two conferences should be held simultaneously, one between the British and the Jews and the other between the British and the Arabs. But again difficulties arose over the Arab Delegation. The British refused to receive the Mufti, whom they regarded as the fomenter of the rebellion, and the Mufti's Party, though they accepted the exclusion of their leader, absolutely refused to allow any representative of Arab moderate opinion to be invited as a full delegate to the Conference. This question was finally solved by an invitation to two Moderates to be present as observers, and diplomatic illness did the rest. The two conferences met simultaneously at St. James's Palace on 7 February 1939. They met under extremely difficult circumstances, for the conflict between emotion and political realism was still raging with full force. The Jewish situation had been still further deteriorating throughout Europe and it was scarcely the moment to ask Jewish leaders to view the difficulties of the Mandatory Administration with objective political realism. In November 1938 the murder of vom Rath, a Nazi official in Paris, had led to appalling pogroms and to a violent renewal of Jewish persecution in Germany. It was not surprising that the only practical question which interested Zionists was the number of Jews, adult and children, who could be saved from the Nazi hell. This feeling

[1] Cmd. 5893.

was shared by many English political leaders, and a Parliamentary debate on Palestine in December 1938 witnessed many fervent appeals from Christian leaders to the Government, urging on them a generous immigration policy. But the Government had also to consider its relations with the Arabs, and the Arabs were clamouring for a complete cessation of immigration.

In such a situation, it is not surprising if the two conferences failed to reach any practical political conclusions, or to agree on any programme. In fact, the only concrete result which emerged from the five weeks of discussion was the production by the British Government of an authorized edition of the McMahon Correspondence and of other relevant documents issued during the crucial period 1915–1919. The McMahon Correspondence was examined by a joint Committee of British and Arab experts. The British maintained their position that Palestine was definitely excluded from the promises made to the Arabs. They were supported by published statements of Sir Henry McMahon himself and of Sir Gilbert Clayton who had drafted the letters. Both men categorically confirmed that both they and Husayn understood that Palestine was excluded from the territories conceded to Husayn. But even so the Government had to recognize that the Arab contentions 'had greater force than had appeared hitherto' and that 'the language in which the exclusion [of Palestine] was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time'.[1]

On 15 March Mr. Macdonald put before the two conferences the proposals of the Government. They were rejected by both. The conferences were therefore adjourned, and on 17 May the proposals of the Government were issued as a White Paper. The proposals covered the two main points of the constitution and immigration. The question of land sales was postponed for a further White Paper which would be issued after discussion with the High Commissioner in Jerusalem.

On the constitutional future of Palestine the Government made the following statement:[2]

1. The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.
2. The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews

[1] Cmd. 5964, p. 10.

[2] Cmd. 6019, p. 6 *seqq.*

share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

3. The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of Government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

4. As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

5. His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

6. At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

7. His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:

   (*a*) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and

the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(*b*) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(*c*) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

8. His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

On the subject of immigration the proposals of the Government were equally disastrous from the Jewish standpoint. This was the scheme put forward:

1. Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow the admission, as from the beginning of April this year,[1] of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:

(*a*) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(*b*) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as

[1] 1939.

soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

2. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

3. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

4. His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

The indignation of Jews throughout the world at these proposals can easily be understood. They were based entirely on the British estimate of the maximum policy which the Administration could put into effect without provoking disorder, and took no account whatever of the harrowing problems confronting Jews in Europe, let alone the traditional Zionist view of Jewish rights and British obligations in Palestine. To get a full understanding of the extent to which they appeared to Jews to be a betrayal of every decent British tradition, it must be remembered that all other countries were closing or had closed their doors to the constant stream of refugees who wished to leave Central Europe. The Nazis had extended their persecution to the Jews of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and their influence was preponderant in the Jewish policies of Hungary, Rumania, and Poland. So desperate was the plight of the Jews that to many non-Jewish leaders also, in the churches as well as in all political parties, the appalling human need of hundreds of thousands of sufferers appeared legitimately to override all other considerations.

The Government, however, maintained its position, and absolutely refused to give way before its critics. It also ignored the condemnation of its policy by the Mandates Commission on the ground that the war had made a serious discussion of the issue before the Council—which alone could make a final pronouncement—impossible. When, on 28 February 1940, it issued

the third part of its policy, the Land Transfers Regulations,[1] it showed no relaxation whatever of its declared intention to produce a solution which would, in its opinion, satisfy legitimate Arab grievances, even at the cost of ignoring the tremendous emotional appeal created by the distress of the Jews in Europe.

The Regulations divided Palestine into three areas. In Municipal areas, the Haifa Industrial Zone and the greater part of the Maritime Plain, there were to be no restrictions on the sale of land to Jews. In Zone A, which included the hill country as a whole together with certain areas in Gaza and Beersheba subdistricts, the sale of land by Palestinian Arabs to any except Palestinian Arabs was prohibited. Sales by Palestinian Arabs to Jews were permitted under certain stringent conditions in Zone B which covered the Emek, Eastern Galilee, and the northern and southern extremities of the Maritime Plain. In both Zones A and B possibilities of sale to Jews existed, where the land was not owned by Palestinian Arabs. From a practical standpoint it excluded Jews from settlement in the greatest part of the country, and left them complete freedom to acquire land in little more than one-twentieth of it.

The Macdonald policy is not, as it might appear to be, a violent reaction against the policies of previous British Governments. Viewed historically the sequence of events from the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 to the Land Regulations of 1940 is a tragic but unbroken chain. It is just conceivable that a policy of violent change in the beginning might ultimately have been accepted by the Arabs. Perhaps, if the country had been immediately handed over to the Jews, the Arabs might have come to accept a *fait accompli*. But whether this is likely or not, from the moment when the Balfour Declaration stated that the rights of the existing population would be safeguarded, it was evident that no final solution was possible while these rights, as the population itself understood them, were ignored. The Arabs of Palestine stated their objection to the Declaration quite openly on the first occasion on which they were able. They have never wavered from that position. Had time modified their hostility, circumstances would have been different, but in fact time did not. This being so, then the only possible sequence of events was one in which the original encouragement given to the Jews was steadily whittled down in the face of Arab intransigence. It is tragically true that the first inevitable effect of translating the Balfour Declaration into actual practical policies was the realization that Trans-Jordan would have to be excluded from the area of Jewish settlement. On this subject the defini-

[1] Cmd. 6180.

tions of McMahon allowed no misunderstandings to arise. As no formal agreement was ever reached by all sides as to the relation between its fulfilment in western Palestine and the promises made to the Arabs, a serious limitation there also was equally inevitable—a limitation which in the result amounted to the subordination of the Promise to the will of the existing Arab population in nine-tenths of western Palestine.

Palestine is a country of paradox. One would have expected that the background of such a tragic political history would be a withered and dying National Home. But so far is this from the truth that, as the next chapter will show, it might be claimed that the growth of the Jewish National Home in Palestine between 1919 and 1939 is among the most outstanding pieces of constructive community-building which the world can show in the sad procession of the inter-war years.

Chapter Three

THE NATIONAL HOME

1. *The 'National' Character of the National Home*

A WORD of explanation is needed of the use of the terms 'nation' and 'national government' in this chapter. It is impossible realistically to include all Jewry under any single explanation. Jews are members of a religion, which is at the same time a civilization. They are members of a civilization which has been historically expressed in a religion. As such they are in some circumstances perfectly entitled to consider themselves citizens of a country and separated from their fellow-citizens only by their different faith. In other circumstances they can only fairly be considered as a corporate group possessing certain characteristics commonly associated with nationhood. The difficulty for Jews as well as others is to accept the fact that these two conditions often exist side by side even within the frontiers of a single country, and that any attempt to do violence to the propriety of either, by basing a solution wholly on the other, ends in artificiality and injustice.

The promise to facilitate the establishment of a National Home in Palestine was recognition not only of the Jewish association with that country, but of the claim to nationhood made by large and influential sections of the Jewish people. This is evident officially in the summary given in the Colonial Office White Paper of the characteristics which the Jewish experiment —as it then was—had already achieved in 1922.[1]

In all the British pronouncements on the subject, and in the Text of the Mandate itself, it is made clear that the building of the National Home was to be a corporate Jewish affair. It was not to be created for the Jewish people by the financial and administrative activities of the Mandatory Power. The Administration was to encourage it by the creation of suitable political and economic conditions, was to make available State and waste lands; but the National Home itself was, quite properly, to be built by Jewish effort and controlled by Jewish officers. It is therefore proper in considering the National Home in itself, as is done in this chapter, to consider the extent to which Jews in Palestine have, in fact, acquired all the characteristics of a 'nation', and the success with which the various bodies which

[1] Quoted on p. 36 *seq.*

control their activities can be considered parallel to a 'national government'. Constitutionally, of course, members of the National Home form part of the general mass of 'Palestinian citizens'. Constitutionally the only Government in Palestine is that of the Mandate. But both the British and the Jews in 1917 clearly saw a public and national objective—however they defined it or regarded it—in the experiment to which the Balfour Declaration gave international sanction. It is in this sense that the words 'nation' and 'national government' are appropriate to a description of the inhabitants of the National Home and the organization of its administration.

2. *The Paradox of its Growth*

A survey which confines itself to the political history of Palestine during the inter-war years cannot of itself provide guidance for the political planning of the future. For Palestine is a country of paradox. From the standpoint of the developments described in the last chapter the disappointment of the Jews and dissatisfaction of the Arabs are alike the natural and inevitable result of the entangling contradictions of policy in which the British Government involved itself during and after the first world war. In this picture the Jewish National Home constantly appears as something embarrassing and almost exotic in the atmosphere of the Middle East. It would be easy to claim—in fact it is often claimed—that all our difficulties in Palestine arise from its existence; Zionists can make a good case for their counterclaim that all our difficulties arise from our weakness in carrying out an international obligation, the Balfour Declaration. But both claims ignore the fact that the French have had still more serious trouble in Syria without any such complications as the constant arrival of Jewish immigrants on the one hand or an unwillingness to meet violence with immediate violence on the other.

It is perfectly true that the promises which we made to the Arabs, and the legitimate responsibilities of imperial policy, have convinced the British that it was impossible for them to achieve that 'integral fulfilment' of the Balfour Declaration which Jewish spokesmen have constantly demanded. But it is equally true that the promises made to the Jewish people have compelled us to refuse to undertake the 'integral fulfilment' of the network of statements including the McMahon promises as interpreted by the Arabs. And in each case the policy followed has been the result of emotional as well as realistic feelings. A rather vague but quite genuine feeling that British promises to the Arabs had

not been fulfilled, and that they were being defrauded of their ancient home, inspired a great deal of pro-Arab opinion both in Great Britain and in the Palestine Administration. An equally vague but genuine sympathy for the misfortunes of the Jews, coupled with a strong biblical tradition, inspired a great deal of pro-Zionist opinion. It is essential to recognize these conflicts and paradoxes in the Palestinian situation, for they are as real and influential factors in any particular situation as any particular political pronouncement.

The position of the Arabs is relatively straightforward and easy to understand. There is nothing abnormal in it. But the Jewish National Home is unique. Any British decision about future policy in relation to Palestine obviously has to take into account the narrative described in the previous chapter and, in addition, factors outside the Palestinian frontier in both the Arab and the Moslem worlds. In the same way it has to take into account the position of the Jewish National Home as it is regarded in the Jewish world; and this can only be done properly if the National Home is considered by itself—almost as though it existed in an otherwise empty territory. For, illogical as it must appear to every outsider, this is in fact how Jews themselves tend to regard it. References to the Arabs in Zionist pronouncements appear largely conventional. In comparison with the problem of Hitler, the problem of the Arabs has not existed for them. In comparison with the Balfour Declaration, everything else has a subordinate place.

As has already been pointed out in Chapter I, the Balfour Declaration did not give rise to the National Home. It only gave it a legal foundation in international sanction. But that it gave clearly and unequivocally. Whatever blame may be laid on British politicians for the confusions which arose between 1915 and 1923, there is no question but that the Jewish people were entitled to take the Declaration at its face value, and to expect its fulfilment. They were not parties to any British promises made to the Arabs, and there is no evidence that at the time when they themselves were negotiating with the British and others in 1916 and 1917 they were aware of the existence of the McMahon correspondence or of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Moreover, although promises to the Arabs were the affair rather of the British than of the Jews, the Jews did, at the very beginning, attempt to regulate their position by the abortive Agreement between Dr. Weizmann and the Amir Faysal. The implementing of that Agreement depended on factors outside their control, and it was no fault of the Jews that the Allies did not accede to all the demands of the Arab Nationalists. It is

true that no fresh basis of official agreement was put forward when the Weizmann-Faysal Document lapsed, but this can only be understood on the background of Arab and Jewish history during the inter-war years.

An outsider might feel that he could properly reproach the Zionist leaders with neglecting their basic task when they failed to win the existing majority of the occupants of the country to their project. But a Zionist leader who did so would, in fact, have deserted and been rejected by his own people. They would never have accepted the abatement of their claims which his actions would have involved. The reason is simple. It is to be found in the fluctuating but steadily increasing pressure on Jewish populations elsewhere during all these years. Life worsened for millions of Jews until it became intolerable. A Zionist leader could only have one thought in his head—to insist all the time on the maximum possible demands, for those demands meant the lives of his people. Every other door was shut, or at best ajar. Only into Palestine could a Jew enter 'of right and not on sufferance'. Had the situation been different, had the optimistic expectations of the Peace Treaties materialized and only those Jews who were fired with the realization of a vision and the fulfilment of a romantic dream sought to enter the country, then indeed the Home might have grown slowly and securely on a basis of Arab goodwill. But matters turned out differently. At the very moment when the Zionist Commission entered the country Jews were being murdered in the Ukraine, and within a decade of the giving of the Declaration antisemitism was rampant throughout eastern Europe. Palestine was a refuge not a romance, a necessity not a luxury. This then is the answer to the 'outsider' at the beginning of the paragraph—that it could not be expected that Zionist leaders would have done anything other than they did—press for the maximum in season and out of season, and leave the British to deal with the Arabs.

There is another fact of a different order. The National Home deserves to be considered for itself, because it is among the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the world during the twenty years of its life. It has unique characteristics in a period which, we are apt to forget, contained many remarkable achievements. It is not only an amazing example of the renaissance of an ancient but somewhat deformed and even in places degenerate community, but *the whole adventure has been conducted on a voluntary basis.* It has been the voluntary work of a group within a 'nation' whose individual members were at the same time performing their political, fiscal, social, and economic duties

in the countries where they lived. A contribution to the Jewish National Fund brought no reduction of income tax in America or elsewhere; a Jewish pioneer of military age performed his military service in any country with conscription like any other citizen. Great Jewish donations to the general lives of different countries continued as before. But at the same time, primarily with the lives and the pennies of simple and obscure Jewish families, a Home was built which displayed within a few years all those functions of a national community which we associate with the spending of taxation produced by the discipline of legal compulsion. The voluntary nature of the whole adventure also explains some of that atmosphere of excitement, of exaggeration, of hectic enthusiasm, of intolerance, impatience, and arrogance, which has occasionally disgusted outside observers. It is useless to expect in Zionist projects the deliberate caution of a Blue Book, or the slowly maturing long-range policy of an old-established Government department, certain that its revenue will come without further effort than that required to work out a satisfactory budget. And it is useless to expect young Zionists not to be intoxicated with the achievement of their dreams, and, in consequence, to appear at times arrogant and intolerant.

There is a final consideration, which affects both Jews and Arabs, and which will need to be most carefully taken into account in the planning of the future of the Middle East. No assessment of the trouble of the past twenty years is likely to lead to useful conclusions which leaves out of account the fact that a conflict, likely to be bitter and complicated in any case, has been fought out under those conditions in which the universal experience of history shows that the maximum amount of trouble will be produced and the minimum amount of agreement will ever be achieved. *Neither side had any executive responsibility for the consequences of its actions.* On a certain occasion the Mufti is said to have declared to Lord Plumer that he could not personally be responsible for the consequences of a particular piece of British policy. Lord Plumer replied that he had not asked him to be responsible. A good story, but a revelation of a situation which could not last. If Jewish activities meant Arab violence, it was for the British Government to deal with it, not the Jewish Agency. If Arab leaders made magnificent promises to their followers, the odium of their non-fulfilment fell on the British, not on the Arab leaders. Neither side ever had to scale down its proposals to its followers to the level of the possible. That invidious task belonged to the Mandatory.

Only on the basis of recognizing all these unusual features can a fair estimate be made of the success or failure, the value or

futility of what Jews have created in less than a generation of the life of the National Home; and consequently of the wisdom or stupidity of seeking a continued foundation in British Middle Eastern policy after the war on which it can realize the hopes which have certainly been centred in it.

3. *Organizations of the National Home*

In the text of the Mandate the World Zionist Organization was recognized as the 'Jewish Agency' representing the Jewish people. It is a Federation built up of territorial and party Zionist organizations. Membership of these organizations depends on the payment of a small subscription (known as the 'shekel'), and it is thus that a vast electorate is formed. Elections take place every two years to a Congress which is the Legislative Body of the Zionist Organization. In 1939, 547 delegates were elected from a membership of 1,040,450 distributed in 51 National Movements. Palestinian representation numbered 134. The Congress in turn elects a Council which meets twice a year to exercise a general supervision over the work of the Organization. It also elects an Executive, and this Executive up to 1929 watched over the destinies of the National Home, and negotiated on its behalf with the Mandatory Government. All the finances of the office of the Organization are provided from the shekels paid by the members.

Within the Organization are various parties, and elections to the Congress follow normal party lines. In the last Congress the Parties were distributed as follows from right to left: State Party (8 seats), Mizrachi (65), General Zionists, B group (28). General Zionists, A Group (143), Labour (Poale Zion) 216. Left Poale Zion (13). Fifty-two represented Nazi-occupied countries where no elections were possible. The three parties of the right demand a stronger line with regard to the British Government; the General Zionists, A Group, is the party of Dr. Weizmann, who is also supported by Labour. There is provision in the Constitution to allow certain groups of Zionists who are not members of general or territorial organizations, to elect members to Congress, provided they observe the regulations and discipline of the Congress and pay their shekels. Of these groups the most conspicuous, until they seceded altogether, were the Revisionists, a group bearing strong affinities to the extreme nationalist groups in other electorates.

In 1929 the Zionist Organization by itself ceased to provide the whole membership of that Jewish Agency for which the Mandate called. A measure of the success of the National Home

is that many groups which had violently opposed Zionism at first had become interested in the upbuilding of Palestine, even if they were still out of sympathy with the political philosophy of the Zionist Organization. These included such important groups as the official Jewish bodies in England and France and the American Jewish Committee. In this year, then, an agreement was made by which half the members of the Jewish Agency were elected by the Zionist Organization and half, in various ways, by the non-Zionist bodies. The effects of this change have been less revolutionary than might be expected, owing to the fact that the latter are largely represented in the Executive of the Agency by men of moderate Zionist views.

The Jewish Agency thus draws into itself all Jewish interest in the National Home, both from Zionists and non-Zionists. But the Yishub, the Jews who actually live in Palestine, not only have their representatives in the Agency and the World Zionist Organization—they have also their own official community, the K'nesseth Israel, which elects an Assembly whose Executive, the Va'ad Leumi, is the only body in the whole network with official powers of compulsory taxation conferred on it by the Mandatory. But even so it is not wholly parallel to a 'national' government of the Jews in Palestine; for it is possible for Jews living in Palestine to refuse membership of the K'nesseth Israel, and one Orthodox Jewish community avails itself of this permission.

The relationship between these bodies is not as difficult as it sounds, for in many cases the same individual represents simultaneously different interests. Agency and Va'ad Leumi are housed in the same building in Jerusalem, and official representatives of the latter sit with the executive of the former without voting power.

The payment of the shekel provides the administrative budget of the Zionist Organization. It does not provide for the upbuilding of Palestine or the expenses of the Agency. This is provided by the Keren Hayesod, which covers the Agency's whole budget, and by a number of other funds of which the most important is the Jewish National Fund. As the Yishub took on the character of a settled community, it in turn met its expenses from its power of communal taxation, together with the grants of the Mandatory Government. These grants were in no sense 'charitable'. They were contributions from the revenue of Palestine, to which Jews had contributed, for expenses which the Mandatory Government would otherwise have had to incur itself. Education, for example, passed from the Agency to the Va'ad Leumi in 1932, and also benefits from a grant from the Administration. The funds collected abroad are thus released

for the extension of the community. As yet, however, the community can take only a limited responsibility for its finances, and when it is realized that it has grown from 60,000 to half a million in twenty years this is not surprising.

The money collected abroad is, naturally, all the result of voluntary work. The oldest Fund seeking such contributions is the Keren Kayemeth Leisrael (the Jewish National Fund) which was created forty years ago for the purchase of land in Palestine. The idea originated with the earliest settlers, and the Fund was actually inaugurated at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901. Since that time it has collected nearly £P.5,000,000 and has purchased nearly 125,000 acres of land, roughly a third of Jewish-owned land in Palestine. The Keren Hayesod (the Palestine Foundation Fund) was founded in 1921, for the development of the National Home, primarily on the land acquired by the Keren Kayemeth. Since 1921 it has collected nearly £P.10,000,000.

In addition to the three general bodies, the World Zionist Organization, the enlarged Jewish Agency, and the Va'ad Leumi, and the two great funds, there are special funds and organizations for covering different aspects of communal life. Their relationship to these general bodies, and to the British Administration, varies from case to case, but in almost every example the same curious phenomenon is found of voluntary bodies performing with considerable efficiency work which in an ordinary country is backed by the finances of the Government and supported by the discipline of the law.

The most important of these bodies is the Histadruth. Technically it is a trade union, but it is unique among the trade unions of the world in the scope of its interests. It links in a single Federation of Labour all those who live by their work, whether of hand or brain, and its membership covers about one-quarter of the Jewish population of Palestine. In addition to the usual activities of a trade union, such as the negotiation of wage rates with employers and assistance to unemployed members, it takes an active part in colonization, and maintains all kinds of financial, co-operative, health, and educational services in the different Jewish settlements, runs its own schools and clinics for workers and their children, its own convalescent homes and health resorts. It also engages in transport activities, and competes for public contracts especially in the field of communications. These unexpected functions grew naturally out of the needs of settlers—the lack of compulsory health insurance, the need for housing, and the inadequacy of the road and rail communications of the country to the needs both of the new towns and the rural settlements in remote parts.

In its network of activities co-operatives of all kinds play a considerable part. They have a definite place in the Palestinian landscape, and over 900 were registered as active in 1939. Many of them are small, many are extremely short-lived or perish still-born from lack of capital or lack of planning. Their role is, however, an important one, in that they fulfil two necessities in the fluctuating and rapidly expanding Palestinian community. Consumers' co-operatives of all kinds from food to houses lower the cost of living; and producers' co-operatives of all kinds from dairies to workshops make possible the starting of work with very little capital and the sale of products from very small producers. The power behind the co-operative movement is the Histadruth, and many of them, including the best-financed and most powerful, are integral parts of its programme.

Apart from the two Funds mentioned, the other international contributions fall into two classes. Certain small funds try to cover the general line of the main work of the Agency from the standpoint of particular interests, such as the fund of the Orthodox non-Zionist Agudath Israel. The more important ones are devoted to particular aspects of the general development, especially education and health.

Education was taken over by the Keren Hayesod immediately after the establishment of that fund, and remained largely its responsibility until in 1932 the Va'ad Leumi was able to take over the Fund's responsibilities, through its own income and the grant made by the Administration. In 1939 the Va'ad was responsible for 52,816 children in 396 institutions, including 194 kindergartens, 180 elementary schools, 13 secondary schools, 4 teachers' training colleges, and 5 trade schools of different kinds. This covered two-thirds of the Jewish population in educational establishments, and of this two-thirds about 30,000 were in schools run directly by the Va'ad Leumi, 13,000 in schools run by the Orthodox religious Zionist organization, the Mizrachi, and 9,600 in the schools run by the Histadruth.

The other third were in schools run by various bodies, some of which, like the schools of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, depended on voluntary international funds, and some on international and other endowments. In all there were just on 80,000 Jewish children and youths in schools in the country.

An important unifying factor in the life and growth of the National Home is that education is in Hebrew, and that a new literature in that language is rapidly coming into existence.

At the crown of the educational structure is the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. This is not only a teaching University, and a most important research centre in Oriental studies, biology,

medicine, and agriculture, but possesses a magnificent library. In addition, it has an important place in the political life of the National Home. All its services are open to Arabs and, at times when tension is low, are made use of by them. And there has always been an element in the University which has stood for the fullest understanding of the Arab situation as a basis of more friendly and positive relations between the two peoples. The number of students has grown steadily; in the academic year 1938–1939 they amounted to 820. In the year 1939–1940, 1,200 students were registered, many of whom had made adventurous voyages in order to reach Jerusalem. On the Faculty of the University the number of exiled professors and leaders from Europe amounted to 65, and Palestine has been able to profit from the opportunities for lecturing and research which it could give to men of international reputation who had been expelled from Germany, Italy, or elsewhere.

The University receives many donations, but it has only small endowments, and the greater part of its budget comes from voluntary contributions from many countries where 'Friends of the Hebrew University' are asked to explain its activities and to collect funds for its maintenance.

The organization of health presents a similarly complex structure. The contribution of the Government does not take the form of grants to Jewish Funds, as in the case of education, but of general health services in which Jews naturally can participate. This, however, forms only a small part of the health services available to members of the National Home, and, it is right to add, to any Arab who wishes to make use of them. Its own services are mainly supplied from three sources. The Histadruth health service covers more than a third of the population, and possesses branches in every Jewish centre in the country, however small. Its income is derived from voluntary membership fees, for there is no compulsory health insurance in Palestine. In negotiating contracts with employers, however, the Histadruth is increasingly able to persuade them to make a contribution to this service, and in 1939 seven per cent. was covered by employers. This is, of course, a much smaller contribution than they would make under any compulsory system, and it is not surprising that the Keren Hayesod should have to contribute about a third of the budget, leaving more than half to be covered by the members.

Equal in importance to this service, and working in close co-operation with it, is the Hadassah, the American Women's Zionist Organization. This Organization sent a medical unit to Palestine in the summer of 1918, and it remained in the country and formed the nucleus of a network of modern clinics and

hospital services. These centre in the great Hospital and Medical Centre which it has constructed as its contribution to the Medical Faculty of the Hebrew University. As a result of this work, the Jewish infant mortality-rate fell below 100 per thousand live births in 1923 and in 1939 had fallen still further to the extraordinarily low figure of 54.

The centre of all these activities, even when they are not directly under its own control, is the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. It owes its power not only to the variety and competence of its officers, but to its official position under the Mandate. While its primary function is to regulate the bringing of Jews to Palestine, it negotiates and acts also in all matters concerning their subsequent lives in the country.

By its control of the distribution of immigration certificates it exercises considerable influence over the character of the National Home. The Agency submits a suggested schedule of immigration based on its estimates of the economic situation. But it is the Government which decides on the total number of Jews to be admitted—usually for a six-months' period. The choice of the individual immigrant, and to some extent the division of the schedule between different classes of immigrants, is entrusted to the Agency, which maintains for that purpose a number of officers in different countries.

The Royal Commission described the Jewish Agency as 'a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government',[1] but it emphasized that it had developed into this position in a perfectly legitimate manner, since from the very beginning it was understood that the main responsibility for building the National Home must rest with the Jews themselves.

4. *The Planned Society*

The community over which these various organizations preside is a flexible planned society. It is by no means totalitarian, nor is it socialistic, nor, on the other hand, is it a liberal capitalistic community. Unique in many other ways, the National Home is also unique in its social structure. What gives it its peculiar character is the combination of the work of the two great

[1] Cmd. 5479, p. 174. It is amusing to note that in addition to calling the Agency 'a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government', the same Commission on p. 49 says of the Va'ad Leumi that 'it would be difficult to find in history a precedent for the establishment of so distinct an *imperium in imperio*'. Nor is this all. It appears that the Labour Courts of Justice of the Histadruth have caused that organization also to be called a State within a State. But to gain a real idea of the difficulties of the Palestine Administration it must be added that the Arabs also possess not dissimilar bodies.

national funds and the Histadruth, with the expansive activities of a free capitalistic society.

In so far as its financial powers allow it to do so, the Agency plans the lives of settlers from a period many years before they arrive in the National Home at all. By various means, and under various auspices, the young would-be immigrant has been converted into a pioneer in various countries of Europe. While still in his teens he becomes a *Haluz*, a pioneer, and is, as soon as there is a vacancy, sent for one or two years to a training-school or farm, where he is prepared for life as a highly skilled agricultural labourer or artisan. The Zionists have profited by the experience of other migrations, and know that it is possible to teach an entirely new way of life to an adolescent, while it is extremely difficult to uproot and redirect a man of middle age. The latter has indeed happened, and happened frequently, but under the stress of external circumstances and the violent uprooting caused by such persecutions as those of Tsarist Russia or Nazi Germany. The speed with which the adolescent product of the slum-like ghettoes of eastern Europe becomes a skilled and healthy farmer or artisan is a perpetual tribute to the adaptability of mankind.

From his training-school the young *Haluz* goes, once he has obtained his immigration certificate, to Palestine. Throughout his journey he is watched over by the Zionist Organization and the officers of the Agency. Once he arrives in Palestine he is received in one of the hostels of the Agency, and work is found for him by the Histadruth. Men and opportunities for agricultural settlement are the most eagerly sought after by both sides. Agricultural settlement, however, is slow and costly, and it is impossible, as Zionists discovered in the earliest years of colonization, for such settlement to be carried through simply by enthusiasm. It was for this reason that the Jewish National Fund was first established—in order to buy the land for the settler. The Balfour Declaration did not give the Jews ownership of any land. Every acre has to be bought in the open market or leased from the Government. The land which is bought is vested in the Jewish people, and let to tenants who, individually or corporately, undertake to work it themselves. These tenants have as much security as the average English tenant farmer.

But the provision of land is not enough. The settler needs equipment, just as the land needs preparation. The first task is undertaken by the Keren Hayesod and the second by the National Fund. From its foundation in 1921 until 1939 the Foundation Fund spent nearly £P.2,000,000 directly on agricultural settlement. Nearly half of the colonies in Palestine have

been helped by it, and nearly 30,000 settlers have directly benefited from its work. Distributed in over a hundred villages they produced before the war more than 60 per cent. of the wheat and potatoes, more than half the milk, and just on half of the eggs and vegetables grown by the National Home. With the effort made since the war to increase home supplies, these proportions have risen.

The settlements assisted were of two kinds; in 1939, 67 were *Kibbutzim* or *Kvuzoth*, which are communally owned and managed, and 44 are *Moshve Ovdim* or smallholders' settlements. These two types form the most characteristic expressions of the planning of the National Home. The *Kibbutzim* are completely communal. All property is owned by the community; all work is planned in meetings of the whole community; when workers marry, their children are looked after by the community, and only spend the evenings or Sabbath with their own parents. In fact the most prominent buildings in these *Kibbutzim* are usually the school and the infants' centre. The numbers in these settlements vary considerably, but the average is between two and three hundred. It is evident that such a life imposes considerable strains on the idealism and the sincerity of the members. Not everyone can bear to live with so little private life and judgment, so much communal control. This, however, is a matter which will adjust itself, for entrance into such colonies is not compulsory. But they have proved invaluable pioneers, for it is possible to establish a new colony between dawn and dusk, and this has been done many times in troubled periods and in troubled areas.

It has in fact also, but more rarely, been done by the smallholding colonies in which greater privacy and individualism are possible. The colonists purchase and market their commodities through co-operatives, and they have communal services for the health and education of their children. The fields of the community are increasingly, but not universally, cultivated communally; but the members own their own houses and are responsible for the cultivation of their own gardens.

In addition to its work in the actual establishment of colonies, the Department of Agriculture of the Agency has spent a great deal of money it receives from the Foundation Fund in assisting agriculture in other ways. One important service has been the creation of various companies in which private capital has participated. The backing of the Agency has been a guarantee of stability and wise management, and has thus encouraged private investment; and the result has been to make considerably larger sums available for agricultural progress than would otherwise have been possible. Housing, drainage, irrigation, and water

supply have been increased by these means. A more direct service has been the establishment of agricultural research stations and teaching institutes. The development of mixed farming is the basis of rural prosperity, and this involves training the farmer as well as careful and systematic research into soil and climate possibilities, into stock-breeding, seed improvement, and methods of cultivation. Most of this work has had to be undertaken on what might be called virgin soil, for Arab methods of cultivation not only had not changed for centuries, but were incapable of change without the intervention of new capital and better education. But the knowledge acquired by this research should ultimately contribute to the prosperity of the whole population of the Near and Middle East. In these indirect services to agriculture the Agency has expended over £P.750,000. Yet another service which has been of value to the country as a whole has been reafforestation, and the Agency, in co-operation with the National Fund, has planted over 3,000,000 trees in twenty years.

It is natural to speak first of agricultural policy because of the enormous stress laid in Zionist thought on the settlement of the land, and the training of Jews to be farmers. Statistically the proportion of those who are wholly engaged in agriculture was in 1939 approximately the same among Jews in Palestine as it is among the English in England. But even if only 6 per cent. or 7 per cent. (or including their dependants, 14 per cent.) are actually farming, a quarter of the Jewish population live in the settlements and have a closer connexion with the land and with rural industries than Jews have known for many centuries; and this connexion has a romantic appeal which is lacking to the establishment of however successful an industry. It may well be, however, that when the romantic appeal has lessened, and it is more possible for the National Home to be coldly and objectively appraised, commercial and industrial activities may be seen to be more important than agriculture. It would only be if all connexion with the land were severed, and the National Home became an exclusively industrial and commercial community, that any danger to its present ideals would necessarily be involved; and of this there is at present no sign.

In relation to industry the Department of Trade and Industry of the Agency (again through the Foundation Fund) has followed a policy mainly of indirect aid. It has not undertaken responsibility for industrial projects with its own resources, but it has occasionally subscribed initial sums to undertakings, giving them thereby a reputation and a security in the eyes of private investors. It followed this policy with regard to the two most important

projects in the country, the Palestine Electric Corporation, and the Palestine Potash Works on the Dead Sea. Further than this the Agency has made a valuable contribution to the industrial development of the country by two means. The General Mortgage Bank of Palestine was founded by the Keren Hayesod in 1921, and the Fund had also an extensive share in the activities of the still older institutions, the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which were created in the earliest days of organized Zionism. Another activity of the Department is the spread of information about industrial possibilities, either by the reports of its Economic Research Institute or by its periodic censuses of development, its statistical surveys, and its promotion of and participation in Trade Fairs.

Underlying all these efforts of the Agency stands the work of the Jewish National Fund, which still remains nominally independent of the Agency and under the control of the World Zionist Organization. Whereas the work of the Agency so far described is that of an intelligent and benevolent government, the work of the Jewish National Fund has few if any parallels elsewhere. For its task is to acquire the land on which the National Home is being built. Unlike other pioneering efforts, the remaking of a Jewish Homeland is not being carried out on unowned land. To a large extent the areas now occupied by Jewish settlement are areas of which their previous owners made little or no use. The sand dunes and stretches over which Haifa is spreading were empty, and the western end of the Valley of Esdraelon was a marshy and malarial swamp. Yet all this land belonged to individual owners and the mere demand of the Jews for land gave it a fictitious value. Where purchase remained a private matter, the result was often wild speculation and subsequent incompetent use. Outside Tel Aviv, for example, there was a stretch of several thousand dunams which was offered to the Fund at from £P.8 to £P.10 per dunam. The Fund at the time possessed no resources with which to purchase the land, and it was sold to private Arab and Jewish speculators. The result was that those who wished to erect houses ultimately had to purchase it at fantastic rates which in some quarters reached £P.400 —£P.500 per dunam—£P.1,600–2,000 per acre.

Since its foundation the Jewish National Fund has acquired over 125,000 acres, a third of the total Jewish acquisition of 375,000 acres. The land which it holds is inalienable,[1] and except for 5,500 acres of urban land and about 3,000 acres of forest, it is all agricultural land. Not all of it was fully cultivated before the war, for agricultural settlement is a slow and costly business, but

[1] See note on J.N.F. leases, p. 35.

most of it was at least occupied and being brought into cultivation.

The difficulties under which the Home has grown can be realized when it is remembered again that not only all the money both for the budget of the Agency and the purchase of land is produced by voluntary contributions but that the money for private investment comes also mainly from abroad. Palestinian development is thus dependent not merely on the enthusiasm of the Zionist Organizations in different countries but also on economic conditions in all parts of the world. A world slump or boom produces an immediate effect on Palestine. Similarly conditions in Palestine are likely to affect the confidence with which subscribers part with their money in other countries. The catastrophic fall of the Polish zloty in 1926–1927 had an immediate effect on the transfer of capital from Poland, the main centre from which it had been coming during the previous years; and the result was to accentuate a depression already existing in Palestine owing to the slowness with which the country had absorbed the 50,000 immigrants who had entered in the previous two years. The number of entrants fell rapidly, and for some months more actually left the country than entered it. During the next few years the world prospered and contributions from abroad were high, while the depression in Palestine kept the rate of immigration low. As Palestine recovered the world entered the depression of the early nineteen-thirties. The result was that Palestine offered Jewish capitalists elsewhere an apparently secure field for investment and there was a boom. National funds fell, but private investments increased. In 1932–1933, when America, the largest contributor to the Keren Hayesod, had dropped her contribution from the £P.296,000 of 1926–1927 to £P.39,000, immigration leapt to over 20,000 and two years later reached the peak of 60,000. No national government has ever had to deal with such extraordinary uncertainties. How the income of the Funds has fluctuated throughout can be seen by the table of receipts for the years 1921–1922 to 1939–1940 on page 81.

Such a table graphically presents the difficulty of budgeting over a period of years, and it must also be remembered that economic conditions which diminish the national Funds may also mean similar difficulties for private capitalists in Palestine, to the assistance of whom the National Funds are expected to be able to come. That the Agency has succeeded in tackling this colossal task is shown by the willingness of outside banks to come to its aid in difficulties. In 1933 its liabilities amounted to over £P.500,000, much of which was due to the assistance which it had given to other institutions in the country. Yet in spite of the fluctuations in its past income Lloyds Bank had sufficient

confidence in its basic soundness to assist it by a loan in the following year of £P.500,000.

NET PROPER INCOME OF THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUNDS FROM VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS[1]

	Restoration Fund £P	*Keren Hayesod* £P	*Keren Kayemeth* £P
1917–1918	84,196	—	76,355
1918–1919	147,641	—	119,410
1919–1920	348,964	—	140,711
1920–1921	133,915	227,113	72,674
1921–1922	—	387,580	79,283
1922–1923	—	461,652	80,681
1923–1924	—	444,053	130,829
1924–1925	—	526,486	189,150
1925–1926	—	520,318	200,993
1926–1927	—	634,716	212,812
1927–1928	—	468,483	203,953
1928–1929	—	402,774	197,500
1929–1930	—	305,294	191,050
1930–1931	—	273,931	144,936
1931–1932	—	186,509	129,606
1932–1933	—	172,458	151,528
1933–1934	—	257,185	207,553
1934–1935	—	271,111	251,065
1935–1936	—	314,975	298,992
1936–1937	—	478,853	381,062
1937–1938	—	481,220	403,085
1938–1939	—	626,938	560,006
1939–1940	—	623,359	617,294
	714,716	8,065,008	5,049,446

The fluctuation in population, or rather the fluctuating rate of increase, presents an equally serious difficulty in the planning of the National Home. The actual number to be admitted each year lies with the Mandatory Government and not with the Agency. In so far as entrants bring their own capital, there is no ground for restricting their entry, but the immigrant most sought by the Agency is the one who is to take part in the planned building of the Home—the Haluz or pioneer who will earn his living in agriculture or in artisan occupations. The difficulty of planning ahead in any country, coupled with the peculiar difficulties of Palestine, have resulted in the country having at times to face unemployment sufficiently serious to tax the resources both of the Agency and the Histadruth. But while this situation

[1] Taken from *Bulletin of the Economic Research Institute*, vol. v, No. 3, 1941.

is akin to that in other societies, what is of particular interest in Palestine is the way in which the National Home has been able to absorb with success far larger groups of immigrants than it had any reason to expect. The explanation lies both in the work of the Agency's Economic Research Department, and in its financial policy, which has relied on the stimulation of private enterprise and the attraction of private capital, as well as on the settling of immigrants through the use of its own resources. At no point was this better shown than in the years following the entry of the Nazis into power, when immigration rose to unprecedented heights, and when there were immigrants who entered with little interest in the National Home, and even regarded their sojourn in Palestine as temporary. Yet the National Home was able to absorb them, to employ their capital profitably to themselves and to the community and so to establish them permanently in creative enterprises.

In twenty years the Jewish population has grown from 60,000 to about half a million, and the irregularity of the growth is shown by the following table of immigration. Of these, 143,261 entered under the Labour Schedule, which means as part of the planned economy of the National Home.

TOTAL JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, 1920–1939

	Immigration	*Emigration*
1920 (September to December)	5,514	(*a*)
1921	9,149	(*a*)
1922	7,844	1,451
1923	7,421	3,466
1924	12,856	507 (July to December)
1925	33,801	2,151
1926	13,081	7,365
1927	2,713	5,071
1928	2,178	2,168
1929	5,249	1,746
1930	4,944	1,679
1931	4,075	666
1932	9,553	(*a*)
1933	30,327	(*a*)
1934	42,359	(*a*)
1935	61,854	396
1936	29,727	773
1937	10,536	889
1938	12,868	1,095
1939	16,405	1,019
	322,454	30,442

(*a*) No statistics.

One normal department of public life has not yet been fully dealt with, justice. The National Home has legally no judicial powers whatever over its members. The administration of justice over Jews and Arabs is an affair of the Mandatory Government, and this could not be otherwise. But, with that capacity for voluntarily assuming functions normally in the hands of a government, the settlers refer a large proportion of minor and civil cases to their own local courts of arbitration, or to the courts of the Histadruth whose decisions, in view of the economic and social power of that organization, have sufficient authority to be generally observed. Such a situation may appear more abnormal to Western readers than it actually is, for separate tribunals of various kinds are familiar in the local conditions.

Such is the general plan of the National Home and, with the exception of the grants for education and health from the Mandatory Administration and the rates levied by the Va'ad Leumi, the entire effort from first to last rests on voluntary subscription and on immigrants who voluntarily submit themselves to rigorous training for the purpose of fitting themselves to take part in this work of national revival.

5. *The Sphere of Free Development*

The National Home is not totalitarian. More than half of the immigration, more than half of the agriculture, and the greater part of the industry is based on individual private enterprise, and the Agency has expressed no desire to alter this system which gives flexibility and resilience to the whole.

The main private enterprises in agriculture are connected with the old colonies founded in the nineteenth and early twentieth century largely in the Maritime Plain and its foothills. Here has developed the main Palestinian export—citrus fruit. The old colonies differ from those encouraged by the Agency in that paid labour is freely employed in them, whereas in the Agency's colonies it is an accepted principle that a man shall only occupy as much land as he and his family can cultivate. The paid labour in the citrus and similar farms is to some extent Arab, since Arab labour is cheaper; and a perpetual conflict is waged between the farmers and the Histadruth which would like to see only Jewish labour employed. The Agency has been involved in the conflict to the extent that it has tried to make Jewish labour economically possible by creating housing conditions which would be tolerable to Jewish labourers, and by seeking to blend the seasonal labour on the citrus plantations with other occupations. Although there is a place for this type of agriculture in a general flexible economy,

it is one which depends almost entirely on external world markets and is not capable of indefinite expansion. This is shown by the fact that the planting of new groves, which rose from 15,000 dunams[1] in 1932–1933 to 74,000 in 1935–1936, had almost entirely ceased by 1939. The war and difficulties of shipping have produced a more intense, but probably more ephemeral, crisis. Of the more than 300,000 dunams planted by Jews and Arabs up to 1939, 20,000 have been or are being destroyed, many thousands more are badly neglected, and a Government examination in May 1941 showed that not a single grove was regarded as being in first-class state in respect of leaves, wood, cultivation, and new growth. However, 170,000 of the more than 200,000 dunams planted before the end of 1935, and so now in bearing, were judged sufficiently satisfactory to receive Government assistance. Citrus may normally be regarded as a very valuable part of a permanent agricultural policy, but one on which it is dangerous to place exclusive reliance. Trees planted since 1935 are not yet bearing and it is impossible to say whether they will ever prove economically profitable. The proportion of groves owned by Jews was about one-third in 1913. In 1938 they exported just over two-thirds of the total. During this same period exports have increased from 1,500,000 to 11,500,000 cases.

The method by which industry has been encouraged has already been described. That it has proved successful can again be most easily shown by figures. Owing to the practice of the Agency of noting developments in between the general census years, it is possible to give an adequate picture of what has happened in twenty years. The rapid growth following the Nazi rise to power in 1933 is particularly striking:

Year	*Number of concerns*	*Number of persons engaged (including owners)*	*Horse Power used*	*Capital invested in £P*	*Annual value of production in £P*
1921	1,850	4,750	800	600,000	500,000
1929	2,475	10,968	10,100	2,234,000	2,510,000
1933	3,388	19,595	50,500	5,371,000	5,352,000
1937	5,606	29,986	106,500	11,637,000	9,109,000

What is of importance for the future is the number and variety of the enterprises. The two largest industrial concerns in the country are the Electric Corporation, which has increased the consumption of electricity in the country from 2,527,000 kwh.

[1] A dunam is approximately a quarter of an acre.

in 1927 to 84,077,000 kwh. in 1939 and to 93,873,482 in 1940, and provides essential power for irrigation as well as for industrial purposes; and the Palestine Potash Works, which exploits the inexhaustible wealth of the Dead Sea. The fact that the oil line from Kirkuk debouches at Haifa is also of considerable importance to the country. But the majority of the industries are still small. They are, however, steadily building up a supply of consumer products, which increase the financial stability of the country, and are capable of considerable expansion with the increase of population and the development of markets in the Middle East.

The main centres of industry are the two cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, of which the former is the only entirely Jewish city in the world and the latter is already one of the most important ports in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the course of this brief survey, reference has frequently been made to the way in which work has been done by voluntarily contributed funds which elsewhere is based on taxation. The special character of the National Home is reflected even in the taxation situation. For taxes, direct and indirect, are paid to the Mandatory Administration, and are spent for the benefit of the country as a whole. As in every other country, the bulk of the taxes is paid by the more, and expended on the less, prosperous. This means in Palestine that the Jewish community provides more of the revenue than its proportion of the population, and that the less prosperous Arab community receives more of the services. While any other arrangement would be impossible as well as improper, this naturally places an extra burden on the Agency which cannot, like an ordinary national government, dispose of all the taxes paid by its subjects.

Twenty years is a very short period in the life of a nation and time will bring many changes to the structure of the National Home, as well as a certain stability and maturity it could not yet be expected to possess. But the main structure of a community is there already, and it differs from any Jewish society elsewhere. It is curious that it should be a matter of boasting that in Tel Aviv there are Jewish street scavengers as well as a Jewish mayor, that Jews occupied with the building industry in Palestine do not merely design, construct, or decorate the houses, but that they actually hew the stone in the quarries, grind the cement in the factories, and make the road to the houses. But a knowledge of the structure of Jewish life elsewhere makes it not only natural but proper that this pride should be there. At the same time the National Home retains essential Jewish characteristics in the intellectual and cultural field. Palestinian

music, drama, and cultural life show that the immigrants have no intention of turning their backs on the positive achievements of Jewish life in Europe or America.

The success of the adventure will depend much on the extent to which these two qualities will be maintained when the Home achieves maturity. Circumstances are likely to prevent its becoming a primarily agricultural or rural community, but it would lose more than occupations for some tens of thousands of Jews if Jewish agriculture dwindled. It is likely to develop a strong industrial and commercial side, but again it would lose if this came to be built on Arab and Asiatic labour in the manual and lower-paid grades. And on the other hand, it would lose if the return to manual labour in agriculture and industry meant a loss of cultural and social vitality. It is on its ability to hold on to both that the significance of Palestine to the Jewish people as a whole depends.

On this depends in turn the value of the National Home as an 'instrument of national regeneration' for the Jewish people. It has been the constant claim of Zionists that much of the Jewish problem and many of the unpleasing characteristics of individual Jews derived from their homelessness, and their consequent lack of national dignity. In this argument there has been a good deal of exaggeration, and yet there is also a good deal of truth. Winston Churchill in 1922 stated that the Balfour Declaration aimed at creating 'a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole might take an interest and a pride'. The National Home has had that effect, not only in the communities of America and the West, but still more in the ghettoes and slums of eastern Europe. In the very earliest days of the Zionist Organization it was a Zionist Student Union of Vienna who first taught the 'Aryan' students that a Jew could not be insulted with impunity. In the many university riots in Poland, Rumania, and elsewhere in the inter-war years, it was often the existence of a Zionist Student Union which persuaded the antisemites that it was wisest to arrange for an overwhelming superiority of force before attacking a Jewish student house. There is certainly no doubt that Zionism has had the effect of restoring Jewish self-respect.

It is, however, often said that the reaction has swung too far in the opposite direction, and that one of the social and day-to-day difficulties in Palestine is the arrogant and aggressive behaviour of the colonists and the offence which this gives the Arabs. It would be surprising if this complaint were not sometimes justified. The colonists are young. They have stepped from humiliation and insecurity, from the feeling at best of being tolerated, into being citizens of a country which they feel to be

their own. They see Tel Aviv, not perhaps a queen of cities, but at any rate not a sand dune. They see their colonies, and know that once they were marshes. They have their heroes. The blood of their own people has made their homes sacred. It would indeed be surprising if the first effect of this liberation were not pride and exuberance.

The speed at which the Home has grown, as well as this feeling of freedom, has lent to the whole atmosphere of Zionist politics and discussion a hectic and feverish quality, an argumentativeness, an unwillingness to hear of difficulties, to wait for time to heal scars and to bring adjustment, which justifies the remark that 'it is not necessary to be a little mad to live in Palestine, but it helps'.

All this is natural, as are the violent divisions of Zionist politics, and the virulence with which the slightest divergence of opinion is attacked on the platform or the P ess. But there is another side which puts it into its proper proportion: the amazing discipline which the members of the National Home have shown during the repeated attacks of the Arabs upon them. 'Most of the Jews were killed by the Arabs, most of the Arabs were killed by the Police.' This was the verdict of the court of inquiry into the earliest troubles, and it remained true throughout. Living as they did in the world of the nineteen-thirties it was inevitable that a chauvinist group should emerge also among the Jews, and this group has indulged in reprisals, but the mass of the Zionists remained firm in their discipline right up to the war. And, although the war came during the rule at the Colonial Office of a Secretary whom they regarded (wrongly, in fact) as the worst enemy of the National Home, the outbreak of war was followed by an immediate declaration of loyalty to the British cause, made by Dr. Weizmann as President of the Jewish Agency, and undoubtedly supported by the overwhelming mass of the Jewish population. That this was the case was quickly shown by the tens of thousands of young Jews who volunteered for service. The complications foreseen by the War Office in the creation of a Jewish Army on the one hand, and the natural desire of the volunteers to fight *as Jews* on the other, prevented their offers from being accepted in anything like the numbers they desired; but thousands of Palestinians have served and thousands more were ready to do so.

Finally, it may be said that there is a real sense in which the National Home is the outcome of a millennial Jewish tradition. The claim so frequently made that antisemitism is due entirely to the Dispersion is exaggerated; the belief that a National Home will automatically secure the fair treatment of Jews everywhere

is naïve optimism. But the essence itself of Rabbinic Judaism is so closely interwoven with the idea of the community; the practical implications of the meaning of social justice, of neighbourliness, of mutual help, have filled so many pages of Rabbinic discussion, that it is good that there should be a field in which this long training should find actual expression. It is no question of reconstructing in Palestine the community of the Books of the Law or of the Talmud; but their principles and their spirit are expressed in the social activities of the Histadruth, the Agency, and other bodies in forms which are as visibly modern as they are invisibly traditional. It is the ability to blend together innovation and tradition which gives stability and vitality to a nation, and their long exile had denied this ability to the Jews as a corporate group.

It may well be that, if they can once find a satisfactory adjustment of their relations with the Arab world, the final justification of the National Home as a nation among the nations of the world will be that it gives an example of that flexible and yet planned society, that balance of liberty and order, which at present we associate with Moses and the prophets and with the people of Israel three thousand years ago, rather than with their modern successors.

PART TWO

THE JEWS OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE MINORITY TREATIES

'*The information at the disposal of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the existing relations between the Jews and the other . . . citizens has led them to the conclusion that, in view of the historical development of the Jewish question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protection is necessary to the Jews.*'

Clemenceau to Paderewski, 4 June 1919.

Chapter Four

THE JEWS OF RUMANIA BEFORE 1914

THE most satisfactory background for the study of the activities of the Jewish delegations at Versailles, and of the steps which led to the elaboration of the Minority Treaties, is provided by the history of Rumania during the nineteenth century. The origin and growth of the Rumanian Jewish community, its economic situation, its struggle to obtain political equality with the rest of the population, and the efforts of Western forces, Jewish or other, to assist it—a knowledge of these explains the fears and determinations of both Jewish and non-Jewish eastern European delegations when confronted with the possibility of a new political settlement after the end of the war of 1914–1918.

1. *Origin of the Jewish Community*

The Jewish community included within the frontiers of the Greater Rumania created in 1919 was extremely diverse in origin. The Rumania of 1914 was composed of the two principalities of Moldavia and Walachia. Each possessed a considerable Jewish population; but that of Moldavia (the northern half of the kingdom) was largely akin to the Jewries of Poland and the Ukraine, while that of Walachia, including the new capital Bucharest, was more akin to the Balkan and Mediterranean Jewries, and contained a definite Sephardic element akin to those of Salonika and the Levant, and descended, in part at any rate, from the victims of the expulsion from Spain in 1492. The Greater Rumania of 1919 included also the Bukovina, with its capital at Cernauti (Czernowitz), which had been an Austrian province since 1774, before which it had been under Turkish suzerainty as part of Moldavia; Bessarabia, which had similarly been taken by Russia from Moldavia in 1812; and Transylvania, with its capital at Cluj (Kolosvar), which, though it possessed a certain romantic Rumanian flavour, had been actually under Hungarian suzerainty since the twelfth century. In the population of each of these new provinces there was a Jewish element. That in Bukovina was half-Polish, half-Austrian in character; that of Transylvania contained many German elements, and that of Bessarabia was mostly made up of Russian Jews who had entered the province after the Russian occupation of 1812. The

behaviour of Rumania in 1919 was, therefore, conditioned not only by her experience and policies during the previous sixty years of independence, but also by her knowledge that substantial additions to her Jewish minority had accrued from the new territories which she was given, or had occupied.

From the historical standpoint the most important community was that of the old province of Moldavia. The Jewish percentage in that province was higher than in Walachia, and the Moldavian Jews belonged mainly to that group of the Jewish people which other countries also have found more difficult to assimilate and to fit into their scheme of life than the Sephardic Jews of the south. The decisive period is that which follows the successive partitions of Poland, and it falls easily into two divisions—from the partitions to the establishment of a united Rumanian State of the two provinces in 1859, and from 1859 to 1914.

There is evidence of the presence of Jewish merchants and others in various Rumanian towns from the later Middle Ages, and there were certainly several communities of some numerical importance in the sixteenth century. But our evidence is too slight to say whether these communities had a continuous history, or to describe accurately the conditions under which they lived. Like other Jewries of the time they were protected by some kind of charter, and used well or ill at the will of their rulers. In the eighteenth century they were sufficiently numerous to be organized, with the approval of the Sultan, under a single chief, sometimes a layman, and sometimes a rabbi. While they possessed their own communal laws, Jews were not considered as 'foreigners', but as native inhabitants of the province; but as neither Jew nor Christian was, in the western European sense, a 'citizen', it is not possible to show what exactly is implied in references to native Jews at this period. They appear to have enjoyed freedom of residence in the villages as well as the towns. While general information of the social conditions of the time is somewhat scanty, there is little evidence of violent friction between the Jews and their neighbours, and there seems to have been little preoccupation with a 'Jewish question'. The change in the general atmosphere was the direct consequence of the Partitions of Poland.

Conditions in Moldavia at this time had reached a very low ebb. During the greater part of the eighteenth century the unhappy country had been a battlefield of the rival ambitions of the Austrians, the Russians, and the Turks. The Government was exacting and inefficient, and the tributary Princes were often no more than minor Turkish officials. Apart from three Russian occupations there had been thirty-seven princes between 1700

and 1800. The main interest of these officials was in almost every case the enriching of themselves or their Turkish masters. The boyars, the land-owning class, were impoverished by war, improvidence, and extravagance, although towards the end of the period there was the beginning of a 'Christian' renaissance under Russian, and an 'enlightened' flicker under French, influence. The peasants were still in practice largely tied to the estates on which they lived; they were not finally emancipated from serfdom until 1864; agriculture was only slowly taking the place of pastoral activity in many parts of the country. In the ranks of the middle class there were few natives. Most were Greeks, Armenians, or foreigners, apart from the Jews. There were only two effective centres of culture, both monastic, in the country, and even some of the boyars as well as the bulk of the peasants were illiterate.

The northern frontier of Moldavia was completely open. No effective watch was kept, and it was perfectly easy for anyone to enter the country. In consequence, many Polish Jews took advantage of this to escape from the disorders of Poland, or from the repressive rule of Russia, especially after Nicholas I had introduced military service for Russian Jews in 1827. The capital of Moldavia is Jassy; and before the first Partition its Jewish population seems to have been insignificant. In 1786 they had paid only 5 per cent.[1] of the tax levied on merchants. By 1792 their proportion had risen to 22·5 per cent. For the population of the whole province, the first figures are of 1803, and show approximately 12,000 Jews. This had risen to 18,000 in 1820 and to 24,000 in 1827, of whom some 5,000 resided in the capital, 15,000 in the county capitals and market towns, and the rest in the villages. During this period the general Jewish position was governed by the 47th article of the Code of the Hellenizing Hospodar of Moldavia, Charles Callimachi, which laid it down that 'difference of religion has no influence on the rights of individuals, except when, for other reasons, some difference has been established by law'. The door was thus open for particular restrictions.

In 1829 an event occurred in Rumanian history which had an important effect on the Jews and led to a further increase in the Jewish population. By the Treaty of Adrianople between Turkey and Russia the frontiers of Moldavia were opened to the trade of Europe, and the country, for some years, was supervised by the Russian Government. As a result of the opening of the

[1] These, and subsequent, figures are taken from *La Roumanie et les Juifs* by 'Verax', who though violently anti-Jewish in his opinions is apparently reliable in his figures.

frontier Jewish immigration took on an increased tempo. The export of Rumanian agricultural products and the import of industrial goods meant an enormous increase in the trade wealth of the country. The annual value of foreign trade rose from almost nothing in 1800 to nearly 60,000,000 lei in 1839 and to 210,000,000 in 1859. The lei nominally equalled the gold franc. The small class of Rumanian Christian merchants and artisans were in no condition to take advantage of the new opportunities offered. The former were entirely ignorant of the industrialism which had already begun to make great strides in western Europe, and neither knew of the new industrial goods obtainable, nor possessed the credit or professional organization to obtain them. As to the latter, they lacked both the tools and the skill to compete with these new factory-made goods, once they were introduced to the country. The Jews, with their experience and their connexions throughout the Continent, inevitably came to possess the practical monopoly of the development of a virgin market; and the story of the economic development of the next thirty years, with all that it did both well and ill, is largely, and at times exclusively, a story of Jewish enterprise.

The period of Russian influence which followed the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople led to an attempt to regularize and to restrict Jewish activities, while encouraging their assimilation. By Chapter 3, Annex P, of the Organic Law of Moldavia, approved in 1831, the following regulations were passed:

1. Jews were forbidden to rent agricultural land.
2. They were allowed, under certain conditions, to have their own slaughter-houses.
3. They were allowed to own distilleries in the villages with the permission of the land-owner, and in the towns.
4. They were taxed communally, and the individual allotments were made publicly in the synagogue by their own authorities.
5. Their children could attend the public schools provided their dress was the same as that of other children.

There seems, however, in these laws no intention of treating them as foreigners, but only as a special category of resident—the question of 'citizenship' lies still in the future. The regulations were certainly not regarded by the Jews themselves as sufficiently odious (or else they were not sufficiently enforced) to stem the tide of immigration. By 1831 the Jewish population had risen to 37,000, of whom nearly half resided in Jassy; their numbers stood at 80,000 in 1838; and twenty years later they had reached 119,000 and formed almost 10 per cent. of the total population of Moldavia. By 1859 they formed more than half

the merchants and artisans of Jassy, and 14,000 lived (illegally by a law, never enforced, of 1841) in the villages. But an equally interesting section of the Jewish population, as well as a very important one from the point of view of the development of Rumania, was that which had come to form 45 per cent. of the population of sixty-four small county and market towns—Jews being considerably more than 50 per cent. in the towns of the northern half of the principality, and much less than 50 per cent. in the south.

2. *The Beginning of Political Conflict*

The thirty years from 1829 to 1859 are the most important in the history of the Jews of Rumania. They form the essential basis for the understanding of the Rumanian attitude to the Jews right up to the present time. The period marks the transition from two 'medieval' principalities under nominal Turkish suzerainty to a single 'modern' constitutional kingdom. The national renaissance—if that be not too strong a word—which led to this development was the work of a small minority of idealistic intellectuals and ambitious land-owners. The one group lacked the power, and the other the will, to tackle seriously the economic problem of the peasant and the artisan; the interests of both were concerned with political power and national dignity rather than with economic developments or social reform; and, indeed, the material was lacking for any adequate measures of social amelioration. There were no schools to provide personnel for an intelligent and honest administration, nor were there yet the human materials to construct an educational system or a modern commercial and professional class. This situation was the result of centuries of poverty, disorder, and corruption. It was not the fault of the idealists and the politicians of the nineteenth century. But while they were powerless to make fundamental changes, they were not blind to the situation, nor reluctant to make proposals and pass laws which, had it been possible to carry them out either honestly or effectively, would have created that middle class which was the essential foundation of a nineteenth-century political society. This would have been a difficult enough situation had the material for this class been totally lacking in the country. But this was not the case. It was almost totally lacking *among the Rumanians*; it was—to their minds—omnipresent and all-powerful among the Jews.

Neither plotting nor malice on the part of the Jewish population had given them this monopoly. It was the inevitable consequence of the conditions which confronted the Jewish population,

whether old-established or immigrant, when the Turks opened the frontiers to occidental commercial influences. Developing business inevitably created its own middle and professional class, and it would have been not merely quixotic but impossible for the Rumanian Jews to have set out deliberately to provide at their own expense for the creation of a Rumanian middle class capable of ensuring that no Jewish monopoly of this section of national life should come into existence.

At the same time the power which they exercised over the economic life of the country seemed intolerable even to a reasonable Rumanian patriot. Jewish influence was equally great in the towns and villages, among the peasants and among the landlords. The actual foundation of their position was the virtual monopoly which they enjoyed in both town and village to distil and sell alcohol. In the villages the sale of alcohol was the basis of much more extensive relations with the peasants, for the Jews also bought the peasant's crops and flocks, provided him with all he needed in the way of seed or manufactured goods, lent him money to pay the exactions of his landlord, and often ensured that he lived indebted to them from the cradle to the grave. The activities of the village publican also extended to the owners of the village. He bought and sold for the manor, and the landlord was often as deeply in his debt as the villager. A further extension of the activities of the village tavern-keeper was made possible if he was able to persuade the landowner to obtain a licence for the creation of what can best be called a 'proprietary townlet'. It was in this way that many of the new towns already referred to originally came into existence. Their creation provided a base for extended operations on a more varied scale, and their original population was sometimes 100 per cent. Jewish. But while they owed their existence to Jewish commercial enterprise rather than to any intention to extend modern civilization, those which survived did, in fact, have that effect, and contributed a foundation on which a modern educational and electoral system could be slowly built.

During the whole of this first period Jewish expansion proceeded almost completely unchecked. The Government was too incompetent and too corrupt to make any headway with its attempts at regulation or restriction. Moreover the landowners opposed every kind of reform which would lessen their power or their profits. But the indignation of the politically conscious minority was steadily mounting; while, at the same time, the Jews, conscious both of their insecurity and of the importance of their economic role, were preparing their demand for political equality. A clash was quite inevitable.

At this moment the western Powers intervened in the matter. The Jews of western Europe, in particular the Jews of France, were filled with the tolerant Liberalism of the nineteenth century. Assimilation was their motto, and emancipation its obvious gateway. But they ignored three essential differences between the position in the West and that in Moldavia-Walachia. Their numbers nowhere, except in Holland, rose to 1 per cent. of the population and there was little danger of any sudden increase. They had no monopoly whatever of the economic life of the countries of which they were citizens. Finally, citizenship implies some considerable degree of assimilation. In the West the idea had its peculiar attractions. Knowledge of French or English opened the doors to a great cultural tradition and literature; social equality meant access to the homes of men and women of culture and experience, and to a social life which charmed them and which they desired to emulate. On the other hand the British or French had little fear of the Jew in any field; to open all doors to Jewish competition left them unafraid. They themselves and their children could meet the Jews in education, in the professions, or in commerce, without fear of being extruded by superior Jewish achievements.

Not one of these factors existed in Rumania. The Jews there were powerful numerically, and across the almost unprotected northern frontier was a depressed Jewish population outnumbering the whole Christian population of Rumania by two to one; they were still more powerful commercially and the Rumanians could not compete with them; while in the fields of cultural and social relations there was nothing in Jewish life which attracted the Rumanians, and still less in Rumanian life to attract the Jews. The two communities lived, and desired to live, apart. It is, then, easy to see why the Rumanians were determined to resist any Jewish encroachments in the political field, and why the Jewish desire for political rights was not preceded, as in the West, by a period of assimilation. But why were the Jews not satisfied with the position they had already achieved? The answer can be given in two words. It was *insecure* and it was *ignominious*; and it is probably true to say that the second reason cut as deeply as the first. All that there was either of idealism or of sober appreciation of their position made Jews realize that there was no escape from their insecurity until they were allowed to broaden the base of their existence. On the one hand they could neither own nor rent land elsewhere than in the towns; and on the other they were denied access to all honourable and lucrative public positions, as well as to all the minor grades of the national or local public services. They could only be

merchants and artisans, and if they lost their positions in these fields no others were open to them.

It was equally true that until the Rumanian Christians could obtain a substantial expansion in these fields, any possibility of their establishing a modern democratic state on the western model was entirely illusory. They lacked the whole of that class between landowners and peasants on which a modern state rests for its administration, its educational system, its technical services in war and peace, and even its parliamentary representatives.

The situation was intolerable to both sides, and neither side was in the least to blame. It was also incapable of immediate solution, for neither side could be expected to be capable of the far-sighted planning, elaborate calculation, and extreme patience out of which alone an ultimate solution might have been evolved.

3. *The Intervention of the Powers and of Western Jewry*

The first intervention of the Powers took place at the Conference of Constantinople in 1856, when the English and French diplomats proposed to insert into the constitution of the principalities two clauses, one of which allowed foreigners to possess property, and the other of which gave equality, civil and political, to all the inhabitants of the country, except for those foreigners who were under the protection of foreign powers. The Prince Regent of Moldavia, in refusing to accept these clauses, pointed out that it would give the Jews greater rights than they possessed in the countries across the Moldavian border, so that it would lead to a new immigration. The Convention of Paris in 1858 attempted to reach the end of complete equality by more gradual means, and proposed to insert into the new constitution of the principalities the following clause:

> Moldavians and Walachians of all the Christian confessions shall enjoy political rights. The enjoyment of these rights may be extended to members of other religions by legislative action.

This was felt by the Powers to be more reasonable, as it allowed the Rumanian Government to take the necessary action gradually, but it remained a dead letter.

In the following year the two principalities united themselves by the expedient of unanimously electing the same prince, Colonel Alexander Cuza. Bucharest became the capital. The whole country was occupied with nationalist and political ambitions, and economic questions were ignored. In consequence

Jewish immigration went on unchecked, and Jews spread rapidly into Walachia, where a problem akin to that in Moldavia soon showed itself. The establishment of the new State and its protestations of liberal intentions led to further interest among the Western Powers. In 1860 Crémieux, the President of the newly formed Alliance Israélite Universelle, visited Bucharest to persuade the new Government to adopt a Western, liberal attitude to the folly of religious persecution, and to the advantage of the principle of human equality. Unfortunately neither of these ideas was particularly relevant to the situation. But the Jewish population, finding that it now had an immediate appeal to the Western Powers through the Alliance, which established over thirty committees in the country almost immediately, began to demand political and economic freedom with increased vigour, and every Rumanian action against them was reported, and often misrepresented, in the West. Western Powers took up their complaints; Rumania universally enjoyed a bad press, and was looked down on as a country of medieval barbarity. In actual fact the Government was not unfriendly, but popular resentment against the Jews was rising the whole time. A period of friction led in 1866 to the first violence. The Alliance proceeded to exacerbate the situation by protest and denunciation without any understanding of the problem. German princes wrote to the new king Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. But this time the Rumanian Government was determined to remain firm, and to introduce legislation according to its own ideas of its needs. Although so much of the commerce of the country was in Jewish hands, it must not be supposed that the Jews were a prosperous community with few poor. Constant immigration across the Russian frontier, as well as the speculative nature of many Jewish activities, led to the existence of thousands of paupers and vagabonds among the rural communities. The Government decreed the expulsion of these vagabonds. In some places it was carried out with undue severity, and there were fatal casualties. The Jews resisted, and filled western Europe with their complaints. The Alliance Israélite Universelle denounced the Rumanians as savages. Feeling in the British Parliament was such that after speeches in both Houses the British Government officially protested. Civilized opinion everywhere was shocked—and yet, there was nothing that the Rumanian Government could do other than it did. There could be no improvement in rural areas so long as there was no control of these unhappy people who had no means of support other than that obtained by the irregular and spontaneous exploitation of the peasant on the spot where they happened to be.

Nor could the Rumanian Jews do other than protest against the injustice of legislation which regarded as deliberate criminals men who were involuntary victims of a system they could not alter. But the actions of neither contributed anything to the solution of the problem. The expulsion of vagabonds was followed by the attempted closing of the village inns, and the destruction of a certain number of the private towns which proprietors had created largely for Jewish commerce. These measures also were essential if a beginning was to be made with the fundamental task of raising the status of the peasant by freeing him from drunkenness and debt, but what were the Jews to do who thus lost their livings? There were no new openings for them. A third measure was, in intention at least, more directly creative. It was the establishment of an agricultural Mortgage Bank, to assist peasant and land-owner to escape from the toils of Jewish usury. This also was a serious problem. By lease and mortgage of the estates of the land-owners, and by the indebtedness of the peasants, half the land of Moldavia had come into Jewish hands. In Walachia the situation was similar, but most of the exploiters were Greeks and Armenian, and only a small percentage Jews. But the Bank could only touch the fringe of the problem, especially as it was regarded more as a political gesture than a serious economic undertaking. In all these measures both the Government and the Jews saw only a *Jewish* issue. There would have been more justification for measures affecting Jews adversely if at the same moment other practical measures to raise the status of the peasantry had been put into force, and if measures to free the land had not been concentrated on *Jewish* exploitations but taken a stronger line towards the exploitation of their tenants by the land-owners, and the indifference of the latter to all measures of agrarian reform.

The Government had only made a beginning when the Congress of Berlin met in 1878 with the intention of settling the affairs of Turkey and the Near East. Largely owing to the pressure of Jewish organizations and individuals, the Congress, which proposed to recognize the Rumanian principality as a kingdom entirely independent of Turkish nominal suzerainty, attempted to make this recognition dependent on the immediate grant of civic and political equality to all Jews born in Rumania. Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin reads:

> In Rumania distinction of religious belief or confession may not be used against any individual as grounds for his exclusion from, or incapacity to enjoy, civil and political rights, public employment, the exercise of public functions or dignities, or the practice of any profession or industry in any part of the country.

> The liberty and public practice of all religions shall be guaranteed to all the subjects of the Rumanian State, as well as to foreigners, and no obstacle shall be put in the way either of the hierarchical organisations of the different communions, or to the relations between the spiritual chiefs and their flocks.
>
> Nationals of all the Powers, whether employed in commerce or other occupations, shall be treated in Rumania, without distinction of religion, on a footing of perfect equality.

The Rumanian Government evaded the acceptance of this direct demand by agreeing to introduce a law for the naturalization of its Jewish subjects. But this law, when introduced, compelled each individual to obtain a separate act of Parliament for his naturalization, unless he belonged to a very small category, such as that of combatant in the war of independence. But even most of the 833 individuals in this category failed, in fact, to secure their naturalization. For this there was no justification whatever. In fact, while in the conflict during the fatal years from 1829 to 1859 it is impossible to blame either side, and while during the period 1859 to 1879 it is impossible to deny that the measures proposed by the Government, even when their execution was open to criticism, were, in themselves, essential to the development of the country, from 1879 onwards the situation changed.

The slowness of the further progress of the country towards the ideal of a modern democratic State was due, not to the predominance of Jews in economic life, but to the selfishness of the great proprietors, the sterile quarrels of politicians, and, in the earlier period, to the intrigues of Russia or Austria. The Jews began to play their familiar but unhappy role of scapegoat, and measures were passed, and ruthlessly if irregularly enforced, which undermined the position of the Jews without conferring any comparable benefit on the general economy.

The best evidence that the 'power' of the Jews was becoming a thing of the past is to be found in a simple fact. The persecutions which followed the assassination of the Russian Emperor, Alexander II, in 1881 led to a panic flight of Russian Jews which lasted until 1914. It would be expected that Rumania, with her long and ill-guarded frontier with Russia, would have again been flooded with Jewish immigrants. But while there were doubtless individuals who entered the country, there was no great influx. During the same period Rumania herself became a country of Jewish emigration. In 1882 little companies of Jews joined with others from Russia in the foundation of the first colonies in Palestine; and larger numbers sought to join the steady stream of Russian emigrants to the United States. From

1880 onwards there is little sign of anything but a normal increase by birth of the Rumanian Jewish population and, in consequence, their proportion to the total population steadily dwindled. Before the war of 1914 it had become less than 5 per cent. of the total, though it was somewhat higher in Moldavia.

The fact that immigration almost ceased had another effect. It became more and more artificial to insist that the Jews were foreigners when each year the proportion of those born abroad was decreasing, and an increasing majority had known no other country of residence. Yet even those Jews who served in the Rumanian army in the Balkan war remained foreigners. Refusal to accept Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin was the cornerstone of Rumanian policy. It enabled the Government to avoid ever mentioning the word 'Jew' in its legislation. All that it had to do was to limit this or that activity to 'those in possession of civil and political rights'. In this way the part played by the Jews in commerce and the artisanate was steadily reduced. And both foreign and domestic criticism was deflected by the simple statement that Rumania was doing no more than any other country in insisting that 'nationals' had prior rights to 'foreigners'.

To describe in detail the long series of laws in which this policy was consistently maintained, whatever party happened to be in power, is unnecessary. But mention must be made of one field, education, in which the evil results of this antisemitic policy showed themselves increasingly up to 1939. Education in Rumania was free right up to the university. In the beginning at any rate the number of schools was totally insufficient, and there was some plausibility in the refusal of access to 'foreigners' except on payment. But, instead of modifying this as time went on, it became more rigid, and 'foreigners' were excluded, even if willing to pay. Further, the Jews themselves were only able to open schools under great disadvantages, since the Jewish communities early lost the right to be considered juridical personalities able to hold property. This prevention of education meant that the assimilation of the rising generation became more impossible, and the standard of Jewish life tended to decline rather than to rise. But this was only one side of the picture. The other side was equally serious. The schools, especially the secondary schools and the two universities of Bucharest and Jassy, became centres of extreme antisemitic nationalism. After 1919 the same was true of the new universities of Cernauti and Cluj. It was from the universities that the first movements of violence spread, and it was from the universities that public invitations to violence continually proceeded.

The leaders of the antisemitic movement after 1919 were two university Professors, Jorga of Bucharest and Cuza of Jassy.

It is impossible to claim that the Rumania of 1859 or of 1878 could have assimilated her Jewish population; but there is no reason to make the same claim for the Rumania of 1900 or 1919. Had there been a progressive relaxation of restrictions, had education given a progressive admission to citizenship with its responsibilities and dignities; had a more liberal policy increased the education and raised the standard of living of the whole class of which the Jews would have formed a part, had the dispersal of the Jews from the commercial occupations in which they were too numerous or too powerful been accompanied by their admission to other occupations, their services could have been of great value to the rising economy of the country, and their loyalty to the Rumanian Government assured beyond suspicion. But Rumanian statesmen were not wise enough to tread this path. They came to Versailles determined only to maintain their traditional attitude; while the Jews of Rumania could see no other hope for a future change than in obtaining international protection.

Chapter Five

THE JEWISH QUESTION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

1. *Diplomatic Treatment of the Jewish Question*

THE Balfour Declaration opened a new chapter in the history of Jewish-Gentile relations, but it was evident before 1919 that the Peace Conference would have to consider also the situation of the Jews still resident in eastern Europe.

That the Jewish question should appear on the agenda of an international conference was no novelty; it had been brought before every important European Congress since 1815. At the Congress of Vienna German Jews tried to ensure that the partial emancipation which the influence of the French Revolution had secured them in various parts of Germany should not be lost in the wave of reaction which followed the downfall of Napoleon; but in this they were almost completely unsuccessful. The matter was brought up again at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 through the efforts of an Anglican clergyman, the Reverend Lewis Way, whose memorandum on the subject of Jewish rights was submitted to and approved by the Tsar Alexander I; but nothing came of it except a pious resolution. In the end Western Jewry completed its emancipation, not through international action, but through the spread of liberalism in the different countries. There remained the humiliating situation of eastern European and Balkan Jewry. The Congress of London in 1830, which recognized the Kingdom of Greece, was able to secure the insertion of a clause in the Greek constitution guaranteeing the equal rights of all minorities, thereby including Jews without mentioning them; and this clause was honourably observed by the Greek Government. The Congress of Paris, which met between 1856 and 1858 to regulate Turkish affairs, found that the Jews of Turkey received a fair measure of toleration, but it failed completely—the first of a series of failures —to secure equality for the Jewish population of the newly recognized autonomous provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 registered a similar failure when the two principalities were made into the independent kingdom of Rumania. Serbia and Bulgaria, who also received sovereign status at this conference, gave equal rights to their Jewish citizens; Rumania first refused, then accepted an obligation to

insert the requisite clauses in her constitution gradually, and finally evaded the issue by legalistic chicaneries. At the conference of Bucharest in 1913 another attempt was made to secure the fulfilment of Rumanian promises made at the Congress of Berlin, this time on the initiative of the United States, but again Rumania proved obdurate. The result was that the Jews of Rumania, together with the much larger numbers in Russia, were still awaiting emancipation in 1914.

The United States was the only country which had had the courage to attempt officially to tackle Russia's treatment of her Jewish subjects. The opportunity arose out of the commercial treaty of 1839 between the two countries, which guaranteed to the subjects of either equal treatment in the territories of the other. Great Britain made a similar treaty in 1869 but, when a British Jew was subjected to humiliating treatment in Moscow in 1912, the British Government refused to intervene, on the ground that the treaty was to be interpreted as meaning treatment equal to that accorded to Russian subjects of a similar category, so that an English Jew in Russia could not claim exemption from restrictions imposed on Russian Jews. This interpretation of the treaty the British Foreign Office maintained up to 1917. The United States adopted the opposite principle, and claimed that an American passport guaranteed the bearer, whatever his race, rights equal to those granted to full Russian citizens; and the State Department refused to tolerate the idea that a foreign Government could discriminate between one citizen of the United States and another. Russia refused to accept this interpretation; and feeling in the United States ran so high at this insult to the American passport that in 1911 President Theodore Roosevelt denounced the treaty rather than accept an interpretation similar to that of the British Foreign Office.

On most of the occasions mentioned above the first initiative had been taken by the Jewish communities of either England, France, or the United States, not acting directly, but securing the favourable influence of their respective Foreign Offices. It therefore was in accordance with a tradition already well established that at the beginning of 1915 the leaders of the Anglo-Jewish community got into touch with the British Foreign Office, in order to discuss with the British Government questions which might arise out of the war situation as well as the presentation of Jewish needs at the Peace Conference. A special officer of the community, Mr. Lucien Wolf, was accredited to the Foreign Office, and given the necessary facilities to allow him to maintain regular contact with it.

2. *Jewish Proposals in Preparation for the Peace Conference*

The attention of the British and Allied Governments was drawn to the complexity of the Jewish situation in an admirably subtle and brilliant memorandum by Lucien Wolf dated 15 June 1916.[1] While stating frankly that the Jewish community had 'not yet fully considered their attitude to the Peace Congress', he painted a picture of the extremely embarrassing situation in which the Allies would find themselves if they ignored the Jewish position and Jewish wishes in relation to it. In the first place, he explained, Jews in neutral countries, and extensive circles who sympathized with them, were critical and even hostile to an Alliance, pledged to all kinds of moral purposes, but which included so notorious a Jew-baiter as Russia.[2] Wolf recognized that Jews in the Allied countries saw clearly that any proposal that the Allies should stand for Jewish emancipation would be 'likely to prove extremely disagreeable to their Russian ally'. But he pointed out that 'the raising of the question, however, will not depend wholly on the discretion of the victorious Allies, since in the measure that it is embarrassing for them it will afford an opportunity for the enemy. . . . There were several forms in which the question might be raised, all of them equally awkward for the Allies.' He indicated three:

1. The Central Powers might claim that the privileges conferred by them on the Jews in the western provinces of Russia during the period of their occupation should be maintained.
2. They might claim that the Polish Question should be treated as an International and not a Russian Question, and that the creation of an autonomous Poland should be subject to conditions of liberal government laid down by the Great Powers.
3. They might deal with the question rhetorically, on the ground of their alleged solicitude for oppressed nationalities.

All this was perfectly true, and Wolf was not exaggerating the harm that might be done to the Allied cause were the question ignored. For, at the time of writing, Germany was in occupation of most of the Russian provinces in which Jews lived; and, owing to the influence of the German Jewish community, she had introduced a number of measures for the amelioration of their situation. Moreover it was known that Russia would claim at the conference the return of the Polish provinces taken by Germany and Austria during the partitions of Poland, and in these pro-

[1] Text in L. Wolf, *Report to the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association*, p. 41.

[2] Rumania did not enter the war until 27 August 1916, but negotiations with her were already in progress—a fact known to Mr. Wolf.

vinces Jews had long enjoyed equal rights with the rest of the population.

While, in the event, the Russian Revolution saved the Allies from the embarrassment of Imperial Russia's intentions—or lack of intentions—towards her Jewish subjects, the German conquest of Rumania, and the Treaty of Bucharest signed on 7 May 1918, acted as another reminder to the Allies that the Jewish question could not be ignored. For Articles 27 and 28 of that Treaty contained provisions for the immediate grant of full political equality to all Jews who had fought in the war, or who were born of parents themselves born in Rumania—a partial emancipation indeed, but considerably more than had been secured by previous international intervention.[1] And here also the known territorial ambitions of Rumania were as embarrassing as might have been those of Russia. The Austrian Jews of Bukovina, the Hungarian Jews of Transylvania, and the Bulgarian Jews of the Dobrudja, had all enjoyed full political rights under the Central Powers, and Germany would have been able to appear at the Peace Conference as the champion of liberalism against the hypocritical pretensions of her victors, were they prepared to hand over to the reactionary policy of the Rumanian régime nearly half a million Jews, who had enjoyed liberty for half a century.

This memorandum of Lucien Wolf secured its object of obtaining a sympathetic hearing for the Jewish case, and he was asked for a specific statement of Jewish ideas on the subject. In a formal communication from the Presidents of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, dated 1 October 1916, the Jewish programme was laid down.[2] It contained four points:

1. *Jews of Russia:* Abolition of all political and civil disabilities differentiating them from their Christian fellow-countrymen.
2. *Jews of Rumania:* Recognition of the right to Rumanian nationality of all Jews born in Rumania, and the immediate fulfilment of Article XLIV[3] of the Treaty of Berlin in regard to them.
3. *Jews in ceded territories:* To enjoy the same equal rights with their Christian co-nationals as by law they enjoy at present.
4. *Jews in Palestine:* The Jewish population to be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.

[1] Wolf, *Report to the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association*, p. 61.
[2] Ibid., p. 43. [3] See p. 100 above.

In formulating this programme Anglo-Jewish leaders, in concert with the similar leaders of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Jewish Community of Rome and the American Jewish Committee, were only demanding that the Peace Conference should at last bring to fruition the struggle which they had waged, ever since their own emancipation, for similar rights for their less fortunate brethren. While they were prepared to support moderate 'municipal privileges' in entirely Jewish colonies of Palestine, they considered both that personal equality with other citizens was the be-all and end-all of Jewish ambition in Europe, and that they themselves were qualified to express the wishes of the millions of eastern-European Jewry.

But eastern-European Jewry, and the eastern-European Jews in the West and particularly in the United States, disagreed with them on both heads. They were not satisfied with the demand for personal equality; and they intended to send representatives themselves to the Peace Conference. The conflict between the 'assimilationist' and 'nationalist' standpoints proved insoluble, and, in the result, there were two sets of Jewish Delegations present at Versailles. To trace this second development of Jewish policy it is necessary to turn to the movements agitating Russian circles at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In the early days of interest in nationality in eastern Europe it is not surprising if Jews were relatively unaffected. The recognition of a nationality was considered to imply territory and the ultimate ambition to make that territory into an autonomous or sovereign State. It was not until the very end of the nineteenth century that a new idea was put forward in Austria, that nationality was an affair of personal interest not of geography, so that a group of people geographically scattered might form a nationality by the simple fact of their common interest. At this point nationalism, as a political movement, linked itself on to a growing consciousness of their special needs among the Jewish pioneers of the proletarian and revolutionary movements in Russia. The Bund, the Jewish Socialist organization in Russia, was originally a Jewish organization because it was necessary to propagate Socialist ideas among Jewish workers in Yiddish; but when the Bund joined the newly formed Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party it asked permission to agitate also for Jewish autonomy in Jewish matters. But Russian Socialists regarded nationalism as bourgeois, and the Bund was expelled from the organization. Problems of a somewhat similar character beset the development of nationalism among Zionist Jews. The Poale Zion, the Zionist Socialist organization, seceded from the other Zionists because they were not Socialists; but it then lost itself in

bitter divisions over the problem of whether their nationalism necessitated the making of demands for the autonomy of Jews living in Russia, or whether that was treason to the idea of a Jewish nationality in Palestine or some other country of colonization.

The problems which beset organizations beset also individuals. On one side was a small group of assimilated Jews who aspired to membership of the Duma and to complete emancipation on the western European model. These feared the raising of the national issue at all because their case was based on identity of interest between Jewish and non-Jewish Russians. On the other side were single writers and journalists who were convinced that a national status for Jews in Russia was an essential complement either to their Socialism or to their Zionism.

It was not until after the failure of the Duma of 1905 to achieve any solid reforms that Jewish organizations suddenly crystallized their stand on national rights; and Zionists, Socialists, and a certain proportion of middle-class non-Zionist groups were united (so far as their ideologies were concerned) in pressing for more than either personal emancipation or permission to emigrate to Palestine. Yet, in spite of the union of ideologies, the Zionist, non-Zionist and Socialist groups refused to join together, and each put forward a slightly different programme of action.

It was in 1906 that this phase of Russian Jewish life came to a head. The Zionist groups put forward a programme at their convention at Helsinki which demanded the recognition of Jewish nationality, with the right to self-government in all affairs of Jewish national life, as a means of invigorating Jewish life in Russia, and so providing an admirable background for the selection of settlers for Palestine. The Bund had come to a similar point of view from a Socialist angle. The 'bourgeois' groups were compelled to adopt some kind of national programme or forfeit all influence.

The whole agitation proved little more than a bubble. By 1907 it was dying down, and by 1914 it survived as an interest only among some of the Zionist groups, and even so in a subordinate position. Assimilationists returned to the struggle for personal emancipation, and Socialist Jews accepted the refusal of the Second International to recognize Jewish national rights.

The outbreak of war, and the fluidity of the eastern European situation brought the whole issue to the front again, but the terrain on which the conflict was fought had shifted half across the world. The Jews of Russia itself were able to keep in some touch with Western Jewry; but the majority of them were refugees from the war fronts or living under German occupation; and

even those who were free needed to be cautious about raising any issue which might lead to a suspicion of their patriotism. But there were close on two million eastern-European Jews settled in the United States, and it was among them that the demand for the recognition of Jewish nationality reappeared. It was voiced by the 'Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs' organized under the Presidency of Louis D. Brandeis at the end of August 1914. The demand provoked exactly the same conflict in America as it had in Russia. Jewish affairs, both at home and abroad, had been thus far in the hands of a body called the 'American Jewish Committee', founded in 1906, and representing a point of view very similar to those of the British Board of Deputies and the French Alliance Israélite Universelle. This body was extremely reluctant to accept the idea put forward by the Zionists that a representative American Jewish Congress should be summoned to express its views on Jewish Peace Aims.

After interminable negotiations, whose constant breakdowns reflected the real conflict of opinions involved, and whose constant resumptions equally reflected the sincerity of American Jewish leadership and its determination to make its voice effective at the Peace Conference, an American Jewish Congress met in Philadelphia on 15 December 1918, elected its delegates to the Peace Conference, and put forward a programme which had the support of both parties in America. This 'Jewish Bill of Rights', passed unanimously on 18 December, contained the following provisions:[1]

1. All inhabitants of the Territory of . . . including such persons together with their families, who subsequent to August 1, 1914, fled, removed or were expelled therefrom and who shall within ten years from the adoption of this provision return thereto, shall for all purposes be citizens thereof, provided, however, that such as have heretofore been subjects of other States, who desire to retain their allegiance to such States or assume allegiance to their successor States, to the exclusion of . . . citizenship may do so by formal declaration to be made within a specified period.
2. For a period of ten years from the adoption of this provision, no law shall be enacted restricting any former inhabitant of a State which included the territory of . . . from taking up his residence in . . . and thereby acquiring citizenship therein.
3. All citizens of . . . without distinction as to race, nationality or creed shall enjoy equal civil, political, religious and national rights, and no laws shall be enacted or enforced which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of, or impose upon any persons any discrimination, disability or restriction whatsoever on account of race.

[1] Quoted from O. Janowsky, *Jews and Minority Rights (1898–1919)*, pp. 266 *seqq.*

nationality, or religion, or deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.

4. The principle of minority representation shall be provided for by the law.
5. The members of the various national, as well as religious bodies of . . . shall be accorded autonomous management of their own communal institutions whether they be religious, educational, charitable or otherwise.
6. No law shall be enacted restricting the use of any language, and all existing laws declaring such prohibitions are repealed, nor shall any language test be established.
7. Those who observe any other than the first day of the week as their Sabbath shall not be prohibited from pursuing their secular affairs on any day other than that which they observe; nor shall they be required to perform any acts on their Sabbath or Holy Days which they shall regard as a desecration thereof.

Before the Peace Conference met the Jews of eastern Europe had recovered their freedom to express their wishes. Fighting was—officially at any rate—over; Russian Tsarism was no more; and everybody was planning the shape of the new Europe. Largely under the inspiration of the office which the Zionist Organization had set up at Copenhagen to conduct propaganda and maintain contacts during the war, local Zionist groups everywhere summoned congresses to discuss the future of the Jews. In all some thirty such gatherings met, and could claim between them to represent a good many millions of Jews. All declared for full national rights, on the basis of a Manifesto sent out from Copenhagen which made the following demands:

1. A National Home in Palestine.
2. In all other countries full equality of rights, including 'national autonomy, cultural, social and political, for the Jewish population of countries largely settled by Jews, as well as of all other countries whose Jewish population demanded it.'
3. Admission of the Jewish people to the League of Nations.

It will be seen that these demands went further than those of the American Jewish Congress, especially in the request for the recognition of one world-wide Jewish nation.

Meanwhile the Joint Committee of the British Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association had also elaborated its original programme into a 'Bill of Rights', which it submitted to the Foreign Secretary in a Memorandum dated 2 December 1918. Taking Poland as a typical case, the Committee suggested the inclusion of the following clauses in the Peace Treaty:[1]

[1] Wolf, *Report to the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association*, p. 73.

All persons born in the territories forming the new Republic of Poland, who do not claim to be subjects of foreign States, and all subjects of the States to which these territories formerly belonged, who are permanently domiciled in those territories, and who do not desire to retain their present nationality, shall be deemed to be citizens of the Polish State, and shall enjoy equal political and civil rights without distinction of race, language or religion.

The freedom and outward exercises of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to the Polish State, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

All religious and cultural minorities in Poland shall be secured in the autonomous management of their religious, educational, charitable, and other cultural institutions, provided always that the Polish language shall be made an obligatory subject of instruction in their schools.

Differences of race or religious creed shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or to public schools, universities, education endowments and the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatever.

The subjects and citizens of all the Powers, traders or others, shall be treated in Poland, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality.

The document studiously omits the word 'national' and makes no such general claim as that of the fourth American clause; but it goes further than the previous Anglo-Jewish memorandum in asking that 'religious and cultural' minorities should be allowed 'the autonomous management of their religious, educational, charitable, and cultural institutions'.

3. *Jewish Delegations at Versailles*

The delegation of British Jews was not the only representative of the anti-national point of view at the Peace Conference, although it turned out to be the most important. The leaders of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, through the fact that the conference was meeting at Paris, considered themselves entitled to take the lead in all Jewish questions. But their dignity was so excessive, and their attitude to the nationalist aspirations of the Eastern Jews so hostile, that they were unwilling to co-operate in any attempt to find a common solution which would involve a compromise on their previous attitude. In consequence their influence was very much less than that of the British, who shared their general point of view, but were prepared to co-operate to some extent with the Easterners.

The Americans, by their personal contacts with President Wilson and by the fact that their delegation included both points of view, were unquestionably the most influential. But while the British maintained a more or less continuous contact with the American delegation, even though it contained a strong nationalist element, the French went so far as to send one of their leaders over to the United States in order to persuade the American Jewish Committee to send a separate representative of the American anti-national point of view over to Paris—in spite of the fact that the President of the American Jewish Committee, Louis Marshall, was present in Paris as an elected member of the American Jewish Congress.

Between the Nationalists and the French obviously no co-operation was possible; but even within the Nationalist ranks continuous difficulties occurred. In its most extreme form the Eastern demand was for the recognition of a single Jewish nation with a central council which should be a full member of the League of Nations. Such a desire was rejected, not only by the British and French anti-nationalists, but also by the American sympathizers with nationalism, who saw in this an alteration of their own status in America which they could not accept as necessary.

Less compromising from their standpoint was the demand that the Jews of any country should be entitled to be regarded as a separate *national minority*. In the immediate situation this aspect of the question had considerable practical importance. If the Jews were considered only a *religious* group, then their *nationality* depended on that of the majority immediately surrounding them. But eastern Europe at the time had no fixed frontiers, and conflicts, sometimes amounting to civil war, were raging all over the area. Why, asked the Jews, must they declare themselves in favour of one side or the other, by claiming one or the other *nationality*? Their desire was to be left alone by both sides, and this they saw best assured in the recognition of their nationality as Jewish. The demand of Jews of eastern Hungary to be considered Jews by nationality illustrates the dilemma in which several million Jews found themselves. By nature they were an extremely assimilationist group, calling themselves proudly 'Israelitish Magyars'. But somewhere across their region would be drawn the new frontier of Rumania, and east of that frontier it would be bad enough to be a Jew, but it would be intolerable to be both a Jew and a Hungarian. Common sense demanded that they should be allowed to be simply Jews. The Jews of Silesia adopted a similar attitude while Poles and Germans were fighting in the region.

Deeper reasons also pointed in the same direction. The communities of France and England, which so opposed national rights, were small and scattered; and they shared the language, tradition, and ethical outlook of the societies in which they lived. Eastern Jews had their own language; they lived in much more compact local groups—many towns of eastern Europe were more than half populated by Jews—and they differed considerably in outlook and way of life from their neighbours. Moreover the Jews of the West were sufficiently wealthy to be able to afford such institutions as they desired, without having to claim exemption from ordinary rates and taxes; the Jews of the East were not. They wanted their own schools and institutions, but could not afford also to pay for those of the majority; so that it seemed reasonable to ask that a proportion of the public money allotted to such purposes should be given to them for their own educational or charitable systems. They were strengthened in their insistence on national rights by the fact that there had been in 1918 an actual example in existence of a multinational state—the independent republic of the Ukraine. In that short-lived republic had been devised a system of Secretaries of State for each of the minorities, Great Russian, Jewish, and Polish; and these Secretaries had wide executive powers. Any citizen of the Ukraine could declare his membership of one of these nationalities, and any other group could apply for 'national-personal' recognition. Troubled conditions and the brief duration of the life of the republic make it impossible to assess how the system would have worked, but it offered an inspiring example to other Jewish communities. The keystone of the structure was the existence of the Secretary of State as a full member of the Central Government; but his existence did not imply direct relations with other Jewish communities outside the Ukraine, nor did it necessitate a similar Jewish structure in countries where it would be inappropriate. The recognition of its utility in eastern Europe would not therefore imperil the status of Jews in the West.

It was this belief that different solutions were reasonable in East and West which made the American unity possible, and even the British and French delegations, although they themselves refused to put forward the demand for national rights, were ultimately obliged to agree not to oppose it if it were put forward by the Nationalists. But this was the fullest extent to which Jewish unity became possible at Paris.

While the French Jews worked with the British Jews, the rest set up a Committee of Jewish Delegations, under the Presidency of the American leader, Judge Julian Mack. The Committee was

a cumbrous and rather vague body, for the smaller Eastern delegations were continually changing. But it was able to take advantage of the close friendship which existed between its American leaders and the entourage of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, and some of its personnel enjoyed the personal friendship and esteem of Wilson himself.

These contacts proved extremely significant. Since the Jews were not members of the Peace Conference, the success of any of their proposals depended on their ability to convince the main Allied Delegations of their claims. The Zionists had succeeded in obtaining the Balfour Declaration while the war was still in progress. So far as national rights in eastern Europe were concerned, the work had all to be done after the war was over. The preliminary discussions of Lucien Wolf with the British, and of the Alliance with the French, Foreign Offices, had concerned only personal political equality. The only non-Jewish body of any importance which had given the matter consideration and had ultimately accepted the Nationalist Jewish claims, was the Second Socialist International, and that was not represented at Paris.

The joint American-Eastern groups, on 10 May 1919, presented a new 'Bill of Rights' to the Conference, many of whose provisions went considerably beyond the original American demands. The new proposals were as follows:[1]

I. The State of . . . undertakes the following obligations to each of the other Allied and Associated Powers, and recognizes them to be obligations of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction:

1. Without any requirement of qualifying or other proceedings, the State of . . . admits and declares to be . . . citizens:

(*a*) All persons born in the territory recognized to be . . . in this Treaty, who have not heretofore been naturalized in some other country, and who were resident or domiciled in such territory at any time since August 1st, 1909, or who have maintained their relation to such territory within such period by passport issued by the present or the former sovereignty;

(*b*) All persons who were inhabitants of such territory on August 1st, 1914;

(*c*) All persons hereafter born in . . . and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

Any person belonging to classes (*a*) or (*b*) may however within two years after the coming into force of this treaty opt his former citizenship.

[1] Quoted from D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, vol. IX, pp. 191–4.

2. The State of . . . agrees that all citizens of . . . shall enjoy equal civil, religious, national and political rights without distinction as to birth, race, nationality, language or religion; assumes the obligation to protect the life, liberty and property of its inhabitants and assures to them freedom of religion and of the outward exercise thereof.

3. None of the foregoing rights shall be abridged, nor shall any discrimination, disability or restriction whatsoever be imposed by law or otherwise upon any person on account of race, nationality or religion, nor shall he be denied the equal protection of the law. All existing laws, decrees and ordinances in contravention herewith are repealed.

4. The right of any person to use the language of any national minority of . . . in business, private intercourse, at public meetings and in the press as well as before the various tribunals either orally or in writing shall not be limited; nor shall any such national minority be restricted in the use of such language in its schools and other institutions, nor shall the validity of any transaction or document be affected by the use of any language whatever. Schools which employ the language of any national minority shall if their course of study complies with the general educational requirements enjoy equal rights with all other schools of the same grade. All existing language restrictions are repealed.

5. The State of . . . recognizes the several national minorities in its population as constituting distinct, autonomous organizations, and as such having equally the right to establish, manage and control their schools and their religious, educational, charitable and social institutions.

   Any person may declare his withdrawal from such a national minority.

   Within the meaning of the articles of this chapter, the Jewish population of . . . shall constitute a national minority with all the rights therein specified.

6. The State of . . . agrees that to the extent that the establishment and the maintenance of schools or religious, educational, charitable or social institutions may be provided for by any State, departmental, municipal or other budget, to be paid for out of public funds, each national minority shall be allotted a proportion of such funds based upon the ratio between its numbers in the respective areas and the entire population therein. Moreover, the authorities of each national minority shall be empowered to impose obligatory contributions upon the members of such minority.

7. The State of . . . agrees that each national minority shall have the right to elect such proportion of the entire number of representatives in all State, departmental, municipal and other public elective bodies based upon the ratio of its numbers in

the respective electoral areas to the entire population therein. They are to be chosen by independent electoral colleges or by such other equivalent methods as shall assure to such minorities like national proportional representation.

8. Those who observe any other day than Sunday as their Sabbath shall not be required to perform any acts on their Sabbath or holy days which by the tenets of their faith are regarded as a desecration, nor shall they be prohibited from pursuing their secular affairs on Sunday or other holy days.

9. The State of . . . agrees that the foregoing obligations are hereby embodied in her fundamental law as a bill of rights, with which no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere and as against which no law, regulation or official action shall have validity or effect. None of the foregoing provisions shall be amendable without the consent of the League of Nations.

II. Any of the signatories of the treaty of which this chapter shall constitute a part and any minority that may be affected by a failure to observe or to effectuate any of the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to submit their complaint for adjudication to the League of Nations or to such tribunal as it may establish and upon such condition as it shall prescribe.

4. *The Formulation of the Minority Treaties*

There was extremely little planning in the development of the Peace Conference. Almost everything seems to have been improvised as the need for it was discovered. This was particularly so in so far as minorities were concerned. In January 1919 President Wilson, in one of his drafts of the Covenant of a League of Nations, had introduced the protection of minorities, either as an obligation to be imposed on new States, or as one to be accepted by all States becoming members of the League. In both forms it encountered such opposition that the matter was perforce dropped. The main argument used against it was that conditions differed so much from minority to minority that no general provisions would cover all cases. This attempt having failed, the matter was left on one side for three months; but this time was used by interested parties, especially the Jewish delegations, to press their views in conversations and memoranda on those delegates to whom they could obtain access.

The first to act were the French and British Jews. Finding that there was a danger that the Allies might accept as adequate some vague and, from their point of view, quite unsatisfactory statements of the Poles and Rumanians as to their intentions, the two groups drew up similar documents and submitted them on 21 February. The co-operation of the Nationalist Jewish

delegations had been asked for but, when difficulties were raised, the French and British acted alone. The memorandum closely followed the previous British Jewish proposals. But at the suggestion of the French an important addition was made—it was proposed that any 'persons or communities who may suffer from the non-observance of any provisions of this Article shall have the right to submit their complaints to the Executive Committee of the League of Nations, and to seek the protection of that body'. This was the first occasion on which the possibility of appeal to an international organization was suggested.

In March the leaders of the American Jewish Congress had an interview with President Wilson during his visit to the United States, and urged on the President the reasonableness of the demand of Eastern Jews for national rights. Wilson, however, refused to commit himself to more than a general expression of sympathy, and the matter still remained in suspense. It was not until the middle of April that actual formulae were seriously discussed. Then the American Jewish delegation succeeded in getting the ear of David Hunter Miller, Legal Adviser to the American Delegation. They put forward their 'Bill of Rights', and Miller considered it from the standpoint of what seemed to him possible in the political atmosphere of the Conference. To the great disappointment of the Jews, Miller's amended proposals entirely omitted the word 'national'. Further discussions ensued, as a result of which he consented to include the term. It is worth noting that by this time the original eastern European demand for equality of status in a multinational state had completely vanished. The American Jews had never accepted it, and Mack had even threatened to resign if it were so much as put forward. The practical question was whether corporate 'minority' rights could be secured in a State dominated by a single nationality.

The State under consideration at the time was Poland, for the Polish Republic was to be a signatory of the Treaty with Germany, and her acceptance as a signatory was an *ipso facto* acceptance of her full sovereignty. If anything were to be done to guarantee the thirteen-odd million members of minorities who would be found within the proposed boundaries of the State, it would have to be done quickly, or it would be held by the Poles to constitute an unwarrantable interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign State.

The American Delegation had raised the matter on general grounds at a session at the end of April, but it was the Economic Section of the British Delegation which raised this essential constitutional issue, pointing out that the Treaty embodied

Poland's relations with Germany, but said nothing of her relations with the Allies. And it was they who insisted that it would be impossible to demand guarantees from Poland afterwards without infringing that sovereignty, even though everyone was convinced that some guarantee was essential if both Jews and other minorities were not to run the risk of losing the rights which they had previously enjoyed under German rule. The matter was referred to a committee, and the committee found it impossible to prepare an adequate document in time. They therefore proposed the addition of a clause, at the end of the chapter on Poland, which became clause 93 of the final text of the Treaty of Versailles, to the effect that:

> Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.

Having thus dealt with the immediate crisis the committee proceeded to draft a Minority Treaty for Polish signature. A similar procedure was adopted with regard to minorities in Czechoslovakia and a clause was included as Article 86 in the Treaty of Versailles.

The Committee of New States and for the Protection of Minorities made the Polish Treaty its model and, with the required modifications, produced similar treaties to be signed by Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and the ex-enemy Powers of Austria and Hungary. Italian and Japanese delegates occasionally sat with the Committee, but the most important work was done by the American, British, and French, represented by Miller, Headlam-Morley, and Berthelot, all important men on their respective delegations. While at the beginning of the Conference various interpretations were current as to minorities, the three Powers were by this time in complete agreement and determined that their will should be respected by the New States and other signatories of the Minority Treaties. An example of this unanimity is the fact that the famous letter of Clemenceau to Paderewski referred to below, in which the whole justification for Minority Treaties was explained, was drawn up by the British representative, Headlam-Morley.

The final text of the Treaty, which was submitted to the Poles on 22 May, and signed by them, with one or two modifications, on 28 June, was as follows:[1]

[1] Wolf, *Report to the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association*, pp. 88–90; *History of the Peace Conference*, V, pp. 437 *seqq.*

Article 1

Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Article 2

Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

Article 3

Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationals habitually resident at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of Poland, but subject to any provisions in the Treaties of Peace with Germany or Austria respectively relating to persons who became resident in such territory after a specified date.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, transfer within the succeeding twelve months their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Polish territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

Article 4

Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Polish authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Polish nationality, and they will then cease

to be considered as Polish nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Article 5

Poland undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary or Russia, to choose whether or not they will acquire Polish nationality.

Article 6

All persons born in Polish territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Polish nationals.

Article 7

All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Article 8

Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Article 9

Poland will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Polish Government

from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of this Article shall apply to Polish citizens of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German territory on August 1, 1914.

Article 10

Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organisation and management of these schools.

The provision of Article 9 concerning the use of language in schools shall apply to these schools.

Article 11

Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision, however, shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defence or the preservation of public order.

Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday.

Article 12

Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Poland agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

The text may be described as a compromise between the wishes of the four parties concerned—the Great Powers, the British and French Jews, the American–Eastern-Jewish group, and the Poles.

The attitude of the Great Powers was not based on idealism or philanthropy. It was based on the promise given to Germany on 16 June, that adequate measures would be taken to protect the German population handed over to other States, and on the purely practical fact that the ultimate responsibility for the new order in Europe lay with those Powers whose armies could enforce that order. As President Wilson expressed it in a speech to the Plenary Session of the Conference called to discuss the Minority Question, the great Powers 'cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which (they) do not believe to be right, and (they) cannot afford to leave elements of disturbance unremoved, which (they) believe will disturb the peace of the world'. At that actual moment pogroms were going on in eastern Europe, and the feeling between Poles or Rumanians and Jews was well known to the Powers, even apart from the memoranda frequently submitted to them by the Jewish delegations. Their anxiety was therefore to see that there was no basis on which the new States could repeat Rumania's defiance of the Congress of Berlin on the one hand, and on the other, no advantage secured by minorities which might be justly resented by the majorities among whom they lived. For this reason the word 'national' was avoided and the colourless word 'racial' substituted for it, and no *central* representative body of any minority was called into being.

Their caution on these two points caused the omission of two of the main claims of the American and Eastern Jewish Delegations. The word 'national' had been the subject of bitter quarrels ever since the beginning of the century. It was not even discussed at a Plenary Session of the Conference, but was rejected by the Committee of New States from the draft submitted by

Miller, after his discussion with the Jews had decided him to include it. In the same way the desire, particularly strong among Eastern Jews, that the whole Jewish population of a country should have an official position as a single unit *vis-à-vis* the national government, was carefully excluded by the insertion of the word 'local' in Article 10, and by the fact that members of minorities throughout are referred to as 'Polish nationals'.

But while it left unfulfilled the two main demands of one group in Jewry, it accepted and went beyond the purely individual guarantees which had been the main interest of Anglo-French demands.

The first article had been asked for by neither group. It was inserted by the Great Powers, and originally applied to the whole Treaty. At the demand of the Poles its application was confined to the first eight clauses. The Sabbath clause (Article 11) was not asked for by the British, but was proposed by Headlam-Morley to the Committee at the request of the American Jewish delegation. At the same time, in its published form, it evoked protests from both groups, for it entirely ignored the Jewish request that Jews should be allowed to work on Sunday—a right they had enjoyed under Russian rule. The assurance to the minorities of a share of the public money spent on education also went beyond Anglo-Jewish proposals, but not as far as the American. Yet even if the Nationalist Jewish delegations did not get all they hoped for, they received the Treaty with real satisfaction. The opposition, as might be expected, came from the Poles.

5. *Reaction to the Minority Treaties*

The Polish reply was received on 16 June. It went much further than the speech of Paderewski in the session of 31 May. Then he had stated that Poland would grant, of her own free will, all rights granted by other countries to their minorities, and would further grant all subsequent rights decided on for all members of the League. In a memorandum of 16 June, the Polish Government began with a bitter attack on the whole idea of a unilaterally imposed Treaty, on the grounds that it was both an infringement of Poland's sovereignty, and an impugning of her good faith and the sincerity of her intentions. Further, some of its articles, which she was supposed to embody in her constitution, were merely administrative by-laws such as no State could accept from outside, or allow only an outside authority to change. Proceeding to attack the Jewish section explicitly, Poland asserted that the present trouble was due entirely to the doubtful loyalty

of the Jews. Once the Jews accepted the existence of Poland and their duties in the new Polish State, relations would again become amicable, as they had been for centuries of Polish history. Moreover the Jews themselves were not agreed as to the rights they desired, and many would resent being bound by the Jewish clauses, since they considered themselves Poles. The special grant of Jewish schools would make trouble with the other minorities, and all the special privileges given to Jews would only put them in an invidious position which Poles would resent, thereby making friendly relations impossible. In particular to allow a minority to complain to an outside Power, instead of encouraging it to seek peace within the frontiers of the State in which it was living, would create and not solve problems.

To this protest Clemenceau replied on 24 June, enclosing a copy of the final draft of the Treaty which, he informed the Poles, had been accepted by the Great Powers, and from which they did not intend to draw back. He pointed out that some modifications had been made—Sabbath rights, for example, had been limited in the case of certain forms of national service—but the main treaty must stand. It was not an innovation, but fully in accordance with European tradition. What was new was only the right of appeal to the League of Nations, and this, by giving a feeling of security to the minorities, should make for appeasement. Finally, in view of the present conditions in Poland, the Great Powers considered the Jewish clauses to be the irreducible minimum to assure security to the three and a half million Jews in the new State, and the Powers could not consent to their omission.

Poland bowed to the inevitable, and Paderewski and Dmowski signed the Treaty on 28 June, immediately after affixing their signature to the Treaty of Versailles.

The Rumanian struggle lasted longer and was more strenuous. In the very beginning Rumania had attempted to forestall any discussion of the position of her Jewish population by the proclamation on 28 December 1918 of a Decree Law which, she asserted, solved the problem. But all that this law did was to allow inhabitants of the country to make a demand for citizenship, on the production of proof that they had been born in Rumania and had never been subjects of any other State. The proofs had to be brought before a single judge who examined the evidence without seeing the applicant, and gave a final verdict. The British Minister in Rumania appears to have accepted this as satisfactory, but on 21 February the Anglo-French Jewish Delegations ensured that the Peace Conference should not be similarly deceived, by presenting a documented study of the

whole Rumanian situation. When the Minorities Question came to the front in May, Bratianu published a further decree, on the basis of which he again assured the Conference that they need not trouble about the matter as it was now settled. But this not only went no further than the Decree of December, but contained the dangerous addition that 'evidence might be submitted independently by citizens' against the Jewish application.

In the session of 31 May, it was Bratianu who led the opposition to the idea of the Minority Treaties. His points were not dissimilar from those of the Polish memorandum, but he insisted especially on the fact that their imposition implied an inequality among sovereign States which Rumania could not and would not tolerate. She would accept what others accepted but no more—and even then she believed that the interference of outsiders would create disorder and not consolidation. As has been already said, Wilson, in a reasoned speech, refused to give way to the smaller Powers and insisted on the Treaties. In July, Hudson, the American representative on the Committee of New States, submitted a memorandum on the Rumanian question in which he underlined the necessity of the Jewish clauses; and a Treaty similar to the Polish Treaty was drawn up and accepted by the Great Powers during August. But Rumania absolutely refused to accept it and broke off relations with Paris. The minority question was complicated by a conflict over the Rumanian occupation of Budapest at this time; and, when the date for the signature of the Austrian Treaty came, Rumania was still at loggerheads with the conference and was excluded from the signatories. On the following day, 11 September, Sir George Clerk, British Minister in Prague, arrived in Bucharest as an envoy of the Great Powers to discuss the whole situation with Bratianu. But the latter outwitted him by resigning, and arousing the country against the Treaty. However, as he remained *de facto* Premier, Sir George was obliged to negotiate with him, and no means out of the *impasse* was found. Shortly after there were elections in Rumania, and Bratianu's party was defeated. But the victors of the election were largely Transylvanian, who could scarcely take responsibility for settling matters in the Old Kingdom. The *impasse* therefore continued. Finally, on 24 November, an ultimatum was issued that Rumania should sign within eight—subsequently increased to fourteen—days, or all relations with her would be broken off by the Great Powers.

Meanwhile, in the hope of securing her signature, modifications were introduced into the Polish text. In particular the Jewish clauses were omitted, an omission which naturally caused great alarm to the Jewish delegations. In place of them, however,

a new Article 7 was inserted by which an attempt was made to settle, once and for all, the basic question of Jewish citizenship. By this article:

> Rumania undertakes to recognise as Rumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirements of any formality Jews inhabiting any Rumanian territory, who do not possess another nationality.

The first period allowed by the ultimatum expired without any Rumanian reply. But at the end of the six days' further grace allowed, she decided that further resistance was useless, and finally signed the Treaty on 9 December.

The only other Minority Treaty in which express mention is made of the Jewish population is that signed by Greece on 10 August 1920. The Treaty had been approved on 3 November of the previous year, but was only signed together with the Treaty of Sèvres. In it 'in towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Greek nationals of the Jewish religion' a Sabbath article similar to that in the Polish Treaty was to be in force.

In none of the other Treaties are the Jews mentioned, and none of them evoked such opposition as the Polish and Rumanian Treaties. In the case of Czechoslovakia it was decided that Jews were too few and scattered to need special protection, although the Jewish delegations pressed for the Jewish articles in order to provide uniformity and to make it easier to impose them on Rumania. The Treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed with the Treaty of St. Germain on 10 September 1919. In the case of Yugoslavia the only problem was the inclusion of the 1913 acquisitions of Serbia, and no Jewish issue arose. The Treaty was signed on 5 December 1919. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria signed without raising any difficulties.

It is interesting to note that almost all writers of the time considered these Treaties amongst the most important achievements of the Peace Conference, and the most certain guarantees of the future peace of Europe. They were admitted to be an experiment. But the Great Powers were wholly convinced both of their necessity and their wisdom; they had taken some time to realize the importance of the question; but, once they did, they gave the matter really serious attention, and maintained their stand resolutely in the face of violent opposition.

Actually, the protection afforded proved so nugatory that a description of the subsequent history of these treaties, of the appeals made on the basis of them, and the League procedure for examining the validity of such appeals, would be of the scantiest practical interest.

Chapter Six

THE JEWS OF POLAND UP TO 1939

1. *Introduction*

WHILE for the study of the conditions which lay behind the conflicts which led up to the Minority Treaties Rumania is the most suitable subject, for the life of a minority after the establishment of the Treaties we need to turn to Poland. For Rumania made practically no effort to carry out the conditions of the Treaty which she had—admittedly—been compelled to sign. In 1939 there were still Jews whose ancestors for several generations had been born in the country who were without political rights. In Poland, however, attempts were made on both sides to work out the conditions of the Treaty in practice. Poles were politically more mature than were Rumanians, and Polish Jews were more accustomed to political action than the Jews at any rate of the Old Kingdom of Rumania. That the Treaties broke down long before 1939 is no evidence that they were not tried; it is rather proof that some new way may be needed if there still be after the war any substantial Polish Jewry seeking integration into a new Polish economy.

2. *Historical Background*

The origin of the Polish Jewish community is lost in the silence of antiquity. When it emerges into history early in the Middle Ages it is already an important factor in Polish life, and is being steadily recruited from the refugees of western Europe fleeing from the hostility of Crusaders and other religious fanatics.

Until the Jagellon Dynasty died out in 1572, Jews were protected by the Crown and lived mostly in the royal towns. There they formed part of the merchant middle class, and were governed by charters very similar to those under which their brethren lived in the west of Europe. With the introduction of the elective monarchy effective power passed to the *Szlachta*, the land-owners; and Jewish and Christianb urghers in the royal towns alike felt the full force of the anti-urban and anti-middle-class prejudices of their new rulers—prejudices which were soon embodied in legislation. In consequence there was a general Jewish exodus to the rural demesnes of the *Szlachta*. It was

during this period, which lasted from the end of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, that they came to live in the small towns scattered through the country, in some of which they formed the overwhelming proportion of the population. The *Szlachta* granted them a contemptuous protection, but both treated them unmercifully and used them for the unmerciful exploitation of their peasantry.

In the middle of the seventeenth century the eastern regions of the kingdom, now part of the Ukraine, were the scene of a wild revolt against the Polish landowners. Under the leadership of Bogdan Chmielnicki, Cossack bands rose against the economic oppression of the *Szlachta*, and thousands of Jews were massacred owing to their identification with the interests of their masters. The movement which in the Middle Ages had flowed from west to east was now reversed, and refugees from Poland began to appear in western Europe, and even in England. In the last century of the history of the Polish monarchy their position deteriorated still further, and it was a largely impoverished community which fell into the hands of Russia, Prussia, and Austria during the partitions of the country. The fate of the three groups was very different. The Prussian section disappeared almost entirely, having largely migrated to central and western Germany. The Austrian community became emancipated with the emancipation of other Austrian Jews. It regularly elected representatives in the Austrian Parliament, and its more prosperous members acquired characteristics similar to those of emancipated western Jewry. But the largest share fell to Russia, and Russia had no desire whatever to receive them. Two hundred and fifty years earlier she had already established the policy of refusing Jews admission to the heart of her empire, and of keeping them, under rigid restrictions, in the frontier provinces. This policy she maintained after the partitions, and the Jews of eastern Poland and Lithuania were firmly excluded from penetrating into other provinces. In this way was built up in the hundred and twenty years of Russian rule the vast and artificially concentrated Jewish population of 'the Pale'.

It is not necessary to recount the story of Jewry under Russian rule during this period. It is enough to say that by the time they became Polish the Jewish masses were depressed mentally and physically, religiously and politically, and to a tragic extent they were despised or even hated by their Christian neighbours. The pogroms of 1881, and the succeeding years, have already been described, together with the flight to western Europe and America which resulted from them. But two millions of Jews still remained in the Russian territory which was to become

Polish, and it was they who formed the majority of the Jewish inhabitants of the new Polish Republic of 1918.

This fact needs constantly to be kept in mind in considering the history of misunderstanding and wrongdoing which marks Polish-Jewish relations during the inter-war years. A historian will be little disposed to blame either side for its failure, at any rate before 1930. In the years which followed a steady increase of physical violence added to the difficulties inherent in the situation. To both Pole and Jew the past was too close, and its mental, physical, and social inheritance too distorted and deformed for the development of tolerance, kindly judgment, patience, and confidence. Both sides are entitled to benefit by this charity, for Poles also had been deformed by the Russian domination. In addition to this, there was an immediate background well calculated to make bad worse. The provisional Czechoslovak Government had the great advantage that *all* the territory claimed by it was in Austro-Hungarian hands. It could therefore concentrate *all* its efforts for freedom on propaganda and education among the Allies. Polish territory and Poland's Jewry were divided during the period before 1914, and during the war hopes, plans, and fears for the future were divided also. While one group worked for freedom on the basis of a Russian victory another worked on the basis of a German victory. The rent cut deep into Polish life, but it was more easily healed between Pole and Pole than between Pole and Jew. It was no fault of the unhappy Jews that ex-Austrian, ex-German, and ex-Russian Poles all started their new life together with profound suspicion of the loyalty of their Jewish fellow-citizens. This suspicion was naturally increased by the fact that Jewry had no reason for anything but friendliness towards the Government, Menshevik or Bolshevik, which had overthrown the hated régime of the Tsars, whereas the first act of free Poland was to indulge in a bitter and aggressive war against this same Power. It would be difficult to imagine a more ill-omened background for a common life. The situation would have needed most careful handling, even had it been possible for the new foundations to be well and cleanly laid.

But they were not. In the first place the Polish Government took a number of years to acquire either stability or authority. It came into existence in 1917, during the war, with the agreement of the German masters of the country, and it therefore represented those elements favourable to Germany and Austria. When the latter collapsed in October 1918 attempts were made to make it potentially more acceptable to the Allies, even though the German occupation still continued. When the Germans

retired, the Polish Government had little authority even at the centre, and almost none in the outlying districts or along its undetermined eastern frontier. There a vague state of war continued for many months, between Poles and Bolsheviks and between Poles and Galicians (Ukrainians or Ruthenians). In these operations ill-organized and ill-equipped soldiery perpetrated a number of acts of violence, including murder, on the Jewish population, sometimes with the approval of their military leaders, sometimes without. These acts, quickly reported by the Jews to the western Powers, seriously embittered feelings on both sides. The Jews rightly resented the fact that few were punished at all, and no compensation was paid for very serious damage done, and the Poles resented the action of the Jews in blackening the reputation of Poland at the hour of her rebirth.

Nor were they pleased when the British and American Governments requested them to receive Commissions of inquiry to test the Jewish complaints, and they found that in each case the Commissioner was a Jew—Sir Stuart Samuel and Mr. Morgenthau.

But this was not the only difficulty, for, in the second place, the status of her minorities was ultimately decided by the western Powers in terms which have proved unrealistic, at any rate in so far as the Jewish minority is concerned. For, of course, the Jews were neither the only nor the largest minority in Poland. This 'infringement of her independence' was bitterly resented in Poland, and the Minorities Treaty had an evil odour from the start, which was inadequately counterbalanced by the general atmosphere of optimism and goodwill with which the world entered the new era.

3. *The Jewish Population in* 1921[1]

On 30 September 1921, although conditions were by no means yet normal, a census was taken of the population. This revealed (with supplementary figures added for the districts subsequently obtained in Silesia and Lithuania) a total population of 27,176,177, of whom 2,845,364 were Jews (10·5 per cent. of the whole). The Jewish population was very unevenly divided between the three sections of the country. Out of more than three million ex-German subjects, only 20,661 (0·67 per cent.) were Jews; out of just over six million Austrian subjects, 607,656 (10 per cent.) were Jews; whereas there were 2,217,047 Jews

[1] All the statistics in this section are taken from G. Gliksmann, *L'Aspect Economique de la Question Juive en Pologne.*

(12 per cent.) among the seventeen million who had been under Russian rule.

The distribution of the Jews differed wholly from that of the rest of the population. Of the latter four-fifths lived in the country, whereas of the former three-quarters lived in large or medium urban centres. In Warsaw itself Jews formed one-third of the population; in nine towns of over 20,000, including Pinsk, Grodno, and Bialystock, they outnumbered the non-Jews; and in most of the smaller towns of the east, as well as a number in the west, their proportion of the population was from one-half to—in four towns—nine-tenths. But of the inhabitants of the villages Jews scarcely formed 1 per cent.

The professional and occupational differences were equally noticeable. While Jews formed 10·5 per cent. of the total population, they only formed 6·8 per cent. of the *working* population, since for both Jews and others the number of non-earning dependants was higher in the towns. With the Jewish population there was also a higher percentage both of women and of children under fourteen. Allowing for this it will be seen that out of one thousand working Polish citizens 68 would be Jews.[1] Of this 1,000, 738 would be engaged in agriculture (including forestry, fishing, and market gardening) showing the extent to which Poland was a purely agricultural country, but only 6 of the 738 would be Jews. If the remaining 262 are taken as approximately the urban population, 91 would be in various industries, and, since industry is an urban profession, the Jews are underrepresented with 21 out of the 91; but of the 41 in commerce, more than half—that is 25—would be Jews; 18 would be in communications and transport, but of these only 2 would be Jews; in public services and the liberal professions there would be 23, and again the Jewish proportion is abnormally low, 3, all of whom would be in the latter half of the category;[2] in domestic service would be 19 including 3 Jews; out of the 30 unemployed would be 5 Jews—both of these figures fairly normal—and of the remaining 21 who were classed as 'miscellaneous', the Jews numbered 4.[3]

In so far as factory work in industry was concerned, the low Jewish figures largely represented Jewish choice, for different days of rest and other ritual prescriptions made industry an

[1] To show the general distribution of the population it can be added that of the 932 non-Jews about 620 would be Poles ('about' because statistics vary), 178 Ukrainians, 58 White Russians, 56 Germans, and the rest Lithuanians, Czechs, etc.

[2] There were Jews in public services, but so few that only a small fraction of 1 would appear out of 3.

[3] See Appendix III, p. 239.

unpopular occupation, and those Jews who did enter it were largely to be found in small and family works. But the unexpectedly low figures in communications and transport were due to the deliberate maintenance by the Poles of previous Russian policy. For in the public section of the occupation, which was the larger section, Jews were very few; in the Postal and Telegraph Services, only 457 (1·7 per cent.) out of 26,350, and on the Railways 1,479 (0·85 per cent.) out of 173,459. But in the free transport services 22,871 Jews (51·3 per cent.) found employment out of a total of 44,061. The same is true of the next category, although the unfortunate inclusion by the Polish census of the free profession of barrister under the rubric 'public administration, justice, etc.' makes it impossible to know how many Jews were in the national or local administrations. The whole figure for Jews under this rubric is only 5,618 out of 135,630, that is 4·2 per cent.; in the other liberal professions of medicine and education, the percentages are 17·6 and 19·4 respectively.

The figures which have been given so far are based on the whole population. If the urban population alone is considered special characteristics of the Jewish communities still remain. Of 100 Poles (including the other minorities) and 100 Jews, 17 Poles and 2 Jews were engaged in market gardening; in industry the figures were 29 and 39; in commerce, 8 and 36.

Finally, within each occupation the proportions still differ when distributed between owners, white-collar workers, and manual labourers; and the tendency of Jews to avoid large factories and industries is marked. But even in these latter industries a distinction remains. In mining and quarrying 7 per cent. of the Jews engaged, and 0·3 per cent. of the rest of the population engaged, were owners or employers; 35 per cent. of the Jews and 7 per cent. of the rest belonged to the white-collar category; 57 per cent. of the Jews and 93 per cent. of the rest belonged to the manual workers. In smaller industries, such as metal workers, carpenters and such-like, more than half the Jews engaged were their own masters; two-thirds of the general population so engaged worked for wages. And at the final stage of manual wage-earners the distinction still remains. Seventy-five per cent. of the Jews working for wages worked in firms not employing more than ten men; only 12·6 per cent. of the others worked in firms of a similar smallness.

It is sometimes true that interesting and significant distinctions remain hidden from the ordinary man until they are revealed by statistics. Such was not the situation in Poland. In every sphere of life, and within the same sphere of life, the

distinction between Jews and the rest of the population was equally marked, and was continually in evidence. Moreover, it was accentuated by the fact that the majority of Jews habitually spoke a different language—which some non-Jews might understand; that they wrote with the Hebrew alphabet, which hardly anyone else can have understood; and many of them dressed and wore their hair differently. In such circumstances the simple statement that '10·5 per cent. of the citizens are Jews' is misleading. It implies that there was one community so many of whose members happened to be Jews. It was truer to say 'the Jewish community formed 10·5 per cent. of the inhabitants of the country'. In every subtle way as well as in every obvious way it was a separate community, distinguished from the Polish population as Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, or others were not.

4. *Relations between the Jewish Community and the Government*

The social conditions of the Jewish community in Poland were little understood by the peace-makers at Paris. At the Peace Conference the organizations of Western Jews, with whom a small group of wealthy Polish Jews would have agreed, desired a policy which would give effect to their belief in the desirability of assimilation as a solution of the Jewish question. For this reason all their emphasis was on individual political and civil equality, a formula which had proved successful in the emancipation of the Jewish populations of western Europe. The majority of the Polish (Russian) Jews themselves, however, desired the permanent recognition of their separate national status. In the actual circumstances, both solutions were rejected. But all that can be said of the compromise which produced the Minorities Treaties is that it was possibly the best solution which could be obtained in the circumstances. For the key to the understanding of subsequent history is that the terms under which Jews and Poles were to live side by side were dictated from abroad. They were in no sense the result of mutual agreement between the two communities affected.

The grant of individual political equality would have solved the problem if on both sides any immediate possibility of assimilation had existed. The statistics given show that it had certainly not yet taken place in economic or social spheres, and the same was true in the psychological sphere. For the attitude of Poles to Jews had been changing for a decade before the war from a tolerant contempt to an active resentment, which the events of the war had inevitably accentuated. These facts destroyed the

conditions for successful assimilation on the Polish side. On the Jewish side also it was evident that the spread of the national idea among the masses—whether in Zionist or Socialist form—had led them to reject assimilation entirely. But the complete acceptance of the Nationalist Jewish claims was equally impossible from both points of view.[1] The Poles would have considered it an intolerable infringement of their authority within the frontiers of their historic country, and the Jews were too divided both geographically and mentally for the responsibility of self-government in such conditions to be lightly laid on them. The peacemakers hoped that to give the Jews some measure of internal autonomy, and to leave the Poles definitely masters of the situation, would be the best interim policy. Subsequent improvements might then come by agreement between the two groups, and by a general development of the educational and social system. In the result, this agreement was never achieved. The Poles sought to extrude Jewish citizens from, rather than admit them to, their new society. The Jews answered by continual protest at home and abroad that the totality of their rights was not immediately conceded them.

The general welfare of any minority within a larger society must, to a large extent, depend on the spiritual and economic health of the larger society. Jewish rights and wrongs, the prosperity or misfortunes of Jewish citizens, are inevitably relative to those of the society in which the Jews live; and the ability and willingness of any Government to give time to the considerations of Jewish demands must depend on many factors other than the friendly or hostile attitude of members of the Government themselves to the Jews. In particular it must depend on the attitude to the Jewish question of the parties which hold the balance of political power. Poland was a country of many parties in three main groups, Nationalists from extreme racialists to 'moderate Conservatives'—the People's Party representing the solid *bloc* of peasant proprietors—and the numerous Socialist groups. Only the third contained any element which was likely to be actively friendly to the Jews; and the Government during the period when it bore any effective relation to the parties in the Sejm always moved in the orbit of the Centre and the Right.

The first period of the history of the Polish Republic extends from a rather ill-defined beginning, while hostilities were still in progress on all fronts, to the collapse of Party and Coalition Government in May 1926. During these years the country had watched with increasing unrest the simultaneous fall of governments and the currency. The business Government of Vladislaw

[1] For the proposals of the eastern-European Jewish Nationalists, see p. 111.

Grabski, set up in December 1923, was the twentieth cabinet the country had had in four years, and the difficulties of the economic situation are shown by the fact that the currency, when finally stabilized, was fixed at the rate of 1,800,000 Polish marks to the new zloty whose value was one gold franc.

The Jewish question could never have been in the forefront during such a period, when far more serious responsibilities were urgently needing to be faced. But it was not wholly ignored. In January 1921 a Ministerial Commission was set up by the Prime Minister, Mr. Witos (representative of the Conservative Peasant tendency), and in March a meeting took place between the Ministers and the Jewish Deputies. The spokesman of the latter put forward four points—to which every Jewish member added others. The four points were:

1. the removal of legal restrictions left over from the previous (especially Russian) régimes,
2. permission to Jews to work on Sunday and other Christian holidays,
3. new legislation to give proper organization and powers to the Jewish communities, and
4. the creation of a permanent Cabinet Commission, presided over by a Chairman with Cabinet rank, to deal with Jewish affairs.

The Government accepted the placing of these four points on the agenda, but asked the Jewish members to agree in advance of the next meeting on other points they might wish to raise. Unhappily, all the other points raised by the Jews partook of the nature of protest and complaint. On most of them they were probably justified from a legal point of view, but they ignored the fact that the Government completely lacked either the power to cope with such details as the misbehaviour of distant local officials, or the money to compensate Jewish victims of disorders which it had been powerless to suppress. When the Commission met again on 19 March, the Jewish members again brought forward their complaints, and the Government, on its side, raised the point of the excessive Jewish population, and the need of an emigration policy. Finding that they could get no immediate satisfaction for their protests, the Jewish deputies very unwisely announced that they mistrusted the Government's intentions and would participate in no further meetings. In September a new Polish Government asked for a memorandum on the grievances of the Jews and this was submitted.[1] But nothing came of it. In 1922 a Bill was introduced into the Sejm to abolish ex-Russian legal restrictions on Jewish activity which were in-

[1] Text in Appendix I, p. 235. French version in *Paix et Droit*, October 1921.

consistent with the Polish constitution (which had been finally voted in June 1921) but this was rejected, largely through the influence of Father Lutoslavski, a Roman Catholic priest and antisemitic leader.

In December 1923 the non-party Government of Grabski came into power; and it broke all records by remaining in office until 13 November 1925. During this period its main task was the restoration of the finances, and success in this would be likely to confer more benefits on the Jews, since the commercial classes inevitably suffer most from financial disorder, than any direct actions of the authorities on precise legal points. Nevertheless, some progress on the Jewish question was made. The Foreign Minister, Count Alexander Skrzynski, who was familiar with England, invited Mr. Lucien Wolf to visit Poland, and informally to assist the Government in its discussion with the Jewish Deputies about the improvement of Jewish conditions. As a result of the meetings a certain number of formal and legal concessions were promised.[1] The Government undertook to introduce a law to deal with the vital question of Sunday work; to recognize Jewish claims to a share in Government contracts, monopolies, and employments; to combat the unfair treatment of Jews by banks, tax officials, and co-operatives; to secure fair treatment for Jewish lawyers, students, and soldiers; and to extend its recognition of Jewish schools and of the use of Yiddish. Apart from these actions, it promised to use its influence to check the antisemitism in the country, and to protect the Jews from unfair treatment.

Unfortunately, before anything was done to implement these promises, the Government found itself entirely occupied with a desperate effort to maintain the stability of the new zloty. In spite of ruthless pressure on the taxable element in the population, including, of course, the Jewish commercial classes, it had not been able wholly to balance its budget; and a certain strain on both its eastern and western frontiers did nothing to enhance the stability of the currency. The zloty began to fall, and in November its creator followed its example. Count Skrzynski attempted to form a new Government on an almost all-party basis, but though the Parties agreed in external policies they disagreed on the fundamental issue of the saving of the zloty. When after six months it was still falling, the 'Grand Old Man' of Poland, Marshal Pilsudski, marched on the capital, the army supporting him, and the first Parliamentary period came to an end on 15 May 1926.

[1] Text in Appendix II, p. 237. French version in *Paix et Droit*, September 1925.

From May 1926 until his death on 12 May 1935, Polish politics were completely dominated by Marshal Pilsudski. The 'dictatorship' which he established was wholly unlike that of any of his contemporaries. He established no party of his own, and suppressed neither the forms of Parliamentary Government nor the reality of free criticism—even of himself. Those who opposed his views were allowed everything—except a chance to undermine his authority. It was a unique form of semi-indulgent paternalism, and was possible only because of the immense personal prestige of the Marshal and the determination which underlay his apparent tolerance.

The main tasks which the Marshal set himself were the restoration of the stability of Polish finances, a task in which the world depression overtook him, so that his failure was scarcely his fault, and the reform of the Constitution in such a way that Parliamentary incapacity and inexperience could not entirely destroy the stability of society and the continuity of government. This task was formally completed just before his death, but too late in the event to show whether he had created the right machinery or not.

In November 1926 the new régime revealed some desire to turn over a new leaf when it took sharp action against a local official who cancelled the election of a Jewish mayor on the grounds of a previous Russian law. The Minister of the Interior reinstated the mayor, saying that any Russian law which was incompatible with the Polish Constitution was *ipso facto* invalid. But legally the corpus of Tsarist Law was not officially annulled until March 1931,[1] although the laws had been a dead letter for some time previously. But when it came to going further than this, and actually introducing legislation to remedy Jewish grievances, the Jews found the various cabinets, which succeeded each other with considerable rapidity under the general aegis of the Marshal, no more favourable than their predecessors. The measures proposed in 1925 were never put into effect, and when, in December 1927, the Jewish Deputies submitted a long memorandum of their complaints to Pilsudski they could acknowledge only that certain minor reforms in education had been carried out, but protested that the bulk of their grievances were still unremedied.

While the Jews had profited indirectly from the greater stability and order which the Pilsudski régime produced, they obtained no positive advantages from it; and when the first rumblings of the world economic crisis began to make the task of creating economic prosperity still more impossible, they were

[1] A detailed list of the laws involved is given in *Paix et Droit*, February 1931.

the first to suffer both from the measures of the Government, and from the rising unrest in the country.

Actually it was evident several years before the depression that the personal goodwill of Pilsudski did not prevent his ministers either from seeking solutions of the economic problem at the expense of the Jews, or from encouraging patriotic organizations without checking their antisemitism. Already by 1928 the Jews had become convinced that little effort would be made to enable them to participate in such prosperity as there was. When, in the following year, antisemitism in the universities appeared as the safety-valve of the young Nationalists, this, coupled with the complete silence of the Government about their repeated complaints, led the Jewish Parliamentary group to go into opposition (this was only a formality, and consisted in voting against the budget; it made no difference whatever to the Marshal). As the crisis deepened the antisemitism of the Nationalist groups became more and more threatening, and troubles in the universities became continuous. To some extent the Government probably allowed these excesses as a safety-valve for general unrest, and nothing which could be called a formal anti-Jewish measure was taken by the Government itself. But in 1934 even this negative support was withdrawn, and new regulations for the artisanate threw hundreds of Jews out of work. This was followed by a more dramatic action in September of the same year, the unilateral repudiation of the supervision by the League of the Polish Minorities Treaty.[1]

The vicious circle of Jewish disillusion and Polish suspicion began to operate again. The less justice the Jews received, the more enthusiasm they were apparently expected by the Nationalists to show. In June 1935, a month after the death of the Marshal, Nazi demonstrations in Danzig led to tremendous excitement in Poland, and even to the expectation of war. The fact that the Jews did not appear to share the general excitement was at once used by the Nationalists to accuse them of disloyalty.

The Jews had cause to regret the death of Pilsudski more because a strong hand had been removed than because they had received any sensible amelioration of their lot under his aegis. At the same time, they could not consider him personally hostile, and history will probably estimate that the tragic inheritance of ill-will rather than any deliberate Governmental encouragement was the prime cause of the decline of Polish Jewry during this period. A far stronger and more stable civil service, educated in

[1] This step was, partly at least, dictated by the need of the Polish Government to seek an understanding with the Nazi régime on the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany and the German minority in Poland.

traditions of impartiality, could alone have ensured that the intentions of the Government were not nullified by local administrations and officers of every category.

The death of Pilsudski removed the strongest unifying force in Polish politics. From the summer of 1935 until the collapse of Poland before the German onslaught in September 1939 the picture was not a cheering one, for Poles as well as for Jews, although the latter certainly bore the brunt of the increasing economic distress and political disorder. The economic position of Poland was too difficult, the poverty and indebtedness of the peasants too far-reaching, and the over-population of the country, by comparison with its administrative and financial resources, too insistent for Poland to do more than limp behind in the economic recovery which marked the passing of the world slump in other countries.[1]

The new constitution, voted just before the death of Pilsudski, successfully eliminated the possibility of opposition, but it could not create in the country a party favourable to the Government. The mantle of the Marshal was officially supposed to have fallen on an amiable nonentity, General Smigly-Rydz. His intentions were moderate, but so also were his capacities; and an authoritarian system under an incompetent leader could only reduce the unhappy country to still greater disorder. The Cabinet attempted during 1935 and 1936 to exclude the extremists of the Right from a share of power, but it was increasingly unable to prevent them from freely provoking violence and disorder in the country, and from spreading their totalitarian ideas into ever-widening sections of the populace. Anti-Jewish disorders, which were already serious if not continuous in the beginning of 1936, had become daily occurrences by the summer; and in addition to anti-Jewish troubles there were increasing murmurs and occasional riots from both peasants and workers. All that the Government could do to alleviate the almost universal poverty was to penalize still further the Jewish section of the population, whose misery in fact was at least as great as that of the rest. Pressure and restrictions on the towns inevitably meant pressure on the Jews, and the overcrowded and ruined countryside was incapable of taking any share of the burden.

In September 1936 Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, formally raised on the Second (economic) Commission of the Assembly of the League, the question of the emigration of masses of the Jewish population. He not only demanded facili-

[1] The population had increased from 27 millions in 1921 to 34 millions in 1931. The agricultural density was 79 per square kilometre of agricultura land. In France it is 44. See article in *The Times* of 22 March 1938.

ties for the annual emigration of 80,000–100,000 persons, but was forced into the humiliating position of admitting that Poland could neither finance this emigration, nor even allow the emigrants to take their money out of Poland with them (entirely apart from the Jews, the measures taken to prevent any money leaving Poland had for some time been fantastic. A passport cost at one time £65). He claimed that the modest emigration to Palestine cost Poland about 40,000,000 zlotys a year. All through 1937 the question of emigration for the Jews was kept alive as a sop to the general distress; and in April a Commission was sent, with the agreement of the French Colonial Minister, to investigate possibilities in Madagascar. The scheme was only officially abandoned in January 1938, but nothing was put in its place.

Meanwhile the Government was seeking to create the party backing which it had hitherto lacked, and a certain Colonel Koc was invited by Smigly-Rydz to form a party of National Unity. The formation of the party was announced in February 1937, and in April it was definitely stated that Jews would not be admitted to membership, although the party—officially—repudiated antisemitic violence. As the party of Colonel Koc would alone be permitted to control the majority of the Diet, this was in fact disfranchisement for the Jews, and a number of measures in the next twelve months showed that the authorities had abandoned all hope of maintaining the fiction of Jewish equality. Power to enforce it had been lost already.

In November ghetto benches were introduced in the universities; in March 1938 boycott activities were officially tolerated; in April Jews living abroad were largely deprived of their Polish nationality. In July further admission of Jews to either law or medicine was made practically impossible. The situation continued to worsen steadily until the spring of 1939. In April of that year Hitler denounced the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, and within a day created the effective unity which the country had lacked since its foundation. Jews rallied with all parties of Poles to the defence of the Republic. But emotion could not create prosperity, and in any case dreams of prosperity had disappeared into feverish preparations for war.

5. *The Economic and Social Development of the Jewish Community*

The basic fact for all study of the economic situation of the Polish Republic is that before 1914 Russia absorbed 90 per cent. of the agricultural and manufactured exports from Congress Poland; and Germany and Austria the agricultural products of

their shares of the country. These markets were entirely closed after 1919. But the new Poland not only had to find new markets, and new sources of credit; she had also to start with a country ravaged by four years of war, with no stable currency, no experienced administration, her reserves destroyed by war or inflation, and a large proportion of her population living in holes in the ground and preserved from starvation by foreign relief. The economic distribution of the vast Jewish community has already been described, and it is not difficult to see that, of all the inhabitants of the country, it was the least in a position to restore its own prosperity (interpreting that word merely as earning the bare necessities of food, clothing, and shelter) by its own efforts. For the peasant the land was at least there; for the Polish middle class a vast new administration was in process of creation; for the big industrialists the restoration of their mines and factories was a matter of prime importance to the State itself; the Jewish community, as a result of a hundred years of Russian rule, possessed hundreds of thousands of members who just kept themselves from starvation as unskilled workers and petty artisans, a pitifully high proportion of whom it was in the interests of no modern community to encourage, protect, or sometimes even allow to continue their activities.

It was not until after two or three fair harvests and a period of stable government under Grabski that the Polish budget began to balance, commercial credits to come into existence, normal banking to be practised, and the apparatus of a modern semi-industrial society to function. But even then there was not enough to go round, and there never was up to the last days of the Republic. The growth of population, shut out from its previous safety-valve of emigration or at least extensive seasonal migration, more than kept pace with the increasing financial balances produced by industry, commerce, and agriculture. There was always unemployment; and the Government was always in need of more credit facilities, more salaried jobs, more openings for wage-earners, than were available. The main source of Grabski's budget was urban taxation. There was more *money* in the towns than the villages, even if there was not more *prosperity*, so that a high proportion of taxes was laid on the towns, and the reliefs which were allowed were rarely exercised in favour of the minorities. The result was that the Jewish community perpetually paid a disproportionate share of the bill. The crushing burden of taxation, the successive inroads into their commercial activities, the refusal to them of credits, their exclusion from public employment were due, not primarily to deliberate anti-semitism, but to the fact that it seemed natural to Polish officials

that, when there was not enough to go round, the first person to go short should not be the Pole. However reprehensible, however unconstitutional it might be, the behaviour was natural and, indeed, in the circumstances inevitable. The extreme Nationalist Parties were constantly alert, and the disclosure that an administration or an official was 'favouring Jews at the expense of Poles' would have only led to the defeat of the one, or the dismissal of the other. The result of the paucity of financial assistance from the Government was that the Jewish community, for no fault of its own, was thrown entirely on its own resources. Its own resources were extremely meagre. The prosperity of a commercial class is dependent on the incomes of its clients; its clients were poverty-stricken peasants and workers. The development of industry is dependent on available capital; there was nowhere sufficient confidence in Poland to attract capital from abroad, and what little there was in the country was rarely available to Jews.

The openings which appeared to offer a chance of escape were: into public employment, for the country had, after all, to build up a whole new administration; into the free professions, where a man could rely on himself to make a living; into agriculture; or, as a final resort, emigration. The first and the last proved abortive. Only a small number of Jews had been admitted to administrative posts by the Russian Government, and the Polish Government simply continued the policy, and, where necessary, local officials enforced Russian laws. From the land, Russian law also excluded the Jews, and here the Poles added to existing legislation—the first actual defiance of the Minorities Treaty and the new Constitution. For, when a Bill was before the Sejm in December 1921 to deal with Polish land-holding in the eastern, non-Polish, provinces, the words were inserted allowing such holdings to 'Poles by race' only, and Jews and all other minorities were excluded.

It is not surprising that the reopening of the universities witnessed an amazing registration of Jewish students. In the faculties which they expected might lead to a livelihood, they sometimes formed more than half of the students. This was partly due to the number of young Poles still in the army; but when in 1921–1922 conditions had become more normal, they still formed more than a third of all the students in the four universities of Warsaw, Vilna, Cracow, and Lvov.[1]

In that year the registrations in these universities showed 6,299 Jewish students.[2] In 1928–1929, which was the last year

[1] From the beginning there was practically a *numerus nullus* at Poznan.
[2] Some student statistics are given in Appendix IV, p. 240.

of normal university life, the figure had risen to 6,873, showing that they were still maintaining their position. During the same period registrations of the rest of the population in the same universities had risen from 13,065 to 17,935. This involved the fall of the Jewish figure proportionally from 34·3 per cent. to 27·7 per cent., but this was offset by the fact that the number of Polish Jewish students studying abroad had risen from approximately 4,000 to 8,000. Precise figures are impossible to obtain, but those given are not unreasonable.

While Jewish students obviously formed only a small percentage of Jewish youth looking for new opportunities to live, they formed a large percentage of the young Polish citizens seeking an entrance into the liberal professions and the higher walks of commerce, industry, and administration. It is for this reason that the battle in the universities was from the beginning particularly acute, and that violence became endemic in academic life several years earlier than in agricultural life. It was a battle which showed the conflict between national sentiment and social advantage in its most naked form. To even a reasonable Pole it appeared intolerable that 30 to 40 per cent. of the places of influence in the life of the nation should be in the hands of Jews. That was the Polish side of the picture. To the Jew it appeared fantastic that a young and poor community, such as Poland, desperately in need of expert services of all kinds, of doctors, scientists, chemists, engineers, technicians, and administrators, should prefer vacancies and incompetence to the employment of qualified Jewish men and women anxious to take part in the building of the common life.

But the picture had yet a third side. The output of graduates was far larger than the economic capacity of the country to absorb them. This was no peculiar Polish feature; the unemployment of graduates was almost a major world problem during the inter-war years, since in every country they provided the seedbeds of violence and extremism. The *Sturm-Abteilung* of Hitler, like the rioters of the *Endeks* (National Democrats) and *Naras* (National Radicals) in Poland, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, or the Cohorts of the Archangel Michael in Rumania, were recruited precisely from this class. There was, then, apart from the minority question, a frantic rivalry for jobs; and while the more reflective element might realize that this situation was not due to the Jews, even when it doubted the wisdom of allowing too high a percentage of Jewish influence in this or that profession, the ordinary student and practitioner thought of the question only in terms of whether he or a Jew should be able to earn a living.

In certain branches of academic life the Jews had no entry from the beginning. The University of Poznan and the Catholic

University of Lublin were both closed to them. Almost complete exclusion from the Schools of Mines and Agriculture cut off enormous areas of creative activity. The faculties of Arts led nowhere, since Jews were practically excluded from teaching in the State secondary schools; the main battles ranged round Medicine and Law, as these led to the two professions in which Jews could earn a living in free practice. And, especially in the late Austrian provinces, Jewish doctors could still get public employment, and a certain number of Jews were still admitted to the bar and judicature. But, though Jews might be said to be almost maintaining their numbers in the university, there was no sign that university training would provide the opportunities for expansion of which the Jewish community stood in need.

If such was the situation up to the end of the academic year 1928–1929, it began to deteriorate rapidly with the opening of the new academic year; and from then until the fall of the Republic the lot of the Jews at the universities became increasingly tragic. As in every other country, economic stringency was accompanied by a great growth of the student population—youth had nothing else to do—and many of those inscribed were to no serious extent students. In 1925 the total registration was 37,125; in 1928, 43,607, in 1930 it stood at 48,155, and in 1932 it reached the peak of 51,770 although it was evident that professional opportunities were diminishing, not increasing, during the period. During the later years the total number of Jewish students declined year by year at an increasing tempo. Jewish freshmen, for example, only amounted to 55 out of 1,322 in Warsaw in the opening of the academic year 1937–1938.

The methods by which this result was obtained were various, and it is to the credit of Jewish youth, women as well as men, that physical violence was not the most successful. Far more was done by legislation, and by administrative and professional chicanery, than by the bludgeons and razors of student hooligans from the Endek and Nara. Serious rioting began in the summer of 1929 at Lvov, and cases of violence occurred sporadically in the following year. With the opening of the academic year in October 1931 there were riots throughout the country, and it was impossible to start the courses for several weeks. In Cracow, and subsequently in other universities, it was proclaimed that it was an intolerable insult to Christianity that Jewish medical students should practise anatomy on Christian corpses, and, as no Jewish corpses were available, Jewish students were excluded from the dissecting-rooms.[1] In riots at Vilna a Polish student, Waclawski,

[1] Judaism insists on the burying of the dead, even of paupers. The question was solved by the Jewish community importing, at its own expense, corpses from the neighbouring provinces of Russia.

was mortally wounded, and the Roman Catholic authorities allowed the arrangement of requiems for him as for a hero, if not a martyr, for his country. A Jewish student was tried for his death and, without any real evidence, was condemned to two years' imprisonment (afterwards reduced) in a violently anti-semitic speech by the judge. In 1932 the Government, partly to reduce the competition in professional life, made it more difficult for those Jews who had studied abroad to secure Polish acceptance of their degrees, and at the same time it raised the fees at Warsaw University. The violent anger provoked among the Polish students by the latter action, which turned against the Jewish students (for no other reason than that these knew it was useless to protest and paid the fees), compelled the university authorities for some time to arrange separate lectures for Polish and Jewish students. In November another Polish student died of wounds received from a Jewish workingman in a drunken brawl at Lvov. The affair was a discreditable one, but the victim was again turned into a martyr by the Nationalists, and the Roman Catholic authorities gave him a solemn funeral which was attended by the ex-Premier Grabski, the ex-Minister of Education Glombinski, most of the professors, and large numbers of priests. At the opening of the academic year 1934–1935 the Faculty of Medicine of Cracow refused to admit any Jews—and so the sad tale could be indefinitely continued. The national authorities, and in part the academic, were themselves too closely identified with the extreme Nationalist Parties to have adequate influence over the students, even where they disapproved of the violent measures they adopted. Special powers given to Rectors proved useless. In November 1937 'ghetto benches' were introduced by law (after the University authorities had already been obliged to adopt them in many places by administrative action) to segregate Jews and Christians at lectures; and to only a few Polish professors and students (especially the Socialists) does the honour belong of refusing to continue work under such circumstances. Had the war not written *finis* to the whole unhappy history it is impossible to say where the situation would have ended. But it had become evident that neither the liberal professions nor skilled technical and scientific activities offered any further scope for the Jewish population without some radical change of the whole social and political order.

Through the free professions the Jewish population had at least been able to make an attempt to broaden its economic and social basis. Through public employment it was unable even to make the attempt. There is no need to labour this point in so far as direct public employment is concerned. The number of

Jews employed by Government offices or municipalities rarely amounted to 1 per cent. in 1921, even in towns with more than a third Jewish inhabitants. During the twenty years of the Republic undoubtedly a certain number of Jews served in the Consulates abroad, as minor officials in Government offices and Government services such as the Polish Telegraphic Agency or the Radio. No census figures give the numbers involved, but in relation to the size of the bureaucracy they were not very great. This, however, is not the whole story, for a large amount of Polish industry, commerce, and finance was under direct or indirect Government control, so that the attitude of the Government, or, more properly, of its local administrators and agents, constantly affected the development of Jewish trade and industry. Before, however, these two occupations are examined, something must be said of the two other opportunities for the readjustment of their economic basis which, theoretically, might have appeared open to Polish Jewry—agriculture and emigration.

There were a certain number of Jews engaged in agriculture, and in southern (Austrian) Poland there were a certain number of large Jewish estates. But the poverty of the Jewish peasants was as great as that of the Polish. More than three-quarters possessed less than the minimum (5 hectares) required for subsistence; and many of the large estates were liquidated by the Government in pursuance of the policy of breaking up 50,000 hectares annually for peasant ownership. How unfairly this might operate against Jewish land-owners is obvious. In the Department of Lvov in 1937, 3,322 ha. were taken, of which 1,982 (59·5 per cent.) were Jewish, although only 4·4 per cent. of the big estates in the Department were in Jewish hands. Any extension in the agricultural field could, then, only have come from the purchase of land previously in Christian hands, and the vigilance of the antisemitic parties made this impossible. Even if land had been made available from State property the outcry would have been the same. It would merely have led to rioting, and the sale or lease would have been cancelled. Of emigration there is even less need to write much. Apart from the 131,000 who managed to make their way to Palestine, the number of these who managed to slip through the closed doors of the rest of the world was relatively small. In all it amounted annually to considerably less than the net increase of the Jewish population, which averaged 30,000.

The only possibilities open, then, to the Jews of Poland lay in a rearrangement of themselves within the field with which they were already occupied, industry and commerce. The effort to find either new occupations or opportunities to leave the country

was a failure. Entirely apart from difficulties imposed from outside, the Jews, in both these occupations, were in a backward condition. The need for a thorough overhaul was pressing. Far too many Jews were occupied in domestic industry where there could be little control of working conditions or of the ages of children employed; far too many carried on their occupations in workshops which were ill-equipped and unhygienic; far too many lived by seasonal and irregular occupations which at best yielded only a miserable pittance. In commerce the same was true. There were far too many tiny shops, dirty and insanitary, whose whole stock of goods could have been bought for a few zloty. Far too many staved off starvation by vague and even anti-social occupations as middlemen, moneylenders, agents, or touts. Such was the inheritance which Tsarist Russia bequeathed to Poland, for the decline of Polish-Jewish industry and commerce had set in well before the foundation of the Republic. That is one side of the picture. But the other side is equally important.

Doubtless, many of the older men and women could never learn any different or better way of life. That aspect of the problem of reorientation is universal. But the Jewish population as a whole was perfectly capable of modernizing itself and extending its productive activities, had it been given the opportunity. Moreover, from the point of view of the Polish State, these Jews in industry and commerce, however backward they might be, carried on a quarter of the industry and two-thirds of the commerce of the whole country. The ability to find new markets for goods, so as to bring much-needed foreign currency into the country, depended mainly on the skill and experience of the Jews; the development of the home market, and of new industries for export or for consumption, was more in the hands of Jews than of any other class. Poland could not save herself by her agriculture alone, even if she modernized and enriched it. She needed the maximum possible development of her industry and commerce. Nationalism prevented her from using to the full the opportunities existing in Jewish experience but, more than that, by impeding and hampering the development of Jewish business, nationalism made it unnecessarily difficult even to maintain the level of prosperity which, during the nineteen-twenties, the Republic seemed likely to achieve. The quiet pressure on the Jews, which existed from the very beginning, helped to delay her recovery from the ravages of the war of 1914–1920; the violent antisemitism of her later years equally helped to delay her recovery, when other countries had recovered, from the depression of the early nineteen-thirties.

The story of Jewish commerce and industry is, therefore, a story of decline, ending in appalling poverty and misery for the Jews, as well as impoverishment for the whole Polish society. For continuous pressure on Jews could not of itself create a Polish alternative to their services. The rate of decline varied according to whether their business brought Jews into direct contact with the non-Jewish public or not. In the latter case, where a Jewish manufacturer or wholesaler was dealing with a 'Christian' retailer, it was possible for him to continue unmolested. In the former case he was, especially after 1929, exposed to direct action from the antisemitic parties; his shop could be boycotted or picketed, his wares could be destroyed, or his 'Christian' *clientèle* drawn off to a 'Christian' rival.

There were two spheres in which the backward state of Polish Jewry, to which reference has already been made, was bound to create a pressing problem from the very moment in which the Government began its efforts to modernize and raise the general level of Polish life. A large number of the village and small-town Jewish shopkeepers and middlemen were bound to be ruined by the development of agricultural co-operatives, and yet these co-operatives in themselves were far better designed to raise the level of peasant life than were the previous Jewish shopkeepers and middlemen. The introduction of measures for the improvement of working conditions in industry—measures often taken by the Polish Government as a result of its membership of the International Labour Office—was bound to create hardship for small Jewish businesses—and the majority of Jews in industry were in such small businesses—which lacked the capital or the technical knowledge to conform to the new regulations. Jewish economists themselves recognize that the introduction of these reforms was inevitable. But they do complain, and rightly complain, that when in the years before the depression these measures affected Poles in similar conditions some effort was made to assist the individual to adapt himself; but that when Jews were concerned, they were ignored; credits were not available for them; regulations and tests of efficiency were pressed to the utmost extreme against them. Moreover, this had a cumulative effect, for it steadily reduced the openings for Jewish apprentices, since only an artisan who had passed the tests could accept apprentices, and only those who had their apprentice certificates could subsequently become licensed as artisans. Finally, by the nature of Jewish employment, if a Jew was completely ruined he was unlikely to be eligible for unemployment assistance, since this was limited to workers in factories or businesses with at least ten employees. And, in fact, this class of the Jewish population,

amounting to several hundred thousand households, spent the last years before the defeat of the Republic in conditions of misery and starvation unknown in western Europe, and scarcely known by the rest of the population of Poland.

The most fortunate Jews came into the category next above that just discussed—Jews engaged as artisans, employers, or home workers in small businesses which were entirely, or almost entirely, in Jewish hands. This group did not need to come into direct contact with the 'Christian' public. Many small industries, owing their creation entirely to the imagination of a single individual Jew, worked wholly for export. All kinds of dress and 'novelty' articles were made in this way, and what had been the inspiration of an individual came, in many cases, to provide work for the entire Jewish community of a town. Thus the Jews of Mielec exported goose-skins to Paris, those of Alexandrow and Skarzew made *bérets*, those of Vilna made gloves, and those of Kossow carpets. These occupations being usually 100 per cent. Jewish, there were no 'Christian' competitors with the technical knowledge to oust them; but technical education which would have enabled these goods better to compete in world markets, and the credits which would have enabled the businesses to be modernized and extended, were constantly denied them. Where the Jewish participation in a profession was less than 50 per cent. their hold on it was much less secure; there were others trained in the same occupation, and ready to take their places. Since it was much easier for the latter to obtain State assistance, the tendency was for an occupation which was purely or mainly Jewish to retain its Jewish character, while one which was half, or less than half, Jewish tended to show a steady decline in Jewish participation. In some cases the statistics are misleading. They may, for example, show a Jewish *increase*. Thus, in the Department of Lvov, Jewish artisans in 1933 numbered 7,104, and in 1936, 10,585. But it is extremely doubtful whether the gross income of the ten thousand exceeded that of the seven thousand; and it is more probable that it was actually less. For it constantly happened that sons and daughters, as well as discharged or unemployed workmen, set up their tiny workshops in the occupations in which they or their fathers were previously employed, not because they saw therein a chance of creating fresh business, but because they had absolutely no opportunity of finding any other occupation.

The small group of wealthy Jewish industrialists, merchants, and bankers had naturally more influence and power of resistance. But they never recovered the influence they had possessed before 1914, and to some extent they were treated like their poorer com-

patriots. Much of the banking system of Poland, as of other eastern European countries, was originally started by Jews. But inflation ruined the private banks, and the enormous development of State credits and monopolies prevented them from ever recovering their previous importance. It was, however, more possible for the Jewish employers of hundreds of workmen to obtain credits than for men of lesser importance, since their failure almost certainly involved the unemployment of numbers of non-Jewish workmen.

Finally, there is the field in which the policy of excluding Jews from employment in public occupations affected those employed in industry and commerce—the industrial and commercial State monopolies. It was calculated in 1935 that some two thousand enterprises were in State hands, employing 20 per cent. of all those engaged in industry and commerce. In addition to coal mines and forests, the State possessed printing works, chemical works, brick works, and, as in other countries, a number of important monopolies—tobacco, salt, matches, and alcohol. It was the monopolies which especially concerned Jews, for some of them were occupations which had previously been entirely in Jewish hands. All branches of the tobacco industry in Congress Poland, for example, had been largely built up by Jews. But its conversion into a State monopoly meant the complete, or almost complete, exclusion of Jews from it.[1]

6. *The Relations of the Jewish Community to the General Population*

The dominant factor about the Jewish problem in Poland was that *it was a problem which the Pole was never able to ignore or to forget*. In no city, great or small (except in the ex-German west) was he ever able to forget the presence of Jews. Whatever his status in the social order, whatever his profession, he was aware of Jews, not merely as a fact, but as a problem. Again and again conversations with Poles who were in no sense unenlightened or antisemitic would end with the despairing words: 'What on earth can we do? They are three million!' Many Poles, probably the majority, were not to the end 'antisemitic' in the German sense, but they were oppressed with the hopelessness of finding any solution to the question.

One group alone was able to ignore it—the Polish Socialist Party, in which collaboration between Jews and non-Jews was con-

[1] I have not been able to find statistics to show the actual numbers affected by such actions. What there is, is to be found in *La Situation Economique des Juifs dans le Monde*, pp. 232–4.

tinuous. It regarded the raising of the Jewish question as a danger, since peasants and workers alike were diverted from the recognition of the real cause of their misery by the smoke-screen of anti-semitic propaganda. In the universities Socialist students frequently stood by their Jewish colleagues; and in Parliament there was little difficulty in Jewish and non-Jewish Socialist members co-operating, or Jewish candidates securing non-Jewish Socialist votes. But after 1920 there was never the slightest chance of Polish Socialists securing power. The Government might swing between 'left' and 'right', but its 'left' was a long way right of anything the Second or Third International would have considered Socialism. The terms 'radical', 'democratic', and 'hyphenated Socialist' in Poland had not a western European significance.

Apart from the Socialists, all Poles were conscious that these three million Jews constituted a 'question'. The most moderate were troubled by the fact that they wanted to live in a society which definitely embodied the *Polish* tradition, and the Polish, primarily Catholic, way of life. They desired to oppress neither Jews nor any other minority, but they did not want to be 'dominated by the Jews'. This last phrase has such a distasteful and 'Nazi' ring about it that it is important to examine what it actually meant in Poland, and in the minds of this class. For one of the great tragedies of modern Polish history is that this liberal and tolerant element in Polish middle-class life was, at most, a negative influence on the development of Polish politics. Had the phrase, in fact, any real meaning, any greater meaning than in Germany? In Germany it meant that in this or that profession Jews might amount to 10 per cent., in one or two to 20 per cent., but it meant no more. In general terms it was based on no reality whatever in the German situation. *But this was not the case in Poland.* In Poland it had a perfectly objective factual meaning, because of the particular distribution of Jews in the country. It is for this reason that the demand of the Jews simply for the equality guaranteed them by the Constitution wore a very different aspect on Polish soil from what it meant in the political and journalistic platforms of the West where opinion was steadily anti-Polish.

The central problem of Poland was the raising of the standard of living of the peasants. The nerve-centres of peasant life are the market towns. Here would be the organizations for their betterment, the schools for their sons, the churches for their festivals, and the places for their meetings. In the majority of cases, if matters were allowed to take their course, the government of these towns would have been largely in the hands of

Jews, who had, from their foundation, often formed more than 50 per cent. of their population. An essential part of the reform of peasant life lay in the development of co-operatives. These co-operatives would naturally have had their quarters in these towns; but the growth of the co-operatives meant the decline of the Jewish traders who had previously controlled the peasant markets. Had the Polish Government seriously assisted the Jews in the task of regenerating the Jewish population also, perhaps the Jewish council of the town—even though it contained representatives of these traders—would have been so public-spirited that it would have supported the process; but as this had not happened it is not surprising if many Poles saw no alternative to avoiding the risk of allowing Jews to control the administration of the market towns.

Next to the peasant problem came the problem of increasing Polish commerce and industry. On the basis of the percentage of Jewish participation in these branches of life the Jews would have controlled many of the Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Artisans in the country. Again, it is possible that their public spirit would have worked steadily for the betterment of their rivals, the Polish industrialists, merchants, and artisans, but it is not surprising if the Poles were sceptical.

It is here that the fallacy of concentrating the argument on the Jewish aspect of the situation emerges, and the inadequacy of the political strategy of both Poles and Jews becomes apparent. *In the political conditions of the time, the Polish contention was justified.* Jewish demands were—whether inevitably or not—exclusively concentrated on the rights of the Jewish minority, and Jewish control would probably have led to Jewish favouritism, which would have been no better than non-Jewish favouritism. *But in actual realities, the question Jew—non-Jew was subordinate to the urgent question of increasing* all *the commerce and industry of the country, whether this essential contribution to prosperity came from Jewish or other citizens.* A policy was wanted which would increase the total output, not one which juggled with ethnical proportions within the existing maximum, whether in favour of Jew or non-Jew.

In the liberal professions an analogous situation existed. The possibility of Jewish control of professional organizations was not remote. Restrictions which were technically unconstitutional resulted in Jewish participation being reduced to about a third of the total in Poland; but there were thousands of Jewish students abroad who intended to return to practise in the country. The Poles regarded the professions as being of too much public, cultural, and even religious importance to be able

to accept the possibility of their domination by a non-Polish, non-Catholic, element with Polish citizenship. An obvious case in a Catholic country is the attitude of the medical profession to birth-control and maternity cases, and of the legal profession to divorce. These feelings were not wholly unreasonable, even though there is an element of the same fallacy in this situation as in industry and commerce. Again a new solution, a third alternative to the policies advocated by Poles and Jews, was required.

The political reality in the anxieties of the Polish moderates is revealed by a consideration of the situation which would have been created—under existing Polish circumstances when the protection of the constitution and the Courts was of little avail—had there not been checks on what otherwise should have been normal Jewish development. In violent conflict with a number of important corporations and organizations controlled by Jewish citizens, would have been those still more powerful bodies which were elected or appointed to represent the population generally. In the latter the situation would have been reversed; the Jews would only have formed small and impotent minorities. It is difficult to imagine that in these assemblies there would not have been violent and active attacks on Jewish influence, which would have plunged the country into immediate and protracted disorder and that the warfare between central or provincial authorities and the local town councils and professional associations would not have ended in the disfranchisement and perhaps massacre of tens of thousands of Jews.

The demand for a *numerus clausus* in some professions was made already in 1923. It was rejected. But apart from some agreement with the Jewish bodies that the peculiar distribution of the Jewish population could not be used to place this or that aspect of Polish life in Jewish hands, no solution of the problem was possible. On this issue the Jewish bodies absolutely refused to compromise and, to the end, maintained their demand for their interpretation of 'equality'. One of the tragedies of the Polish situation is that the Jews, by including the moderate group among their enemies, completely isolated themselves politically from the non-Jewish population—except the Socialists, and the friendship of the Socialists, particularly in the later years of unrestrained nationalism, could not help them.

That such a negative and unconstructive situation lasted for the whole twenty years of Poland's life is the measure of Polish and Polish-Jewish inexperience. Academically, it is equally possible to 'blame' both sides, to blame the Polish majority for not having put forward a programme in which Jews and Poles could collaborate in positive work for the prosperity of Poland, and to

blame the Jews for concentrating all their efforts on clinging to a principle even though it could assure them no practical advantage. In terms of political realities, it is fairer to say that both sides were the victims of circumstances which they did not create and which they lacked the political maturity to overcome. For neither Poles nor Jews created the unhappy position of Polish Jews. Poles, who had lacked independence for so long, could not be expected easily to understand that they could not always be masters in the whole of their house; while Jews who had been rightless and subject to discriminatory legislation for so long, could not be expected to relinquish for hypothetical advantages the formula of equality and freedom which they had at last achieved.

Neither side would make an act of faith. That it might have succeeded is shown by the fact that almost to the end the anti-semitic measures of the Government arose, not from some ideological hostility to the Jews, but from a futile effort to appease the antisemitic forces in the country. They were in no way parallel to the legislation of Nazi Germany, designed to create a feeling of hatred and contempt which was not previously there.

During the period in which the Government had some basis of direct support in the country, this was as far as they went—and, indeed, it was enough to create untold misery in tens of thousands of Jewish households. But in the last years of Polish life the political situation was unique. The Constitution assured the destruction of any opposition and the dictatorial powers of the Cabinet. But the Cabinet did not really represent any political party, let alone majority, and only survived by concessions to what it considered at any moment the most dangerous rivals to its authority. These rivals were obviously not the quiet and well-behaved elements in the community, but the elements which made most noise—the *Endeks* and *Naras*. Even when these elements were decisively defeated in elections, as they were in 1928 and 1938, this did not help in the situation, since the power of Pilsudski in the first case, and the New Constitution in the second, made the results of elections a matter of little practical or executive importance. The Government ruled by vague allegiance to the idea that 'Poland must be strong', that 'Party disunion must not be allowed to endanger the state'—views which were shared by the bulk of the population. But there agreement ended: the rest of the picture is confusion. And in this confusion the groups which really were antisemitic reaped their harvest.

They existed from the beginning, although their power was to some extent circumscribed until the world depression gave

them a favourable ground for an unbounded extension of their activities. They were of two main kinds, clerical and nationalist. The racial element was not strong before the emergence of Hitlerism. Clerical antisemitism followed well-worn lines in denouncing the Talmud, and opposing Jewish influence on the grounds of the harm done to 'Christian' civilization. Its potential influence in Poland was considerable. The Catholic hierarchy enjoyed the support of the *Endeks*, and in return ecclesiastical pressure was constantly used to further *Endek* economic and political ends. This is shown, for example, in the use made of the Polish small trader and the co-operative movement to stir up anti-Jewish feelings. 'Christians buy from Christians' was a slogan that inspired even pastoral letters from the Primate, Cardinal Hlond. The attempts of the hierarchy to restrain the violent elements of the Party, when they took to open assaults on the Jews, were not very vigorous.

The Nationalist element was represented by the National Democrats, but also from early days by the Rozwoy League, which from the very beginning dealt in the familiar phrases about 'international Jewry' and the necessity for a united national front against 'the Jewish menace'. During the first ten years of the Republic this party, like others of its kind, was constantly suppressed, or rather driven underground, by the Government. But no decisive measures were taken against it, and during the first bad collapse of reconstruction, the period which preceded the ministry of Grabski, it indulged in violent outrages against Jews which went practically unpunished. The Bartel-Pilsudski Government managed to keep order fairly successfully, but from 1929 onwards the most serious charge that must be laid against the Polish Governments was their complete failure to suppress the violence of *Endek* and *Nara* hooligans and orators. From the cities and the universities they spread hatred to the small towns and the peasants; and the Government, which began by being unwilling, ended by being unable, to restore order or to punish offenders. The failure to find any positive solution of the problem, together with economic distress, provided an ever-widening circle of adherents for violent measures, and Jewish life in the last years of the Republic was tragic in the extreme. After a long period of administrative repression and economic decline, they had to face boycott, looting, and physical violence. If they resisted, they were likely to be given far severer sentences than the rioters against whom they defended themselves.

In this situation the impotence of the equality guaranteed them by the Polish Constitution and the Minorities Treaty was transparently obvious. The legal right of Polish Jews to member-

ship of every successive Sejm could not give them actual protection or effective justice, and could do nothing to ameliorate their condition.

7. *The Evolution of the Jewish Community*

The status of the Jewish community was decided by the Minorities Treaty. The essential fact is that it was not recognized as a single nation-wide entity. Jews were entitled to 'establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein'. The Poles undertook to provide primary education in Yiddish in places where there was a 'considerable proportion' of Jews, and in such places also to assure them 'an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes'.[1] Only to the Jews among the minorities was given the right that 'Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organization and management of these schools'.[2] Finally, individual Jews had the right to use their language 'in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings' and 'adequate facilities shall be given [them] for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts'.[3] It will be seen with what care any suggestion that a Jewish nationality exists is avoided. Jews obtained only local corporate recognition. On paper at least this was a retrograde step, in so far as they had just come to possess a central organization during the German occupation.

The Club of Jewish Deputies, which brought together Jews elected to the Sejm (and Senators), thus came to be in a sense the central Jewish organization. For this it was not really fitted, since it was not sufficiently numerous; it was not elected primarily on a basis of Jewish problems, and its members were in no way united even in facing Jewish issues. In the first Sejm, among eleven Jewish members, were representatives of six Jewish parties, one party having altogether failed to get a seat. For there were seven main Jewish parties. The largest was, in the beginning at any rate, the Orthodox (*Agudah*), whose interests

[1] Articles 8, 9, 10. [2] Article 10. [3] Article 7.

were more religious than political, and who could consequently be cajoled into supporting the Government by concessions which involved the latter in no difficulties with other sections of the population. It gradually drew nearer to the second most important party, the Zionists, who were well organized and influential. The link between them was the Mizrachi, who were both Orthodox and Zionist. Next to them came the *folkist*, or Democratic Party, a survival of Russian days, and the agitations of the early years of the century.[1] They were interested in neither Orthodoxy nor Palestine, but desired full national status for the Jewish communities of Europe. Especially in Galicia there still remained considerable elements of the Assimilationist Party, which in Austrian days had controlled most of the Galician communities. But in some ways the most important Party was the Bund, the Jewish Socialist Party, since it had a non-Jewish Party with whom it could and did co-operate—the Polish Socialist Party. There were also three separate Zionist-Socialist groups—the Poale Zion, the Zeire Zion (whose right wing the Hithachduth co-operated with the Poale Zion), and the Left Wing of the Poale Zion which was closer to the Communists.

These parties moved together and apart with the intricacy of a movement of the ballet, and their complicated evolutions were made still more complicated by the pressing problem whether Jewish Deputies should or should not vote with the Bloc of the Minorities. The difficulties involved in the decision are obvious. If all the Minorities voted together, they might, in cases where no other Parties in the Sejm could easily combine to form a majority, occupy a position of considerable power, and obtain the passage of measures which would be of advantage to all of them. On the other hand by standing together they allowed their Polish patriotism to be impugned, and made possible the very damaging charge that they had separatist tendencies. Moreover, so far as Jews were concerned, membership of the Bloc was visibly artificial and intended for ulterior motives, since the measures which the Jews disliked or desired were wholly different from those demanded by the other minorities. That this question constantly caused trouble and sometimes split the Jewish representation is, then, no blame to the men concerned.

But even apart from their union with the Minorities Bloc, Jewish unity itself might not necessarily have helped them. A bloc of 11 or 39 deputies would not have had greater power, but, in the irrational atmosphere of Polish politics, it might have lent more strength to the charge that they were a separatist and anti-Polish element. Moreover, it was as unreasonable to demand

[1] See pp. 108 *seq.* and 169 *seqq.*

that all Jews should think alike on political issues as to make the same demand of all Poles—and the Polish Parliament started with almost one hundred parties. But the disunity was unfortunate in two fields. The bitter rivalries between Jewish voters often meant the loss of a seat altogether. In the first Sejm the Jews had 11 seats, in the second (1922) 39, in the third (1928) 14, in the fourth (1930) 10, and in the last (1935) 4. This was partly due to deliberate changes in the constitution to reduce the representation of the minorities, but it was also partly due to Jewish divisions. But the more serious effect of Jewish disunity was that it prevented the Jews from ever putting forward a positive and comprehensive scheme for the status of Polish Jewry, instead of a series of constant protests and complaints on details. And the fact that at times it led to violent assaults by Jews on Jews, and destruction of Jewish property by Jews, did not improve the general situation.

Owing to the diverse political background of the country, the Jews, so far as their communal organization was concerned, had lived under four different regimes. In German Poland they had no important organization, for they were too few. In Austrian Poland (Galicia) there was no central organization, but there were well-developed local communities, with fairly high communal taxes as a basis for their electoral rolls. They had no control of education. The Jews in the provinces taken from Russia in 1920 had no official organization, but had councils which they had themselves elected. In Congress Poland the Jews had been given a comprehensive organization during the German occupation. Religious, charitable, and educational activities entered within their competence; payment of a minimum communal tax assured electoral rights to all men over 24; but the most important addition to the previous regime was the creation of a Central Council representing all the local communities. This Council was retained by the Polish authorities on the departure of the Germans, but only on the religious side. Education was entirely removed from the competence of the communities.

When the new Constitution came into force, and life began to become normal in 1921, the Jews pressed for fresh communal elections. Not many had been held under the Germanic law, and in some cases all or most of the officers of a community were dead. In March 1924 new elections were ordered by the Government, but only for Congress Poland and Galicia, and on the new religious basis. In view of these elections, the Jewish Parliamentary deputies pressed for certain reforms. The main reforms which they desired were: uniformity of organization throughout

the country; the restoration of a central body; the return to the communities of educational authority; and the substitution of elected members for certain Government nominees added to the elected bodies.

The result of the elections was to give the Orthodox Party a victory over the Zionists in community affairs, but the situation differed greatly in different communities. Lvov was wholly in the hands of the Zionists, Cracow was divided between Orthodox and Assimilationist. In Warsaw no group had a majority, and the same was true at Lodz. The most striking result was the almost complete disappearance of the Assimilationists, who had previously controlled most of the communities.

In 1927 a new statute governing all the Jewish communities (except in Poznania, Pomerania, and Upper Silesia) was issued. The local communities were given all the powers foreseen by the Minorities Treaty—maintenance of a rabbinate, construction and maintenance of schools and synagogues, responsibility for religious education, supervision of Jewish butchers, and care of charitable establishments. In addition a central Council for purely religious purposes was restored. The local communities were put under the control of 8 elected laymen and the rabbi; all members of the community over 25 were electors, and all over 30 who were Polish citizens might be candidates for election. The central body consisted of 24 elected laymen and 7 elected rabbis, together with four laymen and 4 rabbis appointed by the Government. In 1930 the communities were given the right to excommunicate members for religious offences. The main criticisms of the scheme turned on the purely religious character of the central body, and the strict definition of the educational and charitable powers of the separate communities. At the same period the main complaint was that the allowance for religious purposes made to the Jews was considerably less than that made to the Catholics, which was explained by the Government to be due to the greater simplicity of the Jewish religion and its buildings, and the consequence that they cost less to maintain—an ingenious but unconvincing explanation.

In 1931 there were fresh elections to the communities, and again the main combatants were the Orthodox and the Zionists. Neither side gained a decisive victory, and the result was interminable quarrelling within the communities. An attempt was made to set up a voluntary central council for Jewish affairs, but this apparently came to nothing. To the end of its days Polish Jewry remained divided, and this inevitably reduced its effectiveness.

The religious life of the community was submitted to the

same kind of conditions as those which prevailed in general Jewish affairs. In fact, religion and life are so interwoven in Judaism that any other situation would have been impossible. In the first decade Jews had to complain rather of non-fulfilment of expected rights than of active oppression, but this in itself could be serious. The question of the permission of Sunday work was a burning sore throughout, and in view of the high proportion of orthodoxy among Polish Jews it imposed a considerable liability on Jewish occupations. Work on Sunday was generally possible —in fact, it would have been impossible to prevent—when it took place behind closed doors, and involved Jews only; but Jews never obtained permission to trade openly on Sunday; in the end, it was probably better that they should not, since it would have been only an obvious mark for further violence from antisemitic hooligans.

Nor did Jews ever obtain full satisfaction of their needs in the field of primary education. The provision of grants was niggardly, and permission to have Yiddish schools where there were considerable Jewish populations was obtained rarely and with great difficulty. With secondary and technical education the same difficulty existed. The result—and possibly the intended result—was that far more Jewish children attended the Polish schools and were educated in Polish than were educated in Yiddish or Hebrew in schools controlled by the community. But in thousands of cases (80,000 in 1930) parents paid to have their children taught in private schools because no school for Jewish children existed. As with every other aspect of Jewish life, a situation which was not very satisfactory before the depression took a turn for the worse after it. Where economies became necessary they were first applied to Jewish teachers and to Jewish schools.

In the last years of the Republic a new threat to Jewish economic life was launched in an attack on Jewish ritual killing of meat (*Shechita*), and a Bill was passed limiting the work of Jewish butchers to the Jewish community. The effect of this was to throw thousands of Jewish butchers out of work, for a large proportion of the general trade had previously been in their hands, and their clientele had included many of the Christian population. It was even planned by successive stages to stop the Jewish method of slaughter altogether by 1941, but the German invasion intervened.

No account of Jewish life in Poland would be complete without a description of the tremendous effort made by Jews elsewhere, and primarily in the United States, to assist their Polish brethren. The place of honour in this work is occupied by the American

Joint Distribution Committee, known affectionately even in the smallest Jewish community of eastern Europe, as the 'Joint'.[1] The Joint came into existence in 1914 for the distribution of funds raised to assist Jews in the war areas, and in 1939 was an organization capable of handling a budget of many million dollars.

The work undertaken in Poland, as soon as the officers of the Joint were able to enter the country, fell into five departments, and much of this work was still being done, partly by Polish-Jewish organizations, and partly with American help, right up to 1939. The first task was to cope with the thousands of homeless refugees throughout the country, for it had been for four years a battlefield, and the Bolshevik revolution had brought further fugitives into the Polish State. The next task was to tackle disease, health, and housing for tens of thousands who were living in ruins or in holes in the ground. Famine and typhus were rife. There were no bathing facilities, rarely good water supplies, no doctors, dentists, nurses, or dispensaries. There were, however, the relics of a Health Organization set up by a Russian-Jewish group, the OZE; and a new independent Polish organization was set up to continue its work, the TOZ, and this received American help to the end.

The basis of physical existence once secured, the Joint approached the treble task of re-creating Jewish education, of setting Jewish economic life on its feet, and of doing what it could permanently to assure the health of the coming Jewish generation. In addition to invaluable help to rabbis and scholars, the Joint rebuilt hundreds of schools from elementary to technical establishments, and assisted in the building of hostels for university students (the great Jewish student hostel at Praga in Warsaw was one of the finest buildings of its kind in the country). Economic rehabilitation was worked through the creation, restoration, or improvement of credit co-operatives and loan banks, and through loans to various co-operatives, such as a building co-operative, co-operative bakeries, and similar activities. The loan activities were united in the *Cekabe* (Central Kredit Bank), whose loans carried a small interest, and the *Gemiloth Hesed Kassa*, when help was required by those who could not even afford the small interest charged by the loan funds. In the last ten years these came to occupy a vital position in Polish Jewish life—numbering 676 in 1933 they had risen to 915 in 1938. Finally, the health work for the children was centred in the *Centos*, whose work after 1930 included the feeding of

[1] There is a good account of the work of the J.D.C. in *The American Jewish Year Book*, vol xli.

tens of thousands of children daily, in addition to creating summer and winter health colonies, pre- and post-natal clinics for mothers, and re-training schools for the children of petty merchants and artisans. In this last it was helping in the field of another pre-war Russian-Jewish organization, the ORT, which maintained 67 technical and agricultural schools and co-operatives of all sorts scattered throughout the country. In these institutions in 1936 were over 4,500 pupils.[1]

In all these activities Polish Jewry played—and paid—its part. The policy of the Joint, and of the Joint Reconstruction Foundation to which it transferred the actual administration of the work after 1924,[2] was to make it as far as possible self-supporting, and administered by authorities chosen within the Jewish field in which it was working. Thus, although American Jewry was continually assisting its Polish brethren, it was not pauperization or indiscriminate charity. By preventing Polish Jewry from an earlier and still more disastrous collapse, it could be legitimately said that it was making no mean contribution to the foundations of Polish society.

Conclusion

The tragic picture which has been drawn in the previous pages is one of bewildering complexity. It would be easy to draw a different picture by stressing either side, and thereby to make it appear that the difficulties were due only to the malevolence and evil actions of parties or of Governments on one side, or to the frequent and even grave mistakes of the Jews on the other. But such pictures are not only false but, in view of the future, dangerous. The Jews of Poland suffered tragically; they bore the main burden of suffering which the insolubility of the Jewish problem laid on the country; and it is foolish to pretend that the situation was their fault. They made innumerable mistakes, some of them serious; but *humanum est errare*, and it is easy to be wise after the event. The Poles likewise suffered from the problem, especially after 1934, when German pressure finally prevented the Government from any strong action against the antisemitic sympathizers with the Nazi régime. It was not a problem for which Poland was responsible and Polish Governments lacked both the experience and the authority to solve it. Their inability to do so exposed them to

[1] See Appendix V. p. 241. A catalogue of the activities of the ORT is given as an example of the wide scope of these activities.

[2] The American Joint Reconstruction Foundation was set up with the aid of the Jewish Colonisation Association, which contributed £400,000 to its capital of £1,000,000.

hostility in liberal quarters abroad which they did not wholly deserve; and at home they were overwhelmed with so many other questions that they short-sightedly allowed the antisemitic movement to spread, even during the period when it was in opposition both to their intentions and their desires. The demoralization of the country which resulted added still further to the instability of the Government and was instrumental in bringing about the chaos which preceded the forced unity of March 1939. But they as much as the Jews are entitled to the charitable verdict of *humanum est errare.*

But if this be pronounced on both sides in relation to the period which has passed, it would be improper to excuse the repetition of the same tragedy in the Poland of to-morrow. It is evident that constitutional equality before the law must be the foundation of Jewish citizenship for such Jews as have survived the massacres of recent years and desire to remain in Poland. But on that foundation it is to be hoped that a structure may be reared which is not created from without, but worked out from within, in agreement between Jewish and Christian citizens of Poland. This will mean that Jews also will need a new sense of discipline, unity, and responsibility. But it is useless to expect this of them unless some prospect lies before them of fruitful co-operation with the national authorities. The peculiar economic distribution of Polish Jewry is, perhaps, a weakness of the Jews, but, if any trace of it survives, it offers an opportunity of valuable contributions to the country as a whole; and, since it is a land which has to be rebuilt from the very foundations, it would be foolish of the Government not to take the fullest possible advantage of all that the remnants of Polish Jewry can offer of skill and service. The fundamental spirit of the Poles is by no means intolerant; the fundamental spirit of Jewry is the reverse of degenerate. Both sides would benefit from a concrete programme for building up the new society as much as they would suffer if any repetition of the inter-war period were to take place.

PART THREE

THE COMMUNIST SOLUTION

'*The Jewish bourgeois are our enemies, not as Jews but as bourgeois. The Jewish worker is our brother.*'

Council of People's Commissars, 27 July 1918.

Chapter Seven

THE JEWS OF THE U.S.S.R.

1. *The Historical Background*

SOMETHING has been said in the introductory chapter of the historical background and social development of the Jews of Russia. The Jews formed a vast community of depressed petty traders, unskilled artisans, and individuals with no regular means of support. It was not a 'proletariat' in the Communist sense, for it lacked economic cohesion and its activities were certainly not 'ripe for socialization'. Such as they were, they could only be considered as the last degeneracy of bourgeois economics and *laisser-faire* individualism. The changes which the mass of Jewry desired from the Government were political and not economic. They looked to the removal of those artificial restrictions which prevented them from undertaking the natural development of their economic life, and which had involved them in the desperate search for a means of livelihood for a constantly expanding population with constantly shrinking economic outlets.

For many reasons the slowly expanding industry of pre-1914 Russia offered them little scope. But although Jewish artisans formed only 2 per cent. of the artisans of Tsarist Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, and though they formed a scarcely higher proportion of the Jewish population, it is not difficult to understand how they came to be considered 'the pioneers of the revolution'.

Conditions of life for the Jewish population under the Tsars steadily worsened as the nineteenth century advanced. When in 1881 the ignorant antipathy of the Russians was fanned by the Government into a series of violent outbreaks against the Jews, the birth of a revolutionary movement among the most intelligent and socially conscious members of that population, the urban, 'proletarian', artisanate, was inevitable.

The first Jewish Socialist newspaper had already appeared during the eighteen-eighties and the writings of Marx, secretly introduced into Russia, were eagerly read in the small factories and workshops in which the Jewish artisans worked. First in Vilna, then in other industrial centres of the Kingdom of Poland, groups of 'Social Democrats' sprang spontaneously into existence. In 1897 they met in secret conference in Vilna, and the 'Bund',

the Association of Jewish Social Democratic Labour Parties, was founded. The main plank of its programme was the abolition of all the artificial restrictions under which Jewish life was lived in Russia, and the granting of complete civic equality to the Jewish population.

In the following year a similar, but smaller, conference of Russian workers founded the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party—the ancestor of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. The Bund joined the Party immediately on its foundation, but as an autonomous group. This autonomy was accepted for purely practical reasons. Small though the number of Jewish workers was, they were, by their superior education and their familiarity with communal organization, an essential element in the struggle for the rights of the working class. Few of the Jewish workers, however, spoke any language but Yiddish; and it was therefore essential that the organization which approached them should be able to do so by Yiddish speakers, and by Yiddish literature. At the beginning this separate existence of the Bund implied no more, and it was perfectly open to any Jewish worker to join the Russian rather than the Jewish party. A few did so, particularly from groups which felt no special solidarity with the Jewish masses, and which believed that in a Socialist society the Jews would have no reason for any further separate existence. For this reason those Jews who later became prominent as leaders of the Revolution, Sverdlov, Kamensky, Joffe, Krassin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, and others, had from the first been members of the Russian and not the Jewish Socialist organization.

The Bund at first was itself so little concerned with the Jewish people as such that when the demand for *national* equality, as separate from, and additional to, personal equality, was made at its third conference at Kovno in 1899, it was rejected on the grounds that the intrusion of the national question would deflect workers from their class solidarity and their class interests. But at the next meeting (Bialystok, 1901) the majority began to waver. The demand for national equality was not rejected but postponed. It would have involved a demand by the Bund that the unitary R.S.D.L.P. should be turned into a federation in which each nationality was separately organized, and this appeared premature. At the same time the conference registered its opinion that 'the concept of nationality applies also to the Jewish people'. This increased interest in the question of nationality was largely due to the activities of the Social Democratic Party in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, activities with which the Bundists were inevitably, if illegally, in close contact.

At their conference at Brunn in 1899 the Austrian Party had decided for a federal form of organization, and had actually split into six national sections under the influence of two Austrian socialists, Springer and Bauer. These developments would not have interested the Bund, since Jews possessed no territorial basis on which a national unit could be formed, had not the idea of nationality been associated by these two Austrian Social Democrats with personal choice rather than the accident of birth in a particular area. Once nationality was considered in that light, it was as applicable to the Jewish as to any other people, and the idea began to win increasing favour with Jewish Socialists in Poland and Russia. The formation of a Polish Socialist organization which began to canvass among Jewish workers in Poland brought matters to a head. At the second congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903 the Bund put forward an official demand to be recognized as a national body, and as the sole body conducting propaganda among the Jewish proletariat. This amounted to a demand for the reorganization of the Russian Party as a federation of mutually exclusive national members, and was vigorously rejected.

The Bund left the R.S.D.L.P. and at its conference at Zurich in 1905 it developed a full national programme, based on the creation of national Jewish institutions which should control all cultural and educational questions, without the interference of the Russian imperial or local government. These institutions were to be elected by secret, direct, and universal suffrage. The events of 1905, however, emphasized the paramount need for unity within the revolutionary movement, and the Bund returned to the R.S.D.L.P. But it re-entered the Party, not because it had abandoned its national views, but in order to continue the fight for them from within, rather than from outside, the rest of the revolutionary movement.

At the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906 at Stockholm the national issue was not raised; but a split had taken place in 1903 on other issues which resulted in a division of the Party into 'Mensheviks' and 'Bolsheviks'. The Bund took sides with the Mensheviks, and when in 1910 the split between the two groups became definite the Bundists remained mostly in the Menshevik camp. Apart from individual leaders of Jewish origin such as Trotsky, the only corporate Jewish groups to support the Bolshevik point of view were certain of the Left Wing Zionist factions.

The conflict between the Bund and the Party was an unfortunate one, and it had very unfortunate results for the Jewish population when the Bolsheviks came into power in 1917. It

arose out of a number of causes. Unquestionably any normal Jewish group, with the normal Jewish tradition of free intellectual discussion behind it, would find it rather difficult to conform to the somewhat terrifying insistence on absolute Marxist orthodoxy which was part of the Bolshevik creed. The strict definition of orthodoxy, and the absolute condemnation of heresy (Marxist: deviation) recalls early Christian councils but not Talmudic discussions. But beside this difference of temperament, there were two factual differences which could not at that time be reconciled within any existing 'orthodox' Marxist formula. The Jews, in thinking of their national claims, were thinking of their position in Tsarist Russia, and the inferiority of their status to that of other members of the Russian proletariat. There were many disabilities which could be removed within the framework of the existing political régime, and this levelling-up might, from their point of view, properly precede a revolutionary change of the régime itself. The fact that they pressed for these rights at the same time as they joined with others in a revolutionary political party did not make them 'reformists' as opposed to 'revolutionaries'. It was a reasonable recognition of the fact that they were, at the actual moment, a stage behind other proletarians in political status. On this point it might be said that the Bund was making a right and proper claim.

Unfortunately, however, the claim to a specific national programme for themselves involved them inevitably in the demand that the Party should be remodelled on a federal basis, and committed them to a 'separatist' policy. In the opinion of the Bolsheviks this would weaken the whole value of the Party in Russia. Here the Bolsheviks were unquestionably right, and the example of the Austrian Social-Democrats, though it was quoted with approval by the Bund, was wholly in favour of the Bolsheviks. For the destruction of the unity of the Austro-Hungarian working class had led to Austrian workers assisting in the suppression of strikes of Czech workers in the interests of the nationalisms of the two sides. To demand a federal form of Party was certainly not the right method of securing the special needs of the Jewish workers.

The other fact was that the nationality policies of the Jewish and Russian sections were based on the consideration of wholly different issues. The Jewish policy was naturally based on the position of the Russian Jews. The Russian policy was based on the position of subject nationalities, both inside and outside Russia. From the standpoint of the revolution within the territories ruled by the Tsars, the national policy of the Bolsheviks was directed to securing the support of the nationalities in both

Europe and Asia who were being oppressed and Russified by Tsarist policy. In the west of the Empire were the civilized nationalities of Poles and Finns, and in the south and east were much more backward nationalities which were either feudal or even nomadic in their social structures. The 'national cultural autonomy' demanded by the Bund suited neither of these groups. So far as such groups as the Poles were concerned, the Bolsheviks insisted on the absolute right of a nation to secession. The right was indeed proclaimed as a general right of all nations, even though the Bolsheviks did not consider it could always be exercised. Whether in any particular case it would be right to allow a nation to secede would be decided in the interests of Socialism by the section of the Social Democratic Party concerned. The Bolsheviks would clearly not have allowed the Uzbeks or Crimean Tartars to secede, or, to take a border-line case, permitted a really independent Ukraine. But equally clearly 'national cultural autonomy' was not the solution for semi-feudal or nomadic peoples, since this would commit them to permanent subjection to their present feudal or religious rulers, and prevent the development of organizations for the masses with the help of Social Democrats.

The Bolsheviks were also concerned with world revolution, and considered themselves to be the vanguard of a world rising of the proletariat. Their definition of national rights was therefore intended to win the adherence of the subject coloured peoples, and of those independent coloured races whom the white empires considered inferior. They hoped at that time for support from India and China, and therefore proclaimed the absolute right of these peoples to their independence, or to equal treatment with other peoples. Here again the definition desired by the Bund of 'national cultural autonomy' was inapplicable, as the British might claim that they had granted it in India, or that they had never interfered with it in China. And similar claims might be made by the other empires. In fact, where cultural autonomy did not exist, it might easily be conceded, and so weaken the 'native' demand for independence.

On these latter points it is very doubtful if Bundists would have disagreed with the Bolsheviks. What they required was really a special solution applicable to the special position of the Jews. But not only are special dispensations difficult to obtain from any 'religion' which demands a ferocious orthodoxy from its adherents, but in this case it had been the view of Marx, and was the view of Lenin and Stalin, that the Jews did not really constitute a nation, and were not likely long to survive as a recognizable element within the Socialist State. In an important

essay on *Marxism and the National Question*, written in 1913, Stalin lays down the essential basis of a nation: 'a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.' And he adds: 'it is possible to conceive people possessing a common "national culture", but they cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, Armenian, Georgian, and Caucasian Highland Jews, who do not, in our opinion, constitute a single nation. . . . It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation.'[1] The Jews, therefore, did not figure among the nations whose freedom was assured in the Bolshevik programme, and the Bund and the Bolsheviks drifted further apart.

2. 1914–1921: *War, Civil War, and Revolution*

The outbreak of war in 1914 found the Jews still living under all the restrictions of a century and a half of repressive legislation. In addition, the 'Temporary Rules', introduced after the assassination of Alexander II, were still in force and prevented any possible extension of their rights or their residence even within the Pale of Settlement to which they were confined.

The whole area covered by the fighting from 1914 to 1917 lay within the 10 Polish and 15 Russian Governments which comprised the Pale. At the time of the Germans' furthest advance they were in occupation of all the ten Governments of the Kingdom of Poland, and of all or part of the Governments of Courland, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, and Volhynia; while the Governments of Vitebsk, Minsk, Kiev, Podolia, and Bessarabia lay in the forward area of the Russian military administration. Only Mogilev, Chernigov, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida lay at any distance from the zone of operations, and in 1914 these provinces together contained but a sixth of the Jewish population of the Pale. What Jews escaped during the Russo-German war, however, they encountered later during the civil war in the Ukraine, so that during the seven years from 1914 to 1921 almost the whole of Russian Jewry was exposed to the ravages of war.

It is not necessary to recount in detail their sufferings during the war with Germany. Apart from the normal miseries of any

[1] Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, p. 8. For 'Armenian' the English text reads 'American', which is presumably a typographical error.

civilian population in such a situation, the Jews suffered from two particular calamities. The class which was represented by the leaders of the Russian army was the most antisemitic in the empire, and many of the Russian officers had participated actively in the violences of the Black Hundreds, the patriotic organization responsible for the series of pogroms around 1905. Further, Polish-Jewish relations had been steadily deteriorating for a generation, and these Russian officers, coming into Poland in the opening months of the war, found their Polish opposite numbers, the Polish aristocracy and gentry, as antisemitic as themselves.

The first result of this combination of enemies was the spread of innumerable rumours, subsequently backed by official military publications and orders, that all Polish Jews were to be treated as German spies—this in spite of the fact that there was a higher percentage of Jews in the Russian army than of either Poles or Russians and that their military behaviour was not inferior to that of their non-Jewish comrades. The spy mania suffered a certain diminution with the exposure of an extensive spy ring among the political police themselves which followed the trial and condemnation of a Russian police officer, Miasoïedov, and the discovery that the ex-minister of war, Sukhomlinov, had accepted bribes and entertained relations with extremely suspect circles. But in the interval enormous suffering had been inflicted on the Jews, and records exist of attacks by the Russian soldiery in over 150 places. As the Russian army began its long retreat these violences naturally increased, and looting and murder were unhappily common.

The retreat, however, had more disastrous consequences. Innumerable communities were ordered suddenly to evacuate their homes before the advancing Germans, and compelled to seek shelter elsewhere in the Pale. Until August 1915 no extension of the zone of residence was allowed, and the result was appalling overcrowding. In all, over half a million Jews were thus compelled to leave their homes. In the towns where they took refuge they were unable to find work, for these were too near the front to have become industrial or munition centres, and the residents themselves had been hard hit by the war. Transport was disorganized or monopolized by the military. Merchants were unable to get their wares, or to transport the articles in which they dealt. But by August the situation had become so alarming that the interior had to be opened to these unhappy fugitives. Yet even so it was only to the towns that they were allowed to go: the villages remained closed. They were also not allowed to seek work in munitions. By 1916 about a third of the refugees had found their way out of the Pale, and

had established themselves as far afield as the Volga and the Asiatic provinces of the Empire.

The sufferings of the Jewish population, and the recognition that a breach had to be made in the pre-war regulations, led to the hope that the whole apparatus of restrictive legislation might be swept away, at any rate as soon as the war was over. The progressive parties in the Duma were unanimous in their opposition to its continuance. But it was not until the last months of Tsarism that the Government showed any signs of being willing to act. Then the Russian advance into Austrian Galicia compelled it to issue instructions that the Jews in the occupied province were to be well treated—otherwise there was an obvious danger that their sympathies would be openly with the enemy. At the same time Jewish educational opportunities were extended in Russia proper, and a Bill was introduced to make permanent the extended sphere of residence opened in the previous August. But there was still no question of residence anywhere but in urban communities.

But by this time the whole fabric of the Tsarist régime was cracking, and in the early spring of 1917 it collapsed. The Jews were emancipated by the Kerensky Government; but for four years more the Jewish community had little time to consider the use which might be made of this freedom, or its relations with the Revolutionary Government of the Bolsheviks which succeeded Kerensky in October 1917. It is clearer, therefore, to postpone consideration of the political changes until the next section, and to continue with the story of the various wars which followed the main European war, and which affected Jewish life in every section of the country.

The breakdown of military discipline in 1917 led to considerable disorder in the western provinces. Bands of soldiers, looking for food or loot, were wandering at random through the country, and regarded the Jewish communities as legitimate prey; but such was the general confusion that it is impossible to give any clear record of Jewish sufferings during this time. The Revolutionary Government at the centre had little authority, and could not have prevented these disorders, however great its desire to do so.

Much more serious, however, was the series of wars which ravaged the Ukraine during the years 1918–1920. During the period of Kerensky a National Government (the Rada) had been established in the Ukraine. It was progressive and democratic, but not composed of Bolsheviks. It handed over the land to the peasants, and its supporters were to be found largely in the rural classes. In the towns where much of the population was non-

Ukrainian it was less strong. The Bolsheviks opposed it from the first, but the Bund supported it until in January 1918 it declared its independence of Moscow.

The Bolsheviks replied to this declaration of independence with the invasion of the country. They rapidly captured Kiev, and the Rada appealed to the Germans. In April German and Austrian troops occupied the country and set up a new Government, reactionary in its tendencies, under the Hetman Skoropadsky. In June the peasants rose against the Germans, and in the autumn they were driven out, at the same time as Petliura, military member of the original Rada, attacked and overthrew the German puppet Skoropadsky.

Supported by the French, who occupied Odessa, Petliura united the greater part of the country, but the Communists set up a rival Ukrainian Government at Kharkov.[1] During this first phase of the war the Jews suffered as Bolsheviks at the hands of the peasants, the Germans, and the troops of Skoropadsky alike, and there was a good deal of violence and still more looting. But this was nothing to the second phase, which opened with the renewal of the conflict by the Communists, who advanced on Petliura from Kharkov in February 1919. Petliura retired westwards, and during the following months the pogroms committed by his soldiers, often under his direct orders, were far more terrible than anything which the Jews had so far suffered. The Red Army gradually fought its way westward; and though there were many atrocities committed by Red soldiers also, there is no evidence of any connivance of the Red Command with these acts. In fact, where the soldiers were caught they were severely punished. The Communists had from the first set their faces against antisemitism; but it must be remembered that they had to cope with what had become an established tradition among Russian soldiers, whatever their political views, or the political views of those who commanded them.

By April the Red Army was in possession of most of the country, and had compelled the French to retire from Odessa. Then a new menace appeared. The Tsarist General Denikin, with a volunteer army largely made up of ex-officers and supported by the Allies, advanced from the south-east and captured Kharkov. This army assaulted the Jews almost as violently as that of Petliura. By the end of August it had advanced right across the country and reached Orel, little more than two hundred miles from Moscow. But its triumph was short lived.

[1] The Bolshevik Section of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party became the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the spring of 1918 at the same time as the Government was transferred to Moscow.

In December the Communists were again in possession of Kiev and Kharkov, and in February 1920 they occupied Odessa, and set up a new Communist Government of the Ukraine. But no sooner was the danger from Denikin at an end than Petliura reappeared on the western frontiers of the country with considerable Polish forces in his following. Guerrilla warfare, with the usual attacks on Jewish communities, continued for several months. It was not until the end of 1920 that peace finally came to the country.

It is impossible to give any reliable estimate of the casualties and damage caused by these three years of war and disorder. The figures for Jewish killed are at least 60,000, and may be as high as 150,000. Three-quarters of a million were rendered completely destitute and homeless, and 300,000 children were orphans whose parents were dead or had disappeared. The material damage was incalculable.

The civil wars in the Ukraine ravaged all those Governments of the Pale which had been little affected by the European war from 1914 to 1917. But that was not the only theatre of war. The war between the Poles and the Communists in 1920 was fought over the same area as the European war, and the anti-Communist Russian General Balakhovich was harassing the countryside of White Russia well into 1921 after peace had been established between the Communists and the Poles. A similar story can be told of the advances and retreats of Yudenich in Esthonia and of Kolchak in Siberia. More than a million Jews had taken refuge in the north and in Siberia during the years 1915 to 1917, and the retreat of Kolchak in particular was marked by serious excesses.

It was, then, a people harried beyond endurance, and with the whole fabric of their life shattered by war, massacre, and flight, which set out in 1921 to build up a new existence under the new conditions of the political régime of the Revolutionary Government.

3. *The Political Settlement*

The various peace treaties by which the western frontiers of the Soviet Union were ultimately fixed, resulted in a considerable reduction of the Jewish population. The Pale had included what became Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Rumanian territory. The census of 1926 estimated the Jewish population remaining to the U.S.S.R. at 2,672,499, forming 1·8 per cent. of the total population; 407,059 lived in White Russia, forming 8·17 per cent. of the population; and 1,574,428 formed 5·43 per

cent. of the population of the Ukraine. Just over a million lived in communities of not less than 20,000 in the cities of Baku, Berdichev, Bobruisk, Dniepropetrovsk (Ekaterinoslav), Gomel, Kharkov, Kiev, Kremenchug, Leningrad, Minsk, Moscow, Nicolaev, Odessa, Rostov, Uman, Vinnitza, Vitebsk, and Zhitomir.[1]

Since then there has been some considerable dispersal, and the Jewish population of Moscow and Leningrad in particular has considerably increased. In 1939 Jews numbered 400,000 in the former city and 275,000 in the latter, being 10 per cent. and 8 per cent. respectively of the total population of these cities. The figure for the total Jewish population in 1939 was just over 3,000,000.

The Jews were emancipated by the Kerensky Government on 16 March (3 April) 1917, and all the disabilities imposed on them by the Tsarist régime were swept away at a single stroke. The result was a period of feverish political and cultural activity, hampered though it inevitably was by the confusion reigning in the country. The Zionists planned the calling of a world conference in order to put forward their claims to Palestine in the post-war settlement; the Bund made plans for the exercise of their cultural autonomy.

In fact it was only in the Ukraine that any of their plans were realized, and then only for a few troubled months. The Ukrainian National Government actually lasted less than a year and its brief spell of life was chequered by civil war. It established a multinational state in which all nationalities were to enjoy equal rights. Each was to be represented in a Ministry of National Affairs by a National Committee and a minister of cabinet rank. The Government was supported by the Bund as well as by the Zionist and Socialist groups, but not by the Communists, Jewish or other. However, when elections took place to a Jewish National Committee, the Zionists and the bourgeois groups swept the polls, and the Bund polled only 18 per cent. of the votes. It immediately went into opposition and rendered the work of the Jewish National Committee sterile. In July 1918 the German occupation swept the whole apparatus of the National Councils away.

In the rest of Russia little was done in the period before the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of October 1917, and the story of the next years is largely the story of the gradual suppression of non-Communist organizations and activities as the Revolutionary Government was gradually able to make its authority felt. The

[1] Nearly all these cities have been the scene of furious fighting since 1941, and all except three have had long periods of German occupation. In Berdichev, Kremenchug, and Uman the Jews formed half the population.

attitude of the general masses of the Jewish population can be gathered from many sources. There was, in fact, nothing in the Bolshevik programme to attract them, and much to repel them. 'The Bolsheviks offered the land to the peasants and the factories to the workers. The Jews were neither peasants nor factory hands.'[1] The Bund, after a brief attempt at finding a compromise, joined the Menshevik opposition, but the Bund represented only a very small section of Russian Jewry. Everywhere the Jewish population showed a majority of the Zionist and bourgeois parties. Only small groups of Zionist-Socialists and individual Jews supported the Bolshevik Party. That Party, however, was not interested in the nationality of the opposition; from its standpoint the Jewish population formed part of the bourgeois groups, or of the Menshevik deviators. They made no attack on them as Jews. But the disfranchisement of all who made a profit from hired labour, or from religion or usury (especially dividends on capital), deprived a considerable number of Jews of political rights.

A declaration of 15 November 1917 proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of all those who were recognized as separate peoples within Russian territory, abolished all national and religious discrimination, and extended to all national minorities and ethnical groups the right to free development. Under this proclamation the Jews later enjoyed their right to Jewish soviets in districts where the bulk of the population were Jewish, i.e. Yiddish-speaking, for it was as an ethnico-linguistic minority that the Jews enjoyed their privileges in the Soviet Union.

This involved a reversal of the apparent policy of the Communist leaders before the revolution, but such reversals were readily accepted by Lenin and the Communist leaders as being necessitated by developing events. It involved no alteration of their general ideas of the relevance of 'cultural autonomy'. The position was defined by the Tenth Congress of the Party in March 1921 as follows:[2]

> In addition to the nations and peoples already mentioned, possessing a definite class structure and occupying definite territory, there exist within the R.S.F.S.R. various casual national groups, national minorities interspersed among compact majorities of other nations, who in most cases do not possess a definite territory (Letts, Esthonians, Poles, Jews, and others). The policy of tsarism was to exterminate these minorities by every possible means, including massacre (Jewish pogroms).

[1] A. Yarmolinsky, *The Jews and Other Minor Nationalities under the Soviets*, p. 50.
[2] Stalin, p. 277.

> Now that national privileges have been abolished and the equality of nationalities established, and the right of national minorities to free national development is guaranteed by the very nature of the Soviet system, the duty of the Party towards the toiling masses of these national groups is to help them to make the fullest possible use of the right to free development which they have secured.

Although it was several years before soviets could be elected, the law ordered that in any region, city, or village, the majority of whose population belonged to a national minority, affairs should be conducted in the language of that minority. The result has been some dozens of village and rural, and a few district and regional, Yiddish-speaking soviets, but these do not cover more than a small proportion of the Jewish population. The bulk of the Jews still live an urban life, and form large or small minorities within other communities. For the majority of the Jewish population, there is, then, no political expression of cultural autonomy, although there are Yiddish-speaking courts and schools where the Jewish population warrants it, and desires it. In any case with the Jews, as with other nationalities, the autonomy is primarily linguistic; and the politics and culture of the nationality must conform strictly to the Communist pattern.

In January 1918 the Revolutionary Government established a Commissariat of Nationalities of which the Commissar was, until 1922, Joseph Stalin. Though the Jews were not granted representation as a nationality, the Council established a Jewish section (*Yevkom*) which, until its abolition in 1923, aimed at establishing the authority of the Government over the Jewish communities. The various bodies elected in 1917 or 1918 under the influence of Kerenskian liberalism were liquidated by the *Yevkom* and purely Communist bodies substituted. How difficult it was to find Jewish Communists at the beginning is shown by the fact that while the Government was still at Leningrad it tried to edit a Yiddish newspaper in order to spread Communist ideas among the Jewish population. But it took three months to find a single Jewish writer capable of or willing to undertake the task. The work of actually converting the Jewish population to Communism was undertaken at the same time by the establishment of a Jewish Section of the Communist Party (*Yevsektsia*).

This Jewish Section of the Party was responsible for such persecution as the Jews suffered *as Jews* at the hands of the new régime. With the special dualism between Party and Government which exists in the Soviet Union, the *Yevsektsia* exercised considerable power and carried on a ruthless war on two fronts—the religious and the Zionist. In both fields it was more ruthless, as well as more efficient, than corresponding non-Jewish

Communist bodies. The observance of Judaism, depending as it does on so many daily practices, was easier to detect than belief in Christianity, and the suppression of the synagogues was carried on with considerably more vigour than the 'anti-God' campaign against the Orthodox Church. But with less political excuse; for the rabbis and the religious establishments among the Jews possessed neither the power nor the wealth of the Orthodox clergy and monasteries. They may have been essentially bourgeois, but they had no political authority over the Jewish community and were not in a position to make contacts with powerful anti-Communist and emigré circles abroad. The violence of the Jewish Communists has a double explanation. The extreme orthodoxy and obscurantism of the synagogues of the Pale led to extreme reaction amongst those who abandoned their traditional faith; the smallness of the numbers of Jewish Communists led them to make up for their paucity by their zeal. Yeshivas and Talmud Torahs were closed, synagogues and communal buildings confiscated, and rabbis and religious teachers exiled to Siberia, executed as counter-revolutionaries, or even killed in riots and demonstrations, especially on the Jewish high holidays.

The battle on the Zionist front was carried on at two different periods. The Zionists were, at first, doubly suspected both as nationalists of a bourgeois type, and as tools of British imperialism in the Middle East. Hebrew was suppressed, as not being a 'national' language in the Socialist sense. Zionist organizations were closed, emigration to Palestine was strictly forbidden. In both these actions *Yevsektsia* ignored the fact that the Government itself was willing in early days to tolerate both Hebrew and the Zionist organizations. An exception was, however, made in favour of those Zionist-Socialist groups which had, from the first, supported the Bolsheviks against the Bund and the Mensheviks, and which had provided considerable numbers of soldiers for the Red Army in the early days of the wars against Poland and the emigrés. These elements became absorbed into the Communist Party fairly early. A great many ex-members of the Bund were admitted some years later.

During the early years one Zionist group which won approval on other than political grounds was the Haluz Movement. This had been extremely strong in Russia some years before the European war, and worked a number of collective farms and settlements in south Russia and in the Crimea. As these settlements could be considered pioneers of the form of agricultural economy which the Communists desired to introduce, they were given considerable encouragement, and they played a notable

part in the earlier period in which agricultural settlement was the main plank in the programme of Jewish reorientation from petty trade and shopkeeping. As the Haluzim were among the younger and more active sections of Russian Jewry, it was perhaps natural that it was the Komsomol, the youth section of the Communists, or rather the Jewish section of the Komsomol, which put an end to this approval and in 1924 opened a violent campaign against them. The Haluz colonies were broken up, their members imprisoned and exiled to Siberia. Many hundreds died of the treatment they received, but it was not until 1929 that their final colony was destroyed.

The *Yevsektsia* was itself finally liquidated in 1930, but before it passed out of existence it had earned an evil reputation among the Jewish population for the brutality and efficiency of its attacks on Judaism, on the Bund, and on Zionism. For it is significant that throughout this early period the persecution of Jewish non-Communist elements came from the Jewish section of the Communist Party, often with very little encouragement either from the Government or from the Party control. But there is another side to the picture. The organization of Yiddish schools and institutes, the development of Yiddish literature, theatres, and cultural activities, came also within the sphere of activities of the *Yevsektsia*.

The abolition of the *Yevkom* in 1923 was followed in the next year by the creation of the *Komzet*, the committee for establishing Jews in agriculture. Kalinin, President of the Executive of the Congress of Soviets, marked a still further modification of pre-revolutionary views on the position of the Jews in a statement made in 1924. In addressing the first gathering of *Komzet* he expressed his approval of its work as being the necessary first step towards the establishment of a Jewish nation within the Federation of Soviet nationalities. In its first years the *Komzet* was primarily concerned with the establishment of settlements in the Crimea. But in 1931 a more ambitious project was announced, the formation of a National Jewish Administration in the district of Biro Bidjan in Eastern Siberia.[1] In 1934 the area was increased and Biro Bidjan was elevated to the rank of an Autonomous Jewish Territory, making the Jews into one of the nationalities of the Union, with representatives on the Council of Nationalities.

While it will be seen that the Government allowed Jews among its supporters considerable liberty in promoting the reorientation or liquidation of Jewish life, there was one matter on which it took a firm stand from the beginning. Antisemitism was made

[1] Below, p. 186 *seq.*

a punishable offence by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on 27 July 1918. This decree declared that:[1]

> Antisemitism and the pogroms against Jews are a danger to the revolution of the workers and peasants. All the working people of Socialist Russia are called upon to fight against these occurrences with all the means at their disposal.
>
> In the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic where the principle of self-determination for the toilers of all nationalities has been promulgated, there is no room for any national oppression. The Jewish bourgeois are our enemies not as Jews but as bourgeois. The Jewish worker is our brother.
>
> Any incitement against any nation is disgraceful and is not to be permitted.
>
> The Council of the People's Commissars orders all soviets to take the strongest possible measures in order to weed out completely the antisemitic movement. Pogromists and pogrom agitators must be placed outside the law.

While such a decree indicated clearly the attitude of the Government it cannot be expected that the whole tradition of Tsarist days would disappear at a wave of the hand. There were excesses against the Jews among the soldiers of the Red Armies in 1919–1921 but they were severely punished. There was considerable feeling against them at the beginning of the New Economic Policy after 1921, somewhat akin to the identification of 'Jews' with 'Black Marketeers' in England during the war of 1939–1945. But the most dangerous period was that of the purge of Trotsky and his followers in January 1928. In this purge not only were a number of prominent Jews involved, but occasion was taken to weed out many lukewarm elements in the Party, including many Jews who had joined out of desperation rather than conviction at the time of the suppression of the Nepmen and the liquidation of private enterprises. In some districts feeling was said to be more hostile to the Jews than in Tsarist days. But the Government was aware of it, and warned the police to proceed firmly against antisemitic agitators, 'but discreetly, and in such a manner as not to give the impression that Communists are the particular friends of the Jews, or that the Government is a Government of the Jews'. In the great purge of 1936–1938 many Jews were again involved, especially leaders of Yiddish cultural life, but there appears to have been less anti-Jewish feeling at the time and there seems to be no suggestion that they were involved as Jews. The steady educational emphasis on group toleration had led to the result that antisemitism was disappearing from

[1] Lestchinsky, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, vol. iii, No. 6, p. 614. Quoting from Jidn in *F.S.S.R.*, Zamlbuch. p. 172.

the people. The extreme youth of the population assisted the work of the educators. Less than one-third was over thirty, and could have had any personal memory of the pre-revolutionary period.

Up to 1936 a large proportion of the Jewish population was still disfranchised on one ground or another, mainly as bourgeois or employers of labour, but not as Jews. But the new Constitution abolished the distinction made in 1917 and completed the work of emancipation.

4. *Economic Development*

Just as there was nothing in the programme of Communism to attract the ordinary Jewish population of the Pale, so there was nothing in the economic distribution of the Jews of which the Communist could make use. Jewish factory workers, who in any case supported the Mensheviks against them, numbered only about 2 per cent. of the Jewish population. The petty shopkeepers, hucksters, and *luftmenschen*, the merchants and ill-provided artisans, represented nothing but classes which the Communists were determined to sweep away. In fact the laws passed in the first months after the October Revolution would have automatically deprived most of the Jews of their livelihood, had the Government been in the position to see to their enforcement. But this was far from being the case, and though Jews were powerless where a zealous and efficient Communist official was on the spot, they had lived so long by evasion of legal restrictions[1] that all that happened for most of them was that it was a new kind of law which they had to evade. The only difference was a decline in the status and opportunities of the merchant and shopkeeper and a corresponding rise in the status of the artisan. For though Jewish artisans were far from being adequate to the needs of the country, they were often the only men available for the innumerable jobs of everyday life.

The period of 'militant Communism' came to an end with the proclamation of the New Economic Policy in 1921. It had failed because it had not been able to maintain, let alone increase, production; and the state of the country was getting worse rather than better. Lenin, therefore, allowed the country to return to private capitalism for a period during which a genuine

[1] In the interminable discussions of the Jewish question in the last decades of Tsarism it is constantly repeated that the main use of the mass of restrictions issued by the bureaucracy was to enrich the officials. Had they been observed the Jewish population would have starved. But they were not there to be observed so much as to provide an excuse for an official to obtain a *douceur* for winking at their evasion.

Socialist economy might be gradually built up. The period of the N.E.P. lasted from 1921 to 1928, but it was only in the first years that it was possible for private enterprise on the Jewish scale of petty and isolated activities to be profitable. These early years did, however, allow the Jews to recover from the devastating effects of the seven years of war. Without such a respite, brief and partial though it was, Jewry might have reached a stage of collapse from which recovery would have been impossible. For the State enterprises were far from being able to offer employment to all who needed it, and the Jews had no resources to meet a long period of unemployment. The boom was severely limited by the constantly falling value of the rouble, and by the poverty of the peasants and urban proletariat who formed the staple *clientèle* of the Jews. This is easy to understand when it is realized that it was ten years after the Revolutionary Government took power before production passed the level at which it had stood in 1913.

As the Government gradually brought its own factories and production into effective working it dealt with private enterprise in a number of ways. Taxes were steadily increased until businesses became completely unprofitable; particular occupations in which the State believed that it could now adequately supply the community were forbidden to private enterprise; consumers' and producers' co-operatives were extended and favoured. The result was that at the end of the period of N.E.P. the majority of Jewish youth had become unemployed.

This was not for want of efforts on the part of the Government, of the *Yevsektsia*, and of foreign agencies, especially the Joint Distribution Committee of America, to find alternative occupations. Artisans were encouraged, they were allowed to develop small co-operatives of their own, and to have up to three assistants or apprentices without forfeiting their proletarian status. Efforts were made, with some limited success, to make Jews into factory workers. But the big drive was towards agriculture.

The history of Jewish agriculture in Russia goes back to the Statute of Alexander I of 1804. He expelled 60,000 Jewish families from shopkeeping and similar occupations in the villages (especially the distillation of alcohol), and encouraged—or desired to encourage—them to settle on the land either in the Pale or in two districts in Astrakhan and the Caucasus. Largely owing to the hostility of the local administrations this resulted in the establishment of only 600 families on land in the region of the Lower Dnieper and Kherson. They suffered great hardships, and were not particularly successful. Expulsions from White Russia in 1823 led to a number of other families joining

them, but they did no more than replace the losses through mortality. In 1836–1837 more Jewish settlers were dumped in the area, after having first been directed to Tobolsk and Omsk in Siberia; and by 1840 there were some 8,000 Jewish families settled in the various Governments of Ekaterinoslav, Lithuania, White Russia, Bessarabia, as well as that of Kherson. By 1864 the total agricultural population had risen to 64,000, and there were 14 Jewish colonies in Kherson, 14 in Ekaterinoslav, 45 in Kiev, and 344 in the other Governments of the Pale. But in many respects these 'farmers' were still rather artisans than peasants, and life in the colonies resembled life in the townlets of the Pale rather than in an ordinary Russian village.

In 1870 a change took place. The Administration became more hostile and not only gave no help to Jewish farmers, but forbade artisan occupations in the colonies. In actual fact this helped rather than hindered their development, for they were at last compelled to take their farming seriously, and the standard of their production improved. Jewish public organizations took the place of Government assistance, and did the work more effectively. In spite of continued Government malice and indifference there was in 1897 a population of 90,000 in these colonies, and 90 per cent. of the population were engaged in actual farming. This was the peak of the pre-revolutionary development, for by 1913 the figures had fallen again considerably.

When in 1917 the Bolsheviks encouraged the peasants to take possession of the land, many Jews in the small towns and villages shared the division of the estates with the peasants, with the full approval of the latter. Many small Jewish co-operatives were formed to farm the land; and many plots were cultivated individually, especially in the neighbourhood of the towns where plots were offered to town dwellers if they would grow vegetables. In fact cultivation of such a plot restored a disfranchised person to the ranks of the workers. In the summer of 1919 the Commissariat of Agriculture issued a special appeal to the Jews:[1]

> The Soviet Power has liberated you from the burden of disabilities. You have become free citizens. You can live where you please and do what you please. But in a Socialist State there is no room for speculation and so-called 'free commerce', which enables rich merchants and speculators to suck the blood of wage-earners and of the poor. The Soviet Power stubbornly fights speculation and free commerce, and thereby, against its own will, deals a heavy blow to the Jewish masses, which, owing to the Tsars' policy, have until now been forced to live by petty trade and other precarious occupations. But while it deprives you of your shameful and unprofitable business,

[1] Yarmolinsky, *The Jews and other Minor Nationalities under the Soviets*, pp. 82 *seqq.*

> it gives you at the same time the right and the opportunity to take up healthy, honest, productive work, including agriculture, which, under the Tsars' rule, was forbidden you; join the ranks of the workers and the Soviet Power will come to your aid!

There were many Jews who expressed their desire to answer this appeal, but the lack of executive power of the Government, and its preoccupation with the civil war, resulted in nothing being done for several years.

In 1924 the matter was taken up seriously. A new committee for settling the Jews on the land, *Komzet*, was set up by the Council of Nationalities, and effective assistance was promised by the Joint Distribution Committee. A special body, the Agro-Joint, was set up and helped with instructors, with tractor teams which ploughed up the new land for the settlers, with loans for the initial purchases of equipment, and in many other ways. It received the friendliest co-operation from the Government. A Russian-Jewish body, the *Ozet*, also supported the work in various practical ways. As a result of this combined initiative the Jewish agricultural population had risen to about 86,000 by the end of 1924, and by 1927 it had reached 165,000. The high-water mark was in 1935, when the Jewish agricultural population for the whole Union stood at about 225,000, of whom 60,000 were in the old colonies of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav, 80,000 in other parts of the Ukraine, 50,000 in White Russia, and 20,000 in the Crimea. This agricultural population cultivated 500 collective farms with a high degree of success. Agriculture accounted for 8·7 per cent. of all gainfully employed Jews in 1934; and in 1939 the figure was 7·1 per cent. This indicates a net diminution of 10,000 workers (i.e. a population of about 22,500), but also means that more Jews were gainfully employed.

The main project in 1924 was the settlement in the Crimea, where there were already a number of Jewish agricultural colonies, especially those of the Haluzim. At the time it was hoped that the northern section of the Crimea, which was largely uninhabited owing to lack of water, might become a Jewish republic. With the help of the Agro-Joint, artesian wells were sunk, and large numbers of Jewish settlers were established. It became possible to travel about 140 miles through almost continuous Jewish colonies. But the opposition of the rest of the population put an end to the project, and in 1928 an alternative scheme was adopted. On 28 March Biro Bidjan was constituted a Region for Jewish Colonization, and extensive State funds were made available for the project. The area allotted to the scheme comprised over 6,000,000, subsequently increased to 9,635,000, acres. The territory lies on the north bank of the River Amur which

separates Eastern Siberia from Manchukuo. Statements differ about the climate and the value of the land for agricultural purposes, but it is rich in timber and in various minerals. The whole area in 1928 contained a population of little more than 30,000. On 30 October 1931, Biro Bidjan was declared a National Jewish Administrative Unit, and on 7 May 1934 it was made an Autonomous Jewish Territory, represented by five members in the Council of Nationalities. In spite of this official support, however, the scheme does not seem to have been successful in attracting Jews. It was estimated in 1937 that of the population of just over 100,000 less than a quarter were Jews, and of these only 10,000 were settled on the land. At one time it was agreed that foreign Jews might be accepted, but it does not seem that more than a handful have actually been allowed to settle there. Beyond giving the Jews of the Soviet Union the status of a nationality, Biro Bidjan has not proved a success.

At the same time the whole attempt to settle the Jews in agriculture cannot be pronounced a complete failure. The agricultural population has been increased by some 175,000 during a period when the movement of population throughout the world has been in the opposite direction; and the Jewish farmers seem to have been relatively successful.

If the Jews appear to play less than their part in agriculture, they have played more than their part in the Red Army. In Tsarist days Jews were already proportionately more numerous than others in the army, because of unfairnesses in the system of conscription, but they were unable to rise above the rank of sergeant. After the Revolution this restriction was naturally abolished, and many Jews adopted the army as a profession. While Jews formed 1·8 per cent. of the whole population in 1920, they formed 2·1 per cent. of the army. In military technical courses they formed 2·8 per cent. in 1922, and 3·4 per cent. of the higher military courses. The result has been that there were in 1943 some fifty Jewish Generals on the Active List.

While the direct efforts of the Government or the *Yevsektsia* to change the economic structure imposed on Russian Jewry by the restrictions of Tsarist days have met with but limited success, the Jews have in fact been successfully absorbed into the Soviet economy, but in a way different from that envisaged by the planners, and, one might add, in a way which would certainly have been impossible outside the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet economy itself eliminated many occupations—petty trading, petty finance, petty handicrafts—in which they were previously prominent. But instead they are found in very large numbers, serving in the various Government administrations, and

in the liberal professions, though there are few Jews who have risen to prominent positions in either. The figures for 1934 showed that in the administrations of the two republics in which they are most numerous, White Russia and the Ukraine, they form a third of the administration, outnumbering in both cases the number of 'natives' employed. Throughout the Union such occupations accounted for 40 per cent. of all gainfully employed Jews in 1934, and by 1939 the figures had risen to 50 per cent. The whole economic distribution of the Jews in those years was as follows:[1]

	1934		1939	
	Number	*Percentage*	*Number*	*Percentage*
Officials and white-collar workers	420,000	33·0	520,000	37·2
Liberal Professions .	100,000	7·8	180,000	12·8
Labourers . .	300,000	23·6	300,000	21·5
Agricultural workers	110,000	8·7	100,000	7·1
Artisans . .	210,000	16·6	200,000	14·3
Commerce . .	30,000	2·5	—	—
Indefinite . .	100,000	7·8	100,000	7·1
Total . .	1,270,000	100·0	1,400,000	

5. *Present Trends*

The most significant element in the Jewish situation in Russia is revealed in the table just quoted. It shows a distribution of the Jewish population which would be quite impossible in any other country, including the United States, and is an amazing tribute to the care with which racial chauvinism has been stamped out in the U.S.S.R. The use which antisemitic propaganda would make of a Jewish community possessing more government and other white-collar workers than artisans and labourers would compel the most liberal-minded Government to take steps to reduce the proportion. In none of the professions which were claimed by the Nazis to be dominated, or exclusively controlled, by the Jews, was the Jewish participation as high as it is in the Government offices of the Ukraine or White Russia. And, though it would be impossible to prove that this did not cause discontent to any individual Russian or Ukrainian, it evidently did not cause any manifestation of feeling with which the Government was not capable of dealing without difficulty. Nor did it render the Government itself unpopular. The mere prohibition of antisemitism by law would not secure such a

[1] Lestchinsky, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, vol. iii, No. 5, p. 521.

situation—unless it were in reality accepted without alarm or anger by the rest of the population.

The explanation is threefold. Much must be attributed to the educational work of the Soviet Union, and its continuous condemnation of racial hatred as being something which smacks of all those things which the Communist child is taught to abhor —imperialism, national chauvinism, bourgeois prejudice, and so forth. In the second place, this 'predominance' appears less 'alarming' in the Soviet Union because there is not that standard of social values by which these occupations are held in higher honour than those of the technician and industrial skilled artisan. It is the latter, not the officials or members of liberal professions, who to-day are held in the highest honour. The situation is, from this standpoint, somewhat similar to that in Budapest before 1914. Jews were extremely prominent in the free professions, in journalism, and in all walks of commerce. But the middle and upper-class Hungarians were indifferent to this, as the professions which they held in honour and sought to to enter were the army and the bureaucracy where Jews were exceedingly few. Whether this situation will be permanent in the U.S.S.R. it is impossible to say.

The third reason goes somewhat deeper. It was the opinion of the successive spokesmen of Communism, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, that in a Socialist State the Jews, lacking any geographical basis for their national life, would disappear. Stalin, to whom the task fell of putting into practice Communist theory, was perfectly willing to allow Jewish life to survive as long as Jews themselves wished it. In fact Jews have, officially at any rate, steadily advanced in their national rights during the period of the Soviet Government, and it would be impossible to find any example of Government oppression of Jews as Jews, or of that kind of administrative prudence which, not out of malice but out of timidity, aims at keeping the Jews and Jewish problems in the background. It is interesting to see that, during the war of 1939–1945, Russian soldiers put on the graves of Jewish soldiers who had fallen the words 'to our Jewish comrade So-and-so', an inscription which would have been regarded as in extremely uncertain taste in England by both Jews and non-Jews. But while Jews have advanced—officially—from a number of small soviets to the full status of a nationality, in fact separate Jewishness is steadily and even rapidly declining, and the expectations of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin are proving correct.

The educational figures give it most clearly. In 1939 in the Ukraine only 100,000 Jewish children were attending Yiddish schools, while 400,000 attended the Ukrainian or other schools.

In Great Russia Yiddish schools had been closed down entirely. There are several reasons for this. In the first place the vigorous anti-Judaism of Jewish Communists actually made the Yiddish schools less 'Jewish' than the neutral atmosphere of the ordinary Soviet schools; and many parents sent their children to the latter so that their Jewish traditions should be less interfered with. In the second place there was nothing but language which distinguished a Yiddish school curriculum from that in another school, and the language was no asset to a social group seeking employment so largely in administration and in professions in which they would be co-operating all the time with non-Jews. Moreover, once religion was omitted there was little left in Russian Jewish history to make a child proud of its Jewishness, and the Yiddish school material on Jewish traditional or historical subjects was exceedingly meagre or non-existent.

At the same time as school attendance declined, the Yiddish scientific institutes also lost vigour; Yiddish journals and papers were reduced in number. Scientific publications had practically ceased by 1939. Many of the cultural leaders fell foul of the authorities for deviations or 'unreliability', and were liquidated in the purges of the years before the war. Jewish territorial concentration steadily diminished, as Jews spread through the union or concentrated in the great cities. The number of Jewish soviets did not increase.

Such was the situation in 1939. Three events which have happened since then may make a difference and arrest the tendency, but it is still too soon to say. The new attitude to the Orthodox Church may result in a revival of the Synagogue also, though there is not much reason as yet to expect this. The contact between Soviet Jewish soldiers and the relics of the Jewish population in the countries west of the Soviet border may have opened their eyes to new aspects of Jewish life. Its economic sordidness probably horrified them; the atmosphere of strain in which Jews lived surrounded by antisemitism might be incomprehensible to them. That may be all they have seen. On the other hand they may have met Zionism and heard of a different Jewish Nationalism. The contacts between Palestinian and Soviet Jews may be extended and help this. Soviet soldiers may also have met some aspects of Jewish religion which were unrealized by them. One thing they are not likely to have acquired—the antisemitism of the non-Jewish population of eastern and central Europe, and that is the greatest tribute to the wisdom and skill with which the Communist authorities have handled the question. For twenty-five years ago pogroms were more numerous on Russian soil than elsewhere.

The third factor is of a different order. By accepting refugees and by extending her territories, the U.S.S.R. has increased her Jewish population by at least several hundred thousand. The figure may be nearer a million. It is possible that these Jews may influence Soviet Jewry to adopt a different attitude both to religion and to Zionism, and reinforce the experiences of Soviet Jewish soldiers. But it is too soon to do more than draw attention to the possibility. Time alone will show a result.

PART FOUR

MODERN ANTISEMITISM AS A POLITICAL WEAPON

'Antisemitism is a useful revolutionary expedient. Antisemitic propaganda in all countries is an almost indispensable medium for the extension of our political campaign. You will see how little time we shall need in order to upset the ideas and criteria of the whole world, simply and purely by attacking Judaism. It is beyond question the most important weapon in my propaganda arsenal.'

Adolf Hitler.

Chapter Eight

ANTISEMITISM BEFORE 1914

1. *The Foundations and Development of Modern Antisemitism*

IN any consideration of the Jewish question to-day it is necessary to deal with two quite different sets of facts. On the one hand there still exist problems, usually changing and temporary but genuine, which arise out of the actual situation of different Jewish communities, and of the reactions to which age-old prejudice, social maladjustments, or unfortunate personal experiences, have given rise. On the other hand is the record of a deliberately created political movement. The two sets of facts exist side by side—often in the same individual. But the confusion between them, or rather the failure to realize that they are independent of each other, has prevented the recognition that something is at stake which is not exclusively the concern of the Jewish people and which cannot be exorcized by purely Jewish action.

Modern antisemitism is a political weapon deliberately invented and artificially developed for ends which have nothing to do with the Jewish people or the Jewish religion. Its salient characteristic is that the material out of which it is forged is not only false, but known by its artificers to be false. The actual problems, prejudices, difficulties, and jealousies which arise out of the presence of actual Jewish communities are too diverse and too diffuse to have any practical value as a general weapon of the kind which the antisemites desired. They had, however, this essential value. They provided the background of susceptibility on which the antisemite was able to paint his vast chimeras, and gave to the most improbable creations of his fancy the similitude of probability.

Among the peasants and the proletariat, and among the ignorant of all classes, there had survived into the nineteenth century relics of the religious intolerance of the Middle Ages, and memories of the exactions of Jewish usurers; and they were familiar with Jews as strange, ragged and 'foreign' pedlars dealing with trumpery, or as old-clothes merchants, ridiculous with their evil-smelling sacks, and the three or four old hats beloved of nineteenth-century cartoonists.

Among the middle classes and the urban artisanate the word 'Jew' stood for something quite different. It stood for the rival

and competitor. The urbanization and industrialization of Europe had opened all kinds of new occupations to the more enterprising members of the Jewish population. The place which they came to occupy, if never so powerful as antisemites represented it, was yet a prominent one in many walks of urban life, and quite sufficient to attract jealousy among the non-Jewish urban population of similar standing, and desiring to obtain similar advantages from the expanding capitalism of the time.

To the aristocrat, the landowner, and the cleric, 'Jews' appeared in still a third light. The urbanized, capitalistic, liberal, secularist, and 'democratic' bourgeois state, which had deprived these classes of their authority and privileges, had emancipated the Jews, and given them every opportunity for influencing the public life of what had been 'Christendom'. To them the Jew was the parvenu, the sceptic, the desecrator of traditions.

Without this triple background of dislike, suspicion, or hostility arising out of actual Jewish problems the whole vast structure of antisemitism would have crumbled. Not a single element in its armoury would have appeared sufficiently probable to pass for truth had not the ground been thus prepared for it by the varied misfortunes, misunderstandings, jealousies, incompatibilities of temperament, economic clashes, or psychological deformations, which inevitably marked the passage of an identifiable minority through more than a thousand years of the histories of the most varied 'Christian' peoples.

The common enemy for which, in different countries, the weapon of antisemitism was forged, was precisely the liberal, secular, urbanized, and capitalistic state of the period; and though it proved no more than a Mrs. Partington's mop in the effort to restore the aristocratic and clerical society which had perished, it was most adroitly chosen for the discomfiture of nineteenth-century politicians. In the first place Jews alone could be described by *all* the adjectives used above to describe the nineteenth-century state. Their politics were almost universally *liberal*, for it was liberalism which had secured their political emancipation, and it was in liberal circles that they were most at home. The Jewish generation which had first profited by emancipation was largely in revolt against the traditions of the Synagogue, and was by temperament *secularist*; for the alternative of a modernized and reformed Judaism had scarcely appeared. They had for centuries been an *urban* population. And they were better equipped for the nineteenth-century *capitalist* development than any similar class of non-Jewish society. They were cosmopolitan, accustomed to handling money, and versed in all forms of commercial practice. Whatever aspect of modern

society was under attack, it was therefore possible to give it the name of 'Jewish'. Antisemitism united 'the enemies of dissent, the enemies of wealth as well as the enemies of the alien and the enemies of the upstart—clericals, nationalists, socialists, and aristocrats.'[1] But that was not all. A concentration on the 'Jewish' aspect of society allowed the attack to be made simultaneously on all fronts, and to bring together the most diverse elements of opposition. The traditional hostility to the Jews of the Churches, whether Roman, Protestant, or Orthodox, brought together the aristocratic prelate who disliked the diminution of his privileges, the sincere Christian who hated the secularist opportunism of the new society, and the poor rural or urban curate whose parishioners were ruthlessly exploited by the selfishness of capitalist enterprise; the old landowner and the non-Jewish industrialist united in opposing the Jewish rival of the latter; and the Christian and the freethinking intellectual found common ground in hostility to the cultural influence of Jews in the arts and professions. But even among the *petite bourgeoisie* in the towns and cities it was useful; for it brought together the jealous, the unsuccessful, and the displaced in a common movement. Only the Socialist movement resisted the temptation and refused to fall into the trap of distinguishing a Jewish from a non-Jewish capitalist. The 'Christian' Socialists, on the other hand, whether Roman or Protestant, were in the forefront of the movement.

Not only could the weapon of antisemitism draw together the most diverse elements in society; it could also be wielded in any one of a number of ways. The charge that opponents were 'Jewish' could be used simply as a stick with which to beat them. It was in this way that organized political antisemitism was first used by Bismarck in his attack on the National Liberals in 1879. The Jews could be used as a scapegoat for the failings of an unpopular régime, as they were used by the Russian bureaucracy from 1881 to 1917. Alternatively the scapegoat technique could be used to persuade people that their misery was neither the fault of their rulers, as in nineteenth-century Rumania, nor of themselves, as in the propaganda which brought the National Socialists to power in twentieth-century Germany. The Jewish bogy could be used to undermine confidence in a régime too strong for direct attack, as in the case of the French Third Republic in the period between 1880 and 1914. Finally, a concentration on supposedly anti-social or unpopular activities of Jews provided a most satisfactory smoke-screen to divert atten-

[1] G. F. Abbott, *Israel in Europe*, p. 412. By Socialists he presumably means the 'Christian' Socialists of Germany and Austria. See below, pp. 201 and 204.

tion from the equally anti-social or unpopular activities of non-Jews engaged in similar occupations. Hence the considerable support given to fascist movements of the Mosley type by non-Jewish capitalists who have been only too glad to have attention diverted from themselves in a period in which socialism, or advanced radicalism, has been 'in the atmosphere'.

There is then nothing surprising in the emergence of anti-semitism in the nineteenth-century picture. To present it as an unexpected return to medieval prejudice in a period of rationalism and toleration is to ignore the opportunism of modern political struggles.

Although it first appeared in German political conflicts it was in France that the foundations were laid, in the appearance of three books, each contributing essential elements to its composite character. In 1845 A. Toussenel published *Les Juifs, Rois de l'Epoque: Histoire de la Féodalité financière.* Its subtitle sufficiently indicates the subject of the book, and there is no reason to doubt that an exposure of the financial scandals and the selfish exploitations of French finance at the period would provide adequate material for any reasonably industrious author. But the characteristic of this particular book, in which the Jews are not the real objective, is admirably shown by Toussenel himself in his introduction: '*Et qui dit juif, dit Protestant, sachez-le. L'Anglais, le Hollandais, le Genévois, qui apprennent à lire la volonté de Dieu dans le même livre que le juif, professent pour les lois d'équité et les droits des travailleurs le même mépris que le juif.*' And, in fact, it is impossible to draw any distinction between the ethics of the Jewish and non-Jewish financiers, industrialists, and speculators of the period. Ten years later, in 1854, appeared the *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* of the Count de Gobineau which was to provide the distinction between Aryan and Semite of which German antisemitism was to make exhaustive use. But Gobineau also was not primarily concerned with the Jews. As Toussenel was attacking the social injustices of capitalism, so Gobineau was condemning the political absurdities, in his view, of representative democracy.

The third work, unlike its predecessors, is directly concerned with Jews and Judaism. While Toussenel provided ammunition for the economic attack, and Gobineau for the political, Gougenot des Mousseaux was concerned with the fields of religion and culture. In 1869 he published, with a commendatory note from the Directeur du Séminaire des Missions étrangères at Paris *Le Juif, le Judaïsme et la Judaïsation des peuples chrétiens*, which is a storehouse of all the medieval libels on Judaism, from ritual murder to the invalidity of oaths made to Gentiles, linked to

jeremiads on the demoralizing influence of the nineteenth-century secularist Jew. With these three books the aristocrat, the conservative, the cleric, and the radical could unite on the platform of antisemitism. But it soon became evident that the mere propagation of facts, even if carefully doctored, was not enough.

In order that the widespread public attention which alone will secure votes at the polls for any democratic party could be concentrated on the small groups of Jews who were numerically lost among the mass of the population, four steps had to be taken.

It was necessary to exaggerate their power constantly in order to give plausibility to the idea that they were *the* enemy of whatever cause the antisemites were advocating. For this purpose the vast financial power wielded during the first half of the century by the House of Rothschild was the foundation on which were evolved fantastic stories of Jewish 'monopolies' and the Jewish control of the world's government.

It was necessary to draw a picture of Jewish unity, in order that it might appear reasonable to attack *any* Jew in any capacity, rather than to admit that Jews in any profession—including the criminal profession—could only be attacked as a part of an attack on that profession, or Jews of any country as part of an attack on the population of that country, and that in both cases Jews who were of another profession or another country were out of the picture. The general, non-political concern of Jews with their persecuted co-religionists had to be presented as part of a common political plot. The politico-philanthropic activities of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and later the colonizing schemes of the Zionist Organization, had to be presented as part of a world-wide political activity aiming at Jewish domination. The 'clannishness' of Jews, arising naturally out of their social and economic isolation, had to be turned into a secret conspiracy.

It was necessary to establish a clear division, Jews one side, non-Jews the other. This task was undertaken by both the clerical and the philosophical enthusiasts of the antisemitic movement, and scandalous misrepresentations of the Talmud poured out from 'Christian' presses with the same velocity as new doctrines of 'race' poured from the presses of the universities. The admission that there were 'good' and 'bad' Jews would have been fatal to the movement, as would have been the admission that a 'bad' Jew had it in his power to become a 'good' one. Hence while clerical antisemites have not wholly desisted from their activities up to the present time, the racialists have tended to become more important. For it might be possible

for a Jew to change his religion to the embarrassment of the former; but it is clearly impossible for him to confute the latter by altering his heredity.

Finally, 'the Jews', already presented as immensely powerful, absolutely united, and unalterably different, had to be shown to be deliberately planning the most sinister enslavements of the immense non-Jewish majorities amongst whom they lived. The 'Jewish world plot' was the keystone of the antisemitic arch, the final plank in the antisemitic platform; for it allowed for a common appeal to face a common danger, equally menacing to all non-Jews, whatever their class, nationality, or political opinions.

It made it possible for antisemitism to become a world-wide institution.

2. *The first Antisemitic Movement in Germany*

The skill with which Bismarck unified Germany in the eighteen-sixties led to a division in the Progressive Party which had grown out of the revolutionary year of 1848. The majority, hypnotized by the growing power of the new German State, supported the political activities of the Chancellor, while remaining attached to English forms of democracy and to the Manchester school in economics. They formed the National Liberal Party, and their support carried the Chancellor through the period of the Austrian and Franco-Prussian wars and the subsequent conflict with the Roman Catholic Church. It so happened that two prominent leaders of the Party, Edward Lasker and Ludwig Bamberger, were Jewish, and many other Jews supported it.

The speculation which followed the successful conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, and the disturbances in the German economic system caused by the quick payment by the French of the reparations demanded of them, led in 1873 to a financial crisis in which inevitably a number of Jews were involved. The result was an outburst of antisemitic pamphleteering, and two works were destined to play an important part in the future development of the movement. These were *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum, vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet*, by a Hamburg journalist, W. Marr. The other (which had originally appeared a year or two earlier) was *Der Talmud-jude* by Augustus Rohling, a Roman Catholic priest of the Rhineland. The one treated the subject from a racial standpoint, the other from a religious. At the time no results followed, and the agitation died down.

But in 1879 Bismarck desired to break with the National Liberals, who were convinced free-traders and who, now that the

Empire was established, desired to see it develop into a Parliamentary democracy on the English model. But Bismarck had no intention of surrendering his power to a democratic Parliament, and he also desired to strengthen the finances of the Reich by a tariff policy. It was this desire to break with the party which had hitherto given him his majority which caused the emergence of antisemitism as a definite political weapon.

The National Liberals were essentially *the* party of the nineteenth-century bourgeois industrialist State, and their hold on the country was extremely strong. If he had to break their power, he had to attack them from all sides, and win the support of the Conservative and land-owning class which hated the industrialists and speculators, the Roman Catholics who hated the Liberals for their support of the *Kulturkampf*, and also the Lutheran Radicals who opposed the capitalist oppression of the working classes. To join together such diverse elements a common attack on the Jews was a useful tactical move, and hints from the Chancellor were dropped to this effect. The works of Marr and Rohling were republished, and ran through edition after edition. In October 1879 an Anti-Semitic League was founded under the presidency of the Lutheran Court Chaplain Adolf Stöcker, who was the leader of the Christian Social Working-men's Union. Although officially neither the Conservatives nor the Centre Party (Roman Catholics) were prepared to join the Anti-Semitic League, in practice the attack on the National Liberals could now be made from three sides, and the agitation was such that in 1880 and 1881 there were anti-Jewish riots in several German cities.

All through the eighteen-eighties the movement grew, developing in various directions, mutually exclusive in all their aims except that of hostility to the Jews. A section of the academic world, hypnotized by the strength of the new German State and captivated by the theory of the Aryan super-race, threw in its lot with the antisemites under the lead of the distinguished political philosopher and historian, and former National Liberal, Heinrich Treitschke. It was, in fact, Treitschke who invented the slogan constantly used by the Nazis: *die Juden sind unser Ungluck*. A petition was prepared, and widely signed, demanding the exclusion of Jews from the schools and universities and from all public employment. Under academic influence the racial aspect of the question steadily gained ground, and the incompatibility of 'Teutonism' with 'Semitism' became a widely held doctrine. As was to be expected it led extremists into the necessity of also rejecting Christianity. But this was going too far for the time, and in any case such an argument had no political value.

Towards the end of the eighteen-eighties the political leadership of organized antisemitism passed from Stöcker to a man of much lower character and greater violence, a political adventurer of the name of Hermann Ahlwardt. His particular contribution was to persuade the Conservative Party to adopt antisemitism as a definite plank in its platform. A born demagogue, he sold his pamphlets by tens of thousands, and his influence with the proletariat was enormous. While he was building up the racial argument, Protestants and Roman Catholics were not idle in spreading libels in the religious press and elsewhere, and the two attacks bore fruit in 1892 in the disgrace of the mob burning a synagogue at Neustettin in East Prussia, and a charge of ritual murder actually coming before a German court at Xanten in the Rhineland. The accused was naturally acquitted but the antisemites were undismayed. In the elections of 1893 the Conservatives adopted both Ahlwardt and his programme. His appearance in the Reichstag was the occasion of disgraceful scenes, but for some years, either as an independent group, or as part of the Conservative Party, a number of antisemitic deputies took their seats. The alliance between the two groups came to an end in 1896 when the Conservative leader, Baron von Hammerstein, who had been responsible for the adoption of Ahlwardt, disappeared in a cloud of disgraceful swindles. A small antisemitic group struggled on for some years, but the political influence of the movement steadily diminished. It was the academic world which kept it, as it were, in cold storage, ready to re-emerge after the defeat of 1919.

Its work, however, had been effectively completed. Liberal democratic tendencies had been checked at the danger point when the structure of the new Reich was still fluid. The secularizing tendencies of the age had been diverted and its cosmopolitanism replaced by a deep and patriotic nationalism. It was not the antisemitic movement alone which secured these results, but the fifteen years of violent agitation from 1879 to 1893 were an essential part of the battle which led to the victory of reaction.

3. *The Movement in Austria-Hungary*

The situation in the Dual Empire was much more confusing than in Germany, but the basic elements of the picture are the same—a bourgeois Liberal group which attracted the bulk of the Jewish votes, and a variety of reactionary and clerical parties who detested its modernistic, secularizing tendencies. The factors which add confusion are manifold. Austria-Hungary was an autocracy conducted by a bureaucracy with the aid of the

Church and the police, rather than a modern Parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary opinions did not therefore necessarily affect the Government. In addition there was a dual Government, in Austria and in Hungary, and the party alinements were not the same in the two States. In Hungary the Nationalists were relatively 'liberal' so long as the authority and autonomy of the Magyars were respected; in Austria the Nationalists were for decentralization, and the Liberals stood for a centralized constitution based on the Germans of Vienna and Bohemia. The battles of the period turned around centralization, dualism, and federalism, and the Jews were to some extent divided between the different groups. The Jews of Hungary were Nationalists; those of Vienna mainly supported the German Liberal Party, desiring a modern centralized Government. But those of Bohemia passed from support of the Germans (a minority in numbers, but a majority of voters for the local Diet) to support of the Czech Nationalists according as their own fortunes seemed to be affected. The Jews of Galicia were expected by the rest of the Poles to vote for Polish interests.

As might be expected from so confused a situation antisemitism was also used in diverse ways by diverse groups.

A further difference between Germany and Austria-Hungary was that the Jews were far more numerous in the latter country. They played a larger role in the industrial, commercial, intellectual, and cultural life of Vienna than they did in Berlin or any other German city. And, in addition to these 'assimilated' Jews, there was in Galicia and the Bukovina a large Jewish population of the 'eastern-European' type, the most ambitious and intelligent of whom were constantly augmenting the Jewries of Vienna and Budapest. If there was little which could really be called a Jewish problem, there were sufficient Jews in prominent positions in the life of the capital, and sufficient eastern-European Jews in its slums, to be conspicuous and to attract the attention and the disapproval of both nationalistic and clerical parties. In 1900 the percentage of Jews in Germany was only 1·04; in Austria it was 4·8, and in Hungary 4·43. When the fact is taken into account that the Jewish population was always very unevenly distributed, both geographically and professionally, it is clearly seen that antisemites had an easy task in creating a 'Jewish danger'. The statistics which they gave that half or more of this or that profession was Jewish may, in some circumstances, have been actually true; but for such figures to represent any real danger they should have shown that a large number of non-Jews of greater or equal calibre were anxious to enter these professions and unable to do so, or that the standards of Jews in

these professions were different from those of non-Jews. In fact it was not a period of much middle and professional-class unemployment, and the enormous armies and bureaucracies provided adequate preserves for non-Jews which were closed to Jews; and while many complaints were made about the ethical standards of nineteenth-century life, they are made equally about Jews and non-Jews.

The preliminary canter of Austrian antisemitism resulted from the foundation in Paris in 1878 by a French adventurer named Bontoux of a 'Christian Bank', the Union Générale, designed to protect its depositors from 'the dishonesty and rapacity of Jewish banks', and Christian Europe from 'the yoke of Jewish finance'. The Bank crashed very rapidly, and the noble and clerical depositors were prepared to believe that the crash was due to the machinations of the Jews. Among the victims were the French Pretender, the Comte de Chambord, and his Austrian wife, the Archduchess Maria Theresia. The Archduchess, who was particularly furious with the Jews for her losses, sent a colleague of Bontoux, the Ritter von Zerboni di Sporetti, to study the new antisemitic movement in Germany. Among others he made contact with Stocker and brought back a mass of literature and ideas. At the same time, with the approval of an Austrian Prince of the Church, Franz Graf Schonborn, Cardinal Archbishop of Prague, the Government was persuaded to call Canon Rohling from Westfalia to the chair of Hebrew at the State University of Prague.

The stage was thus set for the usual combination of conservatives and clericals, and their point of union was indignation at the idea that 'Austrian land was falling into the hands of Jewish financiers'. A Roman Catholic Christian-Socialist movement corresponding to the Protestant movement of Stocker came into existence; and the Catholic Press resounded with the vile denunciations poured out by the pseudo-scholar Rohling from his chair at Prague.

Zerboni also got into touch with two Hungarian antisemitic members of Parliament, Geza von Onody and Victor von Istoczy, with a view to developing a similar movement in Hungary. It was, in fact, in Hungary that the first opportunity occurred. In Tisza-Eszlar, the town which Onody represented, a small girl, Esther Solymossi, disappeared on 1 April 1882, four days before Passover. The beadle of the synagogue was accused of her ritual murder, and his two children, aged five and fourteen were coached with a story of his guilt which they were finally bullied into giving in court—a story which an examination on the spot proved to be totally false. No body, proved to be that

of the girl, was ever found, and the drowned body of an older girl which was produced in evidence had no sign of having been stabbed or bled to death. But a number of Jews were kept in prison for fifteen months while a fantastic trial was staged, and were finally acquitted only when the general public opinion of Europe had been raised against the revival of such superstitions. The grossness of the Tisza Eszlar affair killed antisemitism in Hungary, but it did not deter its advocates in Austria, especially Professor Rohling, who did his best to inflame the affair with his pamphlets, and who constantly professed his desire to state on oath that ritual murder was a common Jewish practice. The affair was fully reported in Germany and added considerably to the influence of the antisemites. An imaginary portrait of the supposedly murdered girl was publicly exhibited by Onody at the first antisemitic congress at Dresden.

At the same time an attempt was made in Austria by the leader of the feudal nobility, Count Belcredi, to capitalize the anger aroused among the more ignorant section of the public by the affair to turn the Socialist movement into antisemitic channels. With the aid of a notorious agitator he tried to convince the working-class that all the ills of feudal and capitalist society were due to the Jews. For some months it seemed as though the agitation might succeed, and it was largely due to the wit and courage of Dr. Joseph Bloch, the young rabbi of a working-class suburb of Vienna, Floridsdorf, that it failed. Apart from this incident, the Socialist Party of Austria, like that of Germany, remained free from the infection.

A third move was made during the same year, this time by the German National Party, a party of the nobility and the small traders, whose meeting point was hostility to the middle-class Liberals, and who selected the Jews as their point of attack. A speech delivered to an audience of Viennese tradesmen made use of Rohling's 'quotations' from the Talmud. It was judged by the police to be liable to disturb the peace, and prosecution followed. The speaker was acquitted, on the basis of the authenticity of Rohling's quotations, and the Talmud suddenly became the focus of wide public attention. The unfortunate Jews were thrown into complete disorder by the attack, as few of them knew enough of the Talmud to deny the authenticity of what a Royal Professor of Prague asserted on oath. For months the agitation continued, and the Jews, apart from a colourless denial officially issued by the Chief Rabbis, appeared powerless to contradict the damning assertions of Rohling. The crisis was the most dangerous they had yet faced, because the Austrian people were still profoundly influenced by the Church,

and a religious condemnation of Judaism would have worked far more harm than the political manœuvres of the National Germans or similar parties.

It was again the rabbi of Floridsdorf who finally stepped into the breach with a published castigation of his ignorance and insincerity which forced Rohling to sue him for libel. Two years were taken in the preparation of the material for the court, and on the day when the trial should have opened in October 1885, Rohling suddenly withdrew.

During the rest of the eighteen-eighties no public incidents of importance took place, but a Christian Socialist (i.e. clerical-conservative) party was being built up, under the leadership of Prince Alois von Liechtenstein and Dr. Karl Lueger, which kept the ritual murder agitation alive. From 1889 onward an increasing number of such accusations disturbed provincial Jewish communities, though when the matter came to trial the Jews were always acquitted—even by antisemitic judges. The Christian Socialists won a number of seats in Parliament, and also in the municipality of Vienna. The opportunity for increasing their influence still further came when in 1892 the Hungarian Liberal Government proposed to introduce various laws aimed at reducing the power of the Roman Catholic Church. The laws covered civil marriage, freedom of worship, and the recognition of the equal status of the Jewish religion. A violent agitation resulted, in Austria even more than in Hungary.

The attack was again opened by an accusation of ritual murder, this time in a scurrilous pamphlet by a Viennese priest, Fr. Joseph Deckert, D.D., dealing ostensibly with a ritual murder of the fifteenth century. Dr. Bloch challenged his statements and, in the course of a long correspondence, Deckert produced a 'converted' Jew, Paulus Meyer, who alleged he had actually taken part in a ritual murder in a town in Russia. With considerable difficulty the town where the incident was supposed to have happened, and the Jewish personalities implicated in the 'crime', were identified, and the latter were persuaded to sue Deckert and Meyer in the Austrian courts for libel. The case aroused considerable attention in Vienna. Again the court condemned the ritual murder accusation, and Deckert and Meyer were convicted. But the antisemitic agitation persisted, and in 1894 the Pope, Leo XIII, fanned it still further by intervening by letter to encourage the Hungarian Magnates to throw out the anti-clerical bills. This letter, and a further intervention of the Papacy through the Papal Nuncio, roused the Liberals in their turn to fury, and at the end of 1894 the ecclesiastical bills were passed.

The scene then shifted to Vienna, where the municipal elections were due in January 1895. The antisemitic party already possessed a third of the seats, and were now determined to win the majority, in alliance with the Christian Socialists. Again the Pope intervened and sent his blessing to the Prince von Liechtenstein, leader of the Christian Socialists. The blessing included Dr. Lueger and the openly antisemitic party of which he was the chief, since von Liechtenstein was officially in alliance with him. Though the Church in Austria, including the hierarchy, was mainly in favour of the alliance between von Liechtenstein and Lueger, yet so open a support from the Pope was felt to be extremely unwise by many of the bishops. A private protest to the Vatican brought an equally private—indeed oral—exclusion of the antisemites from the scope of the benediction. But the damage was already done. In the elections Lueger was returned with a triumphant majority and elected Burgomaster. Twice the Emperor refused his confirmation; twice Lueger was re-elected with an increased majority. In February 1896 the Emperor capitulated and Lueger became nominally Vice-Burgomaster, but with the power, and a year later the title itself, of Burgomaster.

Lueger was a professional demagogue, a man of great charm and ability and no convictions, a powerful orator, skilled in playing on the feelings of the mob; but his constructive programme was constantly adulterated by the vote-catching promise that if Jews, Socialists, and Liberals were suppressed all would be well for the Christians. He embellished the city with gardens, buildings, and various public works; and by a general *bonhomie* he remained immensely popular. He retained his office until his death in 1910. Even with the Jews he was not always unpopular, for if he secured his election on the basis of the popularity of antisemitism, he was often willing to find jobs for Jewish friends whom his professional policy compelled him to dismiss.

The triumph at Vienna was repeated in the same year (1895) in the elections to the Austrian Parliament, and the antisemites, made up of an alliance of the clerical Christian-Socialists and the Nationalists, secured a majority. But in the elections of 1901 they began to lose ground, and some of the Radical Nationalists also seceded to form an anti-clerical party. Moreover this time the Pope thought it wise to issue a statement that the term 'Socialist' was unacceptable as part of the title of a Christian Party. At the first election under universal suffrage in 1907 the antisemites regained their influence, but in 1911 they lost many of their seats.

During this last period the sphere of operations, as well as the

distribution of the interested parties, changed somewhat. The antisemitism of the Christian-Socialists remained a plank in their official platform, but was little emphasized. On the other hand the antisemitism of the Pan-German element became stronger. The place where this change took place was among the students, especially in the University of Vienna, where antisemitic student organizations kept up a mild ferment which at times provoked trouble. A decision which had considerable bearing on the future was that of the Waidhofen student conference, which decided that a Jewish student could not fight a duel as he had no honour to defend, and caused a curious if temporary alliance between the Jewish and the Catholic student organizations. The latter also had come to refuse the duel, but on religious grounds. The rise in importance of nationalist antisemitism marks the change from the situation of the first period, when it was the weapon against the Liberals, to that which followed the war of 1914–1918, when it was a weapon against the Socialists or the minorities.

The first period, however, before its end witnessed yet another striking ritual murder trial. This time the scene was laid at Polna in Bohemia. In spite of every kind of contradiction in the prosecution of the accused, Leopold Hilsner, antisemitic intimidation secured his conviction of two murders, and he was sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life; but such was the atmosphere that it was impossible, even with the support of such members of the Austrian Parliament as Dr. Masaryk, to obtain a fair retrial. It would certainly have resulted in his acquittal.

The keynote of German antisemitism had been the steady growth of the racial element. The religious element played a decreasing role, especially after the departure of Rohling from Westfalia to Prague and the subsequent disgrace of Stöcker. In Austria-Hungary the Roman Catholic Church remains throughout in the centre of the picture, and the succession of ritual murder trials or accusations was entirely the work of clerical antisemites. But in both countries the antisemitic agitation played its part in the destruction of the bourgeois Liberalism against which it was originally introduced. In the new alinement which followed the electoral reforms of the beginning of the twentieth century the Liberals entirely vanished as a political force, and power rested with various Conservative parties—Christian-Socialist, Agrarian, and others. Once this new alinement was firmly in the saddle, antisemitism had little value, and the movement ceased to attract public attention.

4. *The Movement in France*

Antisemitism appeared as a political weapon in France much later than in Germany and Austria, but the elements in the conflict which finally brought it into use were the same. The bourgeois Liberal Party, on whose political outlook the Third Republic was built, had enemies on both sides. It had alienated the Socialists by the violence with which the Commune had been suppressed in 1871; and it was the natural enemy of both the political clericals and the monarchists or imperialists, all of whom were pledged to its complete destruction. Moreover, the French middle class was the real centre of all those characteristics which made up nineteenth-century Liberalism everywhere in Europe. The absence of a monarchy and a respected aristocracy had led to the unrestricted pursuit and adulation of wealth, unhampered by the respect for non-financial values which ancient traditions impose; ever since the Revolution rationalism, and later positivism, had been the mainsprings of intellectual life and necessarily involved warfare with the Church. The battle was fought with bitterness on both sides, but it was, if one may use the word of a struggle which was filled with intrigues of all kinds, fought 'cleanly'. The issues at least were plain and not side-tracked by the introduction of red herrings.

At first victory seemed inclined to favour the clericals, but the follies of their monarchist allies prejudiced their chances, and the genuine Republican forces, aided by the French love of Liberty, gradually became too strong for direct attack. By 1880 the political activities of the Monarchists had ceased to be dangerous, and the real sphere of conflict became clear. It raged around the control of education. During the period of Napoleon III the Church, and especially the religious Orders, had regained much of the control of education which they had lost at the time of the Revolution. During the first ten years of the Republic the Orders possessed, in relation to both the middle and the working classes, a powerful lever against the spread of rationalist and republican ideas by their control of a large number of excellent schools; and the control of these schools became the main issue of the battle. In spite of fierce opposition the next round went to the Republicans, who in 1880 secured the passage of a law expelling the Jesuits, and compelling the schools kept by the Orders to seek the recognition and authorization of the State. At the same time the schools of the State were developed and extended, and compulsory primary education under State control was introduced in 1881.

Four years later a new element appeared in the conflict. In

1878 the intransigent Pope Pius IX was succeeded by Leo XIII. Leo was anxious to secure peace, or at least a *modus vivendi* with the French Republic, and was prepared to take the initiative to obtain it. In an Encyclical of 1885 he exhorted the clergy and faithful in France to accept the Republican form of Government, and authorized them to take part in democratic political action. In 1892 he went still further and exhorted them to rally to democracy and abandon all attempts to dominate the Republic. The reasons for these steps are clear. On the one hand, the bourgeois parties, alarmed at the growth of the Socialists, were disposed to seek peace with the more moderate elements of the clericals, and on the other all moderate elements in the country were shocked at the emergence of a violent antisemitic movement, alien to both Republican and Christian French traditions. Though the higher ecclesiastics stood aside this movement was politically Roman Catholic, and was supported by certain elements in the religious Orders.

The leader of the movement was a man of tempestuous energy and violent temper, Edouard Drumont. In 1886 he had published, in two volumes, an attack—often merited—on the scandals and corruptions of French capitalism. It was entitled *La France Juive*, and adopted the now familiar thesis of attributing all corruption to Jewish influence, and claiming that all Jews were corrupt. He followed this publication with the appearance of a frankly antisemitic daily, *La Libre Parole*. The book ran through edition after edition, and the paper enjoyed a wide circulation. An extensive antisemitic literature emerged, including translations of German works, such as Rohling's libels on the Talmud, but the matter did not assume dangerous proportions until 1892 when the Panama scandals burst on the public, and revealed the extent to which financial corruption had affected the centres of Republican political power. As in the German financial crisis of 1873, the inclusion of certain Jewish financiers among the criminals allowed the whole matter to be treated in an antisemitic fashion, and passions rose to a height which France had not known for decades. In 1894 the campaign culminated in the condemnation of a French staff officer, Alfred Dreyfus, for treason—because Dreyfus happened to be a Jew.

There were incidents in the trial and condemnation of Dreyfus which led a small minority of the Left Wing Republicans to doubt his guilt, or at least to doubt the validity of his trial, and these doubts were expressed openly. The clericals at once saw what appeared to them a magnificent opportunity to resume the attack on the Republic, which they had concealed rather than abandoned at the exhortation of the Vatican. Instead of having

to defend the political and educational pretensions of the Church, they could appear as the defenders of the honour of the Army, which by regular court martial had convicted Dreyfus of his crime. The Army occupied a peculiarly venerated place in French hearts after the defeat of 1870, for the French had never really abandoned the hope of recovering Alsace and Lorraine. Since the Panama scandal, and the popularity of *La France Juive*, had drawn unpleasant attention to the 'power of the Jew', no combination could have appeared more favourable than that of the defence of the Army, and the exposure of the Jews.

Unfortunately for them Dreyfus was totally innocent of his supposed crime.

In their desperate efforts to maintain his guilt the Army, backed by the antisemitic Press and with the open or tacit support of the clericals, committed itself more and more deeply and irrevocably. But when they realized that they were too deeply involved to draw back in their attitude to Dreyfus, they discovered also to their chagrin that they had wrecked the whole cause of the militaristic-clerical opposition to the Republic and its bourgeois values. Fortunately the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the majority of the ordinary parochial clergy, had remained in a neutral, if somewhat dishonourable, silence. But the incursion of the Orders and the clerical politicians into the dubious realms of antisemitic propaganda sealed the doom of the Orders in France, and destroyed any possibility of the Church retaining its hold on education. The final rehabilitation of Dreyfus did not take place until 1906, but by that time the Church had already paid the inevitable price of failure. The legal and complete dissolution of religious associations which were not purely charitable, or had not reported to the State their statutes and endowments (which they had refused to do), was pronounced in 1903 and 1904.

When in 1904 Pope Pius X, who had succeeded Leo XIII in 1903 and was more hostile to the French Government than his predecessor, made public a somewhat insulting protest against the visit paid to the King of Italy by the President of the Republic, the Government recalled its representative from the Vatican. In 1905 the separation of Church and State was made complete. The final act of the Republic, by which the churches were required to register as associations for public worship, was rejected by the Vatican. It would not allow the faithful to register. In consequence the Church lost its property —which the registered associations would have been allowed to administer under public control. If France was the last country of Europe to witness the adoption of antisemitism as a political

weapon, it was the first to see that such an action must ultimately bring disastrous fruit.

5. *The Movement in Russia*

The Russian situation differs from that in other countries in that an antisemitic weapon of the typical nineteenth-century kind was grafted on to semi-medieval conditions in which the oppression of the Jews was almost a normal part of Government machinery. Before the pogroms of 1881, and the flight which followed them, more than 5,500,000 Jews lived in the country, almost wholly confined (except for a few privileged classes) to the strip of territories known as the Pale, running along her western frontier.

The increasingly reactionary nature of the Government of Alexander II, after the whole resources of the bureaucracy had been exhausted by the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, led to the growth of small radical and revolutionary underground movements. There was too much liberalism and democracy in the air of the century for Russia wholly to escape, but there were no open and constructive channels by which these sentiments could be expressed. When Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, he was succeeded by a stolid, honest, and unimaginative autocrat, Alexander III. It was certain that no reforms would be welcomed under his rule, but the ferment caused by the assassination needed some safety valve for the immediate release of popular feelings. Following the example of western Europe—for 1881 was a year of vigorous antisemitism in both Germany and Austria—the bureaucracy diverted public attention to the Jews. By making them the prime authors of the murder of the Tsar, they tried to prevent the peasants and the urban population from considering whether the Government policy of repressing all liberal opinions was not, in some measure, responsible.

The simultaneous outbreak of pogroms all through the Jewish region, together with the identical explanations of their actions given by those of the rioters who happened to be arrested, make it perfectly clear that the pogroms were inspired. Nothing spectacular had suddenly happened in Jewish—non-Jewish relations to cause them. And if confirmation were wanted of official responsibility, it is to be found in the two facts that the time-table of the riots was almost always identical—a day of rumours, a day of rioting, and on the third day the sudden effective appearance of the military and police—and that they ceased completely and immediately on the order being given from St. Petersburg that violence was not to be tolerated.

When it came to official justification of the idea that the Jews were in some way responsible for the murder, it was quickly found that it would be difficult to make such a case convincing, and the ground was changed. It was asserted that the pogroms were the spontaneous reaction of the Russian to the 'injurious' nature of Jewish activities, and a period of violently oppressive legislation set in, which really only terminated with the downfall of Tsarism in 1917. But these activities were not merely political antisemitism of the nineteenth-century type familiar elsewhere. There was not always an ulterior objective to be reached by attacking the Jews. The latter were the direct object of the legislation, and the laws were the straight anti-Jewish measures of a reactionary Government which refused to face facts. Of course a large number of Jewish activities could be described as 'injurious'. They were damnably injurious to the unfortunate Jews who had no other livelihood in their harassed and restricted existence, and they were equally 'injurious' to the Russian peasants. But the solution lay in altering the conditions of Jewish existence, not in further restrictions.

The situation of the Jews grew steadily worse all through the reign of Alexander III. When he was succeeded in 1894 by the weak and amiable Nicholas II they, in common with all the liberal and democratic elements in the country, hoped that there might be a change. But the new Tsar proved no better than his father. No change was made in the Government, and Pobiedonostzev, the real power behind the Government of Alexander III, remained at his post as Procurator of the Holy Synod. In fact it was after the accession of Nicholas that Pobiedonostzev made his famous statement about the Jews of Russia: 'One-third will die out, one-third will leave the country, and one-third will be completely absorbed in the surrounding population.'

The realization that the new régime was going to be as reactionary as the old led to a great increase of general revolutionary activity. This led to a re-emergence of political antisemitic activities by the bureaucracy. In 1881 the Jews had been used as a scapegoat to assume responsibility for the assassination of Alexander II. Now they were to play a more curious role. They were to be used by the bureaucracy to persuade the weak-minded Tsar that all demands for reform were due, not to any failings in the Russian administration, or to any discontent of his 'Russian' subjects, but to the deliberate plotting of the Jews. To this end, after a number of years' work, the famous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were evolved.

The story of their fabrication is long, complicated, and

unusually dull, but it starts before February 1895, i.e. at the very beginning of the new Tsar's reign. In that month General Orgeyevsky, head of the Russian police organization in Paris, sent to Stolypin, Minister of the Interior, a document entitled *The Mystery of Jewry*, which was an extraordinary farrago of statements, either irrelevant or inaccurate, supposed to reveal the secret motives of Jewish history. The opinion of Stolypin is tersely recorded in the file copy in the Ministry: 'this is a form of propaganda wholly inadmissible to the Government'. But it still remained desirable that evidence should be produced to lay before the Tsar to prove that the Jews *were* behind all demands for reform, and the Paris police office was set to work again. Why this task should have been delegated to them has never been made clear, but one of the few indisputable points in the extraordinary history of the document is that it arrived in Russia from Paris.

At an uncertain date, but probably in 1901, this second document reached Russia. It purported to be an account of the plan made by a secret Jewish Government for the overthrow of Christian society and the establishment of a world ruler of the House of David. It contained everything which its creators desired; it implicated the Liberals, the Freemasons, the Radicals, the bankers, even the underground railways—everything in fact which might appear to a reactionary Emperor to be deserving of suppression. It was published in 1902 (or 1905, for even that is uncertain) as an appendix to a mystical work, entitled *The Great in the Little*, by a Russian *dévot*, Sergei Nilus. This time it reached the Tsar, for the imperial copy is to be found to-day in the Library of Congress with the Emperor's annotations, which show that he was at first horrified at the appalling nature of the Jewish plot, but later suspicious of the authenticity of the document.

In fact the *Protocols* made little impression in Tsarist Russia. They only assumed importance when transcriptions of them came west in the valises of White Russians after 1919, and were used to give a Jewish emphasis to the anti-Bolshevik feeling of the time.

Meanwhile the situation in Russia worsened, and some reform became inevitable. In 1905 a Duma was finally created, but its deliberations were autocratically stopped when it became apparent that it was going to ask for serious reform. Again public opinion was in a dangerous state, and again the bureaucracy repeated the successful tactics of 1881. This time the actual agents of the Government are known, a scoundrelly organization which the Tsar had been persuaded to patronize,

The League of the Russian People, or 'Black Hundreds'. In the early autumn of 1905 they began to appear in the Jewish provinces, and events followed exactly the course of 1881. Pogroms broke out with suspicious spontaneity, and were suppressed after the appropriate period of licence. The full complicity of the secret police was openly established, but no protection or compensation was given to the Jews.

One last demonstration of deliberate antisemitic tactics marks the last years of Tsarism. In 1911 a ritual murder trial on the Austrian model was staged with tremendous pomp. But it turned out to be a complete fiasco, for when, after two years' agitation, the trial began, the evidence of the defence was so disastrous for the prosecution that even a Russian jury, carefully selected for anti-Jewish feelings, acquitted the accused.

It is true to say that antisemitism proved a failure in Russia, but this does not mean that the anti-Jewish legislation of the period from the death of Alexander II to the end of the régime was not catastrophically successful in its destruction of Jewish life and prosperity. But when definitely antisemitic tricks were tried they did nothing to strengthen the hands of the bureaucracy. The pogroms did not arrest the development of revolutionary thought or save the régime from the consequences of its actions. If the failure was not as conspicuous as that of the clericals in France, the overthrow of the bureaucracy was far more complete and disastrous when it came, and it involved the Imperial House and aristocracy in its downfall.

Chapter Nine

ANTISEMITISM AFTER 1919

1. *The Position in* 1919–1921

THE period following the war of 1914–1918 witnessed an immense extension of the use of antisemitism as a political weapon, but there was a change in the objectives for which it was used. The religious aspect, which had been especially conspicuous in the activities of political Roman Catholics during the first period, passed almost entirely into the background. The racial aspect assumed a new prominence based on the increase of nationalism, and a further use of it was made possible by the identification of the Jews with the 'Bolsheviks', a title which in such countries as Canada or the United States was apt to mean no more than a somewhat mild type of radical.

For a brief period in 1919–1921 two interlocked factors seemed to be going to provide an alarming amount of fresh material of which antisemitism might make dangerous use. The first was the prominence of Jews at the time of the Peace Settlement and the varied forms which that prominence assumed. The second was the publication throughout the world of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

In the Peace Settlement the Nationalist element among the Jews secured by the Balfour Declaration the establishment of a National Home in Palestine, a project which was commonly believed at that time to be likely to lead to the rapid establishment of a Jewish State under British protection. At the same time the (mainly non-Zionist) Jewish organizations of the United States and western Europe secured from the peace-makers of Versailles the guarantee of complete political and social equality, together with certain separate rights as 'minorities', in those countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea in which, before the war, Jews had not possessed equal rights with the rest of the population; and it was no secret that these treaties had been imposed by the Great Powers on both Poland and Rumania (the two countries of most importance from the Jewish point of view) with extreme difficulty, and in the face of vigorous opposition. Finally, in relatively leading positions in a number of national delegations were individual Jews who were supposed to possess considerable power behind the scenes.

While these events appeared to many to indicate that Jews

were in fact almost as powerful as antisemitic propaganda had claimed, still more people were horrified at the apparent Jewish control of the Communist revolutions which had shaken public opinion from 1917 onwards. Among the original Bolshevik leaders in Russia it is impossible to say in every case whether a man was Jewish or not. For all, both Jews and others, had the habit of changing their names. But Trotsky, who was universally known to be Jewish, was the most prominent leader after Lenin (who was often stated inaccurately to be a Jew), and of the group which immediately surrounded these two, 25 to 30 per cent. were in all possibility also Jews. In Hungary the Communist *coup d'état* was led by a Jew, Bela Kun, and though he himself was relatively moderate, the 'executioner' of his group, Szamuely, and many others were Jewish. In Munich the Communist *putsch* was led by a Jew, Ernst Toller; and the Jewish Rosa Luxembourg shared with the non-Jewish Liebknecht the leadership in Berlin.

It was this appearance of Jewish strength on all sides which disposed people to lend an ear to the 'revelations' contained in the *Protocols*. Brought to the West by devious ways, they were quickly translated and appeared in Britain and America, in France, in Germany and in many other countries. In this country they were taken with a puzzled seriousness by the *Morning Post*; in the United States they turned Henry Ford into an irrational antisemite.

But it was not long before the bubble was burst. Events made it clear that 'the Jews' lacked the power they had appeared to possess. In Palestine they were unable to overcome Arab opposition; in eastern Europe they did not obtain in practice the rights guaranteed them by the treaties; their supposed power did not save them from massacre in Poland or in the parts of Russia controlled by Petliura or Denikin. Even under the Bolsheviks they were (in the early years) the subject of hostility and persecution on economic grounds.

But above all it was not long before the *Protocols* themselves were exploded for all except a minority of fanatics. It was discovered that they had been forged[1] from a satire on Napoleon III by a French lawyer—who was not a Jew—Maurice Joly. Set side by side with the brilliant and witty original work, *Les Dialogues aux Enfers entre Montesquieu et Machiavel*, not only were they revealed as a literary plagiarism, but even in elabor-

[1] Forgery has played a prominent part in antisemitic propaganda. Apart from many minor incidents, the Dreyfus case was built largely on the forged *bordereau*, and American antisemites have concocted a complete forged document, with mythical history attached, alleged to have been written by Benjamin Franklin.

ating their plot the authors of the *Protocols* were shown to be incapable of understanding the original they were copying.

Little by little the story of their fabrication was uncovered, and though much in it is still obscure, the opening by the Bolsheviks of the old Imperial Archives revealed enough to show that there was no Jewish document of any kind whatever involved in the whole business. It was a work of the Russian police, of an apocalyptically minded Russian layman, Sergei Nilus, and of a professional hack of the Black Hundreds called Butmi. Even the British, French, and other antisemitic editors themselves were unable to agree as to the identity of the authors of the plot, the language of the original document, or the circumstances in which it had been either produced or obtained. In their different editions they circulated no less than ten mutually exclusive stories.

The agitation they had first aroused died down; ordinary people had other things to think about. But the events of 1917–1921 were not wholly forgotten; and when, primarily from German inspiration, antisemitism assumed dangerous proportions in many countries, it drew on this material. To this day the *Protocols* are impudently circulated among the ignorant from Latin America to Japan, not omitting the Arab world, as though there had never been any doubt about their authenticity, or, at least, as though the forgery had never been proved.

2. *The Second Antisemitic Movement in Germany*

In the period 1919–1939 all that was new in the use of antisemitism is perfectly exemplified in the developments in Germany. Where it flourished in other countries it was of a similar type, and in later years at any rate, largely nourished, materially as well as spiritually, by German action and inspiration. The Nationalists in the days of the Weimar Republic were fairly consistently anti-Jewish, but in comparison with the National-Socialist Party they made little use of Jew-hatred as a political weapon.

It is one of the tragic ironies of history that Hitler should have learnt so much of his antisemitism from Lueger. His paranoia caused him to execute literally on the body of Jewry slogans he had learnt from a man who had used them indeed as a convenient political tactic, but never allowed his professional demagogy to interfere with his personal friendships with individual Jews. Lueger would compel a Jewish official to resign, and privately find him a better job; for he had no real feelings against him. Hitler compelled Jewish officials to resign and persecuted

them relentlessly afterwards, because he really believed that they were inevitably evil. When he stated that in persecuting the Jews he was doing the work of the Lord, he really and profoundly believed it to be true. The satanic violence of German antisemitism was the direct consequence of this personal hatred. Hitler was not egged on by men more extreme than himself in his actions against Jewry. He was himself the extremist. That Streicher, the Gauleiter of Franconia and the most vulgar and bloodthirsty of Nazi antisemites, was able so long to retain his position and his influence, he owed to Hitler's approval.

Antisemitism was no chance addition to the armoury of the Nazis. Their official programme, later declared unalterable, was promulgated at a meeting in Munich on 24 February 1920, when the Party scarcely numbered more than a few hundred members. Of its twenty-five points no less than eight deal directly or indirectly with the Jews.

4. Only those who are members of the nation can be citizens. Only those who are of German blood, without regard to religion, can be members of the German nation. No Jew can, therefore, be a member of the nation.
5. He who is not a citizen shall be able to live in Germany only as a guest and must live under a code for foreigners.
6. The right to decide on the leadership and on the laws of the State may belong only to citizens. Therefore we demand that every public office, of whatever sort, whether of the Reich, of the State, or of the municipality, shall be occupied only by citizens. We oppose the corrupt parliamentary system of filling offices only from the party viewpoint without respect to character or ability
7. We demand that the State be obliged, in the first instance, to provide the possibility of work and life for the citizen. If it is not possible to feed the entire population of the State, the subjects of foreign States (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.
8. All further immigration of non-Germans is to be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have immigrated to Germany since the second of August 1914 shall be compelled to leave the Reich immediately.
18. We demand the most ruthless campaign against everyone who injures the public interest through his activity. Those who commit crimes against the people, usurers, profiteers and so forth, must be punished by death, without respect to religion or race.
23. We demand legislative action against conscious political lies and their broadcasting through the Press. In order to make possible the creation of a German Press, we demand that:
    (*a*) All editors and contributors of newspapers which appear in German, must be members of the nation.

(*b*) Non-German newspapers must have the special permission of the State in order to be published. They shall not be allowed to be published in the German language.

(*c*) Every financial participation in German newspapers or the influencing by non-Germans is to be forbidden and we demand as punishment for violation the closing of such a newspaper plant, as well as the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the participating non-German.

Newspapers which work against the public welfare are to be forbidden. We demand legislative action against an artistic and literary tendency which exerts a destructive influence over our national life and the closing of institutions which work against these demands.

24. We demand the freedom of all religions in the State in so far as they do not endanger its welfare or offend against the morals and sense of decency of the German race.

The Party as such represents the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself to a particular belief. It fights the Jewish materialistic spirit within and without and is convinced that a permanent convalescence of our nation can only succeed from within on the foundation of *Public Interest before Private Interest.*[1]

From these points emerge already the main lines on which German antisemitism was to develop. Only a reference to 'Jewish Bolshevism' is omitted. The 'permanent convalescence of the nation' is linked up with the fight against the Jewish materialistic spirit; poverty and unemployment are ascribed to the unwanted presence of non-Germans in the country; the purging of non-German elements in the administration of the Weimar Republic suggests that even in the hated republic the enemies were not German. This last point was still further developed in the catechism used at the beginning of public meetings, which opens:

Q. Who is responsible for our misery?
A. THE SYSTEM. (The continually repeated phrase 'the System' as a portmanteau word to cover everything the Nazis disliked in the Weimar Republic is a good example of the excellent psychology of their propaganda.)
Q. Who is behind the System?
A. THE JEWS.

The reiteration of this 'tabloid' formed an important part of Hitler's earliest speeches. An essential part of the 'convalescing' process was to persuade the people that the tragic collapse of their defeat was due to no fault of their own, but to treason and betrayal from outside. 'The stab in the back', argued the Nazis,

[1] Quoted from the translation in *Germany Enters the Third Reich*, by Calvin Hoover, pp. 229 *seqq.*

had laid low a victorious army, and prostrated a noble people. But if this famous lie was to be made convincing it was necessary that the stabber should be a member of the household, yet not a member of the family. Had there been only one Jew in Germany the dagger would have had to be put into his hand; there was no one else capable of filling the role. Once Jews were cast for this part, it was natural that every subsequent misfortune of the Germans should be attributed to the same source. In spite of the cynicism with which he treats the Germans in *Mein Kampf*, in his public utterances Hitler always described them as the noblest people treacherously overthrown by a non-German enemy.

When the Nazis came into power in 1933, the same use was made of Jews in other countries. Any unpopularity which Nazi actions provoked abroad was ascribed entirely to the disloyal collusion of Jews in Germany with Jews in other countries. The German people were told that the wave of indignation which followed the boycott of April 1933 was entirely due to *Greuelpropaganda*;[1] and thousands of Jews in Germany were compelled to write abroad denying that there had been any *Greueltaten* to justify the indignation. As the power of the Third Reich grew, and it became possible to insult the Governments of other countries with impunity, a still further extension took place.

Any official British, American, or other criticism of Nazi actions was at once alleged to be the result of Jewish influence, and statesmen of various countries were suddenly discovered by the Nazi Press to be Jews with the most surprising biological light-heartedness. This allowed the Nazis to claim the friendliest feelings for such countries as Britain and the United States; for they could attribute hostile criticism to 'Jewish pluto-democratic influence' overlaying the real 'Aryan' nature of the Englishman or American with whom the Nazis could have no quarrel. Under war conditions it became possible, when desirable, freely to make Churchill, Roosevelt, or other statesmen of the United Nations into Jews, or into stooges of crypto-Jewish influence.

The twisting of antisemitism into a medicine for the cure of the depression resulting from defeat is a peculiarly German invention. It was unknown in the Austria of 1866, or the France of 1870, and much less use of it was made by Germany's defeated allies in 1919.

This, however, was only one side of the use which, from earliest days, Nazi propaganda made of German Jewry. Whatever class they were addressing was told that the sole, or chief, reason for any distress from which they might be suffering under the

[1] *Greuelpropaganda:* atrocity propaganda, *Greueltaten:* atrocities.

Republic was the presence of the Jews. When they were seeking the help of big business, the enemy was international Jewish finance, or German Jewish competition; when they were nursing the small shopkeepers, the enemy was Jewish multiple stores; when speaking to workmen, the Jewish capitalist; to peasants, the Jewish middleman and usurer; to students, the Jewish 'monopolists' in the professions. In the field of international affairs also the enemy could be alternately Jewish pluto-democracy or Jewish Bolshevism. Everywhere the Jews were presented as the barrier to German recovery and German happiness.

To the outside world, which did not necessarily view with favour the idea of German recovery, a different twist was given to the picture. On the one hand the Nazis, before they came into power, constantly assured foreigners that Nazism as a whole, and Nazi antisemitism in particular, were not articles for export; they insisted that foreign Jews in Germany were always treated with respect; that they had no quarrel with the Jews of other countries. But they asked that other countries, in turn, should recognize that the Nazi Party was fighting their battle in saving Europe and the world from 'Jewish Bolshevism', and evolved an elaborate propaganda to prove that *in Germany at any rate* the Jews were a public danger.

The very violence and fantasy of Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda convinced the majority of foreigners, as well as the majority of German Jews, that Hitler's bark was much worse than his bite. He demanded so complete an elimination of Jews from German life, his threats as to what the Nazis would do when they were in power were so barbarous, that men could not believe that in the twentieth century such persecution was really intended. Even at the beginning of 1933 there were still many of both classes who persisted in remaining blind to the inevitable consequence of the fact that, whatever may have been the motives of his followers, that of the Führer was a conviction that he had a 'divine' mission to purge the world of the Jews. And a divine mission allows of no trifling.

The events which immediately followed Hitler's accession to power left them little excuse for remaining blind. There were various excesses throughout the country, which led to the formation of a technique followed on subsequent occasions. The excesses were deprecated, but they were also excused in that they were explained to foreigners as being due to the inevitable and irrepressible reaction of the Germans to years of alien (i.e. Jewish) domination. But, it was said, in the new Germany there would be no excuse for illegality. The natural feelings of the people would be given legal expression—and the boycott of

1 April was officially proclaimed, followed by the burning of books. Similarly in November 1938 'spontaneous' indignation at the murder of Vom Rath was supposed to be responsible for the widespread and simultaneous destruction of synagogues. It was followed by 'legal' action on the part of the Government in the imposition of a fine of £80,000,000 (1,000,000,000 'Reichsmarks) on the already ruined Jewish community.

For two years this policy of 'spontaneity' and 'legal' expression of the people's feelings was followed, with careful attention to outside reactions. Measures were taken during this period against many classes of Jews, but not against the Jewish community as a whole. By 1935 the Nazis felt bolder, and had become convinced that no danger of international action threatened them. The result was seen both at home and abroad. At home the Nuremberg laws, by which the whole Jewish population was reduced to the ranks of helots, were officially adopted. These two fundamentals laws contain only a few clauses, and were passed by the Reichstag 'unanimously'. They run as follows:[1]

LAW RESPECTING REICH CITIZENSHIP
OF SEPTEMBER 15TH, 1935

The Reichstag has unanimously adopted the following law, which is announced herewith:

1

(i) One who belongs to the protective union of the German Reich and is, therefore, under particular obligation to it, is a national.
(ii) Nationality is acquired in accordance with the Reich and Nationality Law.

2

(i) Only a national of German or kindred blood, who proves by his conduct that he is willing and likely faithfully to serve the German people and Reich, can be a citizen.
(ii) Citizenship is acquired by grant of the certificate of citizenship.
(iii) The citizen is the sole holder of full political rights according to law.

3

The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Deputy to the Führer will issue the legal and administrative regulations required for the operation and amplification of the Law.

Nuremberg, September 15, 1935. *Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor*
ADOLF HITLER
Minister of the Interior
FRICK

[1] Translation from *The Yellow Spot*, p. 30 *seq*

Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour of September 15, 1935

Imbued with the consciousness that the purity of German blood is essential to the continued existence of the German people, and animated by the inflexible resolve to ensure the security of the German Nation for all time, the Reichstag has unanimously adopted the following law, which is announced herewith:

1

(i) Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even if, for the purpose of evading this law, they are concluded abroad.
(ii) Proceedings for annulment may be initiated only by the Public Prosecutor.

2

Relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are forbidden.

3

Jews may not employ in domestic service female nationals of German or kindred blood under the age of forty-five years.[1]

4

(i) Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reich or national flags or display the Reich colours.
(ii) On the other hand, they are permitted to display Jewish colours. Those availing themselves of this authorisation do so under the protection of the State.

5

(i) Whoever acts contrary to the prohibition of (1) will be punished with penal servitude.
(ii) Any man who acts contrary to the prohibition of (2) will be punished with imprisonment or penal servitude.
(iii) Whoever acts contrary to the provisions of (3) or (4) will be punished with imprisonment up to one year and a fine or one of these penalties.

6

The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Deputy to the Führer and the Reich Minister for Justice will issue the legal and administrative regulations required for the operation and amplification of the Law.

[1] The age was later reduced to thirty-five.

The law shall be in force from the day following announcement, except (3) which shall be in force from January 1, 1936.

Nuremberg, September 15, 1935, *at the Reich Party Congress of Liberty.*

Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK
Reich Minister of Justice
DR. GURTNER
Deputy to the Fuhrer
R. HESS
Reich Minister with Portfolio

By 1937 it had become possible to describe the unhappy Jewish community of Germany in these terms:[1] 'At present, the German Jew has no civil rights. He is not a citizen; he cannot vote or attend any political meeting; he has no liberty of speech and cannot defend himself in print; he cannot become a civil servant or a judge; he cannot be a writer or a publisher or a journalist; he cannot speak over the radio; he cannot become a screen actor or an actor before Aryan audiences; he cannot teach in any educational institution; he cannot enter the service of the railway, the Reichsbank, and many other banks; he cannot exhibit paintings or give concerts; he cannot work in any public hospital; he cannot enter the Labour Front or any of the professional organizations, although membership of many callings is restricted to members of these groups; he cannot even sell books or antiques. If he is starving he can receive no aid from the *Winterhilfe* organization, and if he dies in battle his name will be on no war memorial (for has he not seen the erasing of the names of his forebears from such memorials by order of Goebbels and Frick?). In addition to these, there are many other restrictions applying in certain localities. The upshot of them all is that the Jew is deprived of all opportunity for advancement and is lucky if he contrives to scrape a bare living unmolested by Black Guards or Gestapo. It is a campaign of annihilation—a pogrom of the crudest form, supported by every State instrument.'

By this time the Nazis scarcely needed to make use of anti-semitism for secondary reasons. They were all-powerful in Germany. But there was still one dastardly use which the Jews might serve. The determination to recreate in the youth a bullying, militaristic spirit was one which was early taken, but was not necessarily easy to fulfil in a nation where every man or woman of middle age had known the horrors of war and defeat.

[1] *The House that Hitler Built*, Stephen E. Roberts, p. 263.

The tactic had already been adopted, with tragic success, of encouraging the *Sturm-Abteilung* and the *Schutz-Staffel* to beat up and bully any Jews whom they might encounter. Once the Nazis were in power, this same policy was extended to the school children. By publications, particularly from the Stürmer Press, by exhortation from their teachers, and by the lessons and examples they received in the Hitler Jugend, children from the tenderest years were led to bully and despise Jewish children, in order that the natural friendliness and sympathies of youth might be perverted in them, and a 'proper' military spirit awakened.

In their vast campaign in foreign countries the Nazis from the beginning proclaimed themselves the saviours of European cultural values from the Jewish Bolsheviks. At the same time they justified their policy towards the Jews of Germany by the circulation of skilfully forged or distorted statistics, and by endless explanations of the meaning of their 'Aryan' philosophy. During their first two years of power, when they were still relatively weak, they went little beyond the same line of action. By 1935, as has been said, they had begun to feel safe, and were ready to intensify their activity.

By that time, apart from the general anti-Jewish element in all Nazi activity, there were three official organizations wholly or mainly concerned with the spread of antisemitism in other countries. The Chairman of the Liaison Committee co-ordinating the work of these organizations, together with others working in the international field, was the Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess. This gives the measure of the importance attached to this work of undermining other States. The *Fichte Bund* in Hamburg maintained contact with all Germans resident abroad, spread Nazi ideas among them, and organized them with such efficiency that non-Nazi Germans from South America to Japan were afraid to express their opposition to Hitler. The *Antisemitische Weltdienst* in Erfurt maintained spies and agents in many countries, whose business it was to report on Jewish activities or the activities of any group or individual appearing to be in contact with Jews. It also produced an immense series of publications in all languages dealing with the Jewish question, translated and distributed the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and provided 'experts' to give evidence at such trials as that of the Swiss Nazis for distributing copies of the Protocols in Switzerland. The Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question in Berlin meanwhile produced pseudo-scholarly works on Jewish history and kindred subjects, which often needed considerable scholarship to expose. None of these organizations boggled at deliberate lying. The 'facts' that they produced were invented at will,

whether they were dealing with the 'real' names and relationships of prominent men, the ownerships of businesses, the activities of politicians, or anything else.

This, however, was only the groundwork of Nazi international antisemitism. Throughout, the real objective was the destruction or weakening of the democracies and the democratic idea. But it was found by experience that the quickest and surest way both to penetrate another country and to disguise the true objectives of German propaganda, was to put the stirring up of prejudice against the Jews in the forefront of their activities. To this end two means were used; parties of similar tendencies in other countries, many of which had been created or assisted directly by Nazi organizations, were sedulously inoculated with Nazi anti-Jewish and 'Aryan' ideas; and the flight of thousands of German Jews was made to serve Nazi ends. The two methods were skilfully combined.

So long as Jews left Germany in comparatively small numbers, and took with them considerable sums in capital, ensuring their independence or even allowing them to start industries of value to the countries which received them, the refugees attracted little general attention. But by 1935 they were pouring out in a considerable stream, and they were able to bring extremely little with them. They sought not only a refuge, but some employment whereby they might live. This situation was at once exploited by national fascist groups which proclaimed that the refugees were taking the bread out of the mouths of natives. A Jewish question came into existence where it had previously been unknown, and Germany provided the paradoxical spectacle —until the explanation was realized—of a country which constantly expressed its desire to be *judenrein*, and at the same time put every kind of difficulty in the way of emigration. But in fact the haste with which the refugees arrived, their poverty, their nervous condition, their frenzied search for work, all this was designed to secure exactly the results at which the Nazis aimed. It made a few thousand individuals in various countries as conspicuous as if they had been millions—and, of course, the fascist parties always exaggerated their numbers. Even in England, the constant repetitions of Mosley have persuaded thousands of Englishmen that this country has received many hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees.

The disturbance caused by the arrival of refugees thus gave scope to the fascist parties to impress themselves on public opinion. To what extent the parties were also directly financed by Germany it is not possible always to establish. But it is known that in its general propaganda abroad the Nazis were

spending 286 million marks by 1934, after one year in power, and that this figure had risen to nearly 500 million two years later. In 1936 Arab leaders in Palestine were shown by the police to have received £50,000, and 20 million marks was assigned for propaganda in Poland alone in 1938.[1] But Germany, even if it did not directly provide funds, directly provided training. Whether it were Mosley and the British Union of Fascists, Degrelle and the Belgian Rexists, the Mufti and the Arab extremists, or Codreanu and the Rumanian Iron Guard, to name only a few, the leaders were brought to Germany, fêted at the Party Rally, taught the Nazi methods of propaganda, provided with literature, linked up with the local German organizations, magnified in the Nazi Press, and generally identified with the interests of the Third Reich. In all this work antisemitism played a very important part. In Great Britain Mosley attracted little attention until he provoked disorders in the East End of London by his violent attacks on the Jews. In countries like Poland, Rumania, or the Arab world, where a Jewish problem already existed, antisemitism was the main, or even the only, weapon which was needed. The situation almost became comic when Mussolini, who had always decried racialism and rejected antisemitism as a political weapon in Italy, and who had actually encouraged Jewish students to come and study in Italian universities, was compelled to toe the line and to introduce in 1938 anti-Jewish legislation on the Nazi model.

In 1935 the Nazis began intensive work in Spain, and at once issued a special edition of the *Protocols*—although there are hardly any Jews in Spain. In 1938 they fomented an actual *putsch* in Brazil, and tried the same in Lithuania and Rumania. The troubles in Palestine were encouraged by them; the increasing violence of Polish political life was largely due to them; and in many other countries their agents were actively at work. In Austria, Bohemia, and Slovakia, as soon as they had seized them, they established governments which forced anti-Jewish legislation on often reluctant people. After 1940 'Nuremberg Laws' were ruthlessly imposed on most of the countries of Europe.

The appalling intensification of antisemitic violence after the Nazis obtained almost complete power in Europe in 1940 was a demonstration of the fanatical hatred of Hitler rather than a cynically planned exploitation of Jewish misery for ulterior ends. In fact it provoked opposition in every country in which it was applied, and nowhere can it be said to have increased the popularity of German rule. In Hitler the tragic destiny of antisemitism completed its cycle. Beginning as an artifice, it ended

[1] See 'The Nazi International', *Quarterly Review*, October 1938.

as an unparalleled tragedy just because Hitler himself was sincerely convinced of the truth of the propaganda so cynically and insincerely employed by his teacher Lueger.

Conclusion

To some extent the distinction between the antisemitism which aims at persecuting the Jews, and that which uses the Jews for other objectives, is an artificial one. But it is justifiable in that it brings two points into the open. One is that antisemitism only takes root, with all its absurdities, because there actually are unsolved problems connected with the world situation of the Jews. The non-existent Jew of antisemitic propaganda carries conviction because it can be tied up with actual abnormalities in the position of the Jews, and with ancient prejudices and superstitions in the mind of non-Jews. The other lesson is that antisemitism is a most potent weapon against society as a whole. Hitler was making no mistake when he seized on it as the easiest and most effective way of undermining the unity and strength of his opponents.

Not the least curious part of the history of the Nazi use of this weapon was the impunity with which it was employed. The steady growth of fascist parties in different countries, the closeness of their ties with the Nazi authorities inside and outside Germany, were not secrets which could be hidden. Now and again some minor action would be taken against some unimportant link in the Nazi chain. In Switzerland in 1936 the chief Nazi agent was murdered by a Jewish student, Frankfurter. To the Swiss it was no more than a personal crime to be punished in the same way as a murder committed for gain by a housebreaker. In England on one occasion three Nazi 'journalists' were deported. In South Africa a local fascist organization was closed down, and the German officials with whom it was linked suffered some temporary inconvenience. And so on, in other countries. But no united action was taken, no public recognition was given to the emergence of a new menace in international relations. Only in the United States was a Congressional Committee set up to inquire into the activities of foreign agents, and even then little effective action was taken.

Jewish organizations, indeed, did take the matter seriously, but they were almost completely powerless. In the first place their hands were full with the thousands of refugees who poured monthly from central Europe. In the second place they were still more handicapped by the fact that this was a non-Jewish, not a Jewish problem, and they had no means of convincing the

world of the truth of this fact. Rather the vigour with which they attempted to oppose the continual stream of defamation convinced others that it *was* a Jewish problem, and the non-Jews played into Nazi hands by demands that the Jews put their own house in order, so that it might no longer be possible to make accusations against them. On several occasions the distribution of the *Protocols* was made the subject of actions for defamation, or obscenity. But the laws on such subjects had not been framed with such a situation in mind, and in consequence even verdicts which dismissed them as a forgery did little good. Libel against a community is not actionable in most countries. The Protocols continued to be circulated. At the present moment there exists in England a publishing company (The Britons) whose sole function is their dissemination.

It may be that in many parts of Europe the bestiality of the policy of extermination adopted in 1942 may cause an ultimate revulsion of feeling among the general population. But it would be unwise to expect antisemitism to die down of itself. The millions spent by the Nazis, the millions of pamphlets circulated, the psychological shrewdness of their attacks, these have left results behind. In Canada, in Latin America, in South Africa, as well as in the United States, men only read of what has happened in Europe. They did not see it before their eyes. They had no personal experience of it; and the feeling of revulsion which they might temporarily experience was soon lost among the other horrors and excitements of total war. To discover effective means for dealing with this world-wide scourge will tax the skill of statesmen and educationalists for many years to come.

EPILOGUE: THE FUTURE

FROM one end of the field to the other, the future of the Jews presents a question mark. Complete uncertainty affects them more than any other people. The British may not know what social order, what planning of economic life, what new phenomena in national relations may make new demands upon them. But they can be confident that decisions will lie primarily in their own hands, and that the land and the people themselves will remain unchanged. The keynote of the political situation of the Jewish people is dependence; the keynote of their physical situation is insecurity.

These two facts must not be forgotten when Jewish leadership is accused of hysteria, or of foolish internecine quarrels. Nothing else could be expected in these conditions. Nowhere are they able to carry out themselves the solutions they propose for their future existence; nowhere can they take a democratic and popular decision on their own responsibility. Jewry has become increasingly self-conscious during the past half-century; it has become increasingly organized, until to-day every Jewish community is split between rival groupings, each trying to impress the importance of its own programme on the majority among whom it lives, and in whose hands its fate will lie.

Such a situation is wholly unhealthy, and nothing would do more to restore balance and proportion, faith and constructive planning, to Jewry than the opportunity of discussing *ex aequo* with the nations the problems which oppress them. For, in however unusual or unique a measure, Jewry is a 'nation'. In fact it is more. It is a civilization, made up—as are other civilizations—of a number of nations. Only, in the case of Jewry these nations are more fluid, more interpenetrated than are the nations which compose, for example, European Christendom. But the Sephardim, or Spanish Jews, the Ashkenazim (Tedesco) or German Jews, the Pollaks or eastern-European Jews, have qualities of their own, and even separate histories, as much as Holland and Belgium, Germany and Denmark. Attached to these main groups there are others on the fringes. On one side are the extreme assimilationists, the essentially 'hyphenated-Jews', and on the other the Jews of the Caucasus, the Falashas of Abyssinia, and others. And the men, women, and children of this rich and varied civilization, as ancient and creative as any other in the world, are wholly dependent on others even for the

simple permission to live and work in the country of their choice. It is a unique and tragic destiny.

The words 'as of right and not on sufferance', which distinguish for the Jew his entry into Palestine, the absolute equality of citizenship which individual Jews had won in western Europe and America, have an almost mystical significance for Jewry which it is difficult for others to understand. Nothing is more false than the idea that the Jews are by nature and by choice a wandering and unsettled people. It would be difficult to find a case in their long history in which their movements were voluntary and unnecessary. They are a people to whom the idea of 'home'—that untranslatable English word—is as rich, as deep, and as compelling as it is to the English themselves. The spiritual comfort and exaltation of Judaism revolves around the home even more than the synagogue.

To-day the Jewish people are more despondent, more cynical, than at any period of their history. The utter failure of the Minority Treaties; the uprooting of communities, such as that of Germany, which felt themselves secure; the policy of the British administration in Palestine; the refusal of the United Nations to recognize the corporate existence of Jewry in the Second World War—all these have bred in Jews a terrible conviction that, as the world is gradually replanned, they will be left again in the same insecurity, with the same sense of being the unwanted nuisance, the poor relation of humanity.

The two problems which clamour already for courageous solutions are: the future of European Jewry and the future of Palestine. Some might add the combating of antisemitism, but, as I have tried to show, this is a Gentile, not a Jewish, problem. On both problems it is urgent to make clear-cut proposals. In all Europe there remain less than a million and a half Jews, and it is useless to try to re-create in some surer form the minority existence envisaged in the Versailles settlement. The economic abnormality which contributed to the failure of that solution no longer exists, for to-day European Jewry has no economic foundations whatever.

It seems certain that the bulk of the survivors of the Jewries of Europe have no thought but to turn their backs on countries so full of bitter memories. If they have seen the heroism of a minority in their defence, they have seen also neighbours, to whom they had done no wrong, look on unheeding at their martyrdom; and to live again in their midst seems psychologically intolerable to them. In any case, there are many thousands who are completely homeless and stateless, living in temporary refuges. Is the solution to be individual infiltration

or group settlement or what? Infiltration means infiltration into the world's great cities. It is ill to condemn this simply on the grounds that they are breeding grounds for antisemitism; for the world should not accept that antisemitism is an incurable and permanent disease. At the same time it is permissible to say that there is no reason to aggravate the problem, as it would be aggravated by infiltration on the necessary scale, a scale comparable to the flight from Russia fifty years ago.

Group settlement has been an idea much in vogue among Governments in recent years. It has much to commend it, *if* it be possible to settle a group which is a unity, and not merely a conglomerate of unsatisfied individuals. And what is a 'group' for a civilized people? It cannot be less than a unit which is able to provide the whole range of education for its members from the primary school to the technical school, the university, and the religious seminary; which can satisfy its cultural life with adequate libraries, musical and dramatic companies, and synagogues; which provides the whole range of economic opportunities of a self-contained community, or a community capable of trading as an equal with its neighbours. Anything less than this is a farce, a farce which solves no problem except that of mere geographical displacement. So far none of the group settlements proposed have envisaged anything like the numbers which would be needed for the creation of a full life for its settlers. Moreover, group settlement, if it is to start with virgin soil, is a slow process, which for many years would provide a bare livelihood only to the young and the strong; and many of those seeking new homes will be neither. It will need innumerable experts and inexhaustible financial credit, and the Jewish people have no surplus of either.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only satisfactory solution from the Jewish point of view is one which makes it possible for those who desire it to go to Palestine. To enter, in this place, the controversy about the relative rights of Jews and Arabs, the relative responsibility of Jews and British, would be inappropriate. There is nothing wrong in controversial issues; there is nothing wrong in taking sides—only such a study as this is not the right place for it. But this it is possible to say. So far as the Jews and Jewish needs are concerned, the argument in favour of allowing them room to develop, and the complete control of their own future, is overwhelming. Were the country otherwise empty, nobody would question it. But the country is not empty, and the resulting conflict of interest is one which will need the most serious attention, and the most courageous and generous action, of the peacemakers. I do not believe it can be

settled by a balancing of legal rights and promises. A new standard of judgement is required—and that not in this question only. If the twentieth century is to become the century of the common man, I suggest that the new basis is the practical basis of need.

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER SIX

Appendix I

DEMANDS OF JEWISH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, SEPTEMBER 1921
(*Extract from 'Paix et Droit', October* 1921)

Dans le domaine législatif nous demandons, en suivant l'ordre dans lequel les projets de loi ont été déposés:

(1) L'adoption du projet portant suppression des taxes spéciales que les juifs ont à payer lorsqu'ils sont en traitement dans les hôpitaux. C'est aux communes qu'il appartient de prendre la charge des malades nécessiteux sans distinction de religion;

(2) Le vote d'une loi abolissant les incapacités juridiques des juifs dans l'ancienne Pologne;

(3) L'abolition des restrictions légales imposées à la population juive dans les territoires de l'ancien empire russe dévolus à la Pologne par le traité de Riga;

(4) Le vote d'un projet qui, par dérogation à la loi sur le repos dominical dans le commerce et l'industrie, permette à la population juive observant le sabbat et les jours de fêtes juives, de travailler le dimanche et les jours de fêtes chrétiennes;

(5) L'adoption par la Diète d'une loi sur les écoles juives qui respecte les stipulations du traité de Versailles protégeant les droits des minorités religieuses;

(6) La reconnaissance légale de l'organisation autonome des communautés juives en tant que groupements religieux.

Dans l'ordre administratif, nous demandons:

(1) Une prompte solution de la question dite 'des étrangers'. Il importe que, conformément à l'esprit de l'article 3 du traité de Versailles, on reconnaisse comme citoyens polonais tous les anciens sujets russes qui habitaient effectivement le territoire de la République polonaise au jour de la ratification du dit traité, et ceux qui, l'habitant avant la guerre, n'avaient pu, parce que prisonniers ou réfugiés de guerre, s'y trouver lors de la ratification;

(2) Une action efficace contre tous les pogromes et exces antijuifs, contre la propagande ouverte ou secrète, par voie d'appels, d'agitation dans la presse, etc.;

(3) La punition des personnes coupables d'avoir participé aux excès antijuifs, tant lors de l'invasion bolcheviste qu'au moment de la retraite et de la marche victorieuse, qui l'a immédiatement suivie, de l'armée polonaise et des armées amies de Balakovitch et de Petliura; des sanctions pour les excès commis récemment par les Silésians;

(4) La réhabilitation des juifs innocents fusillés pendant l'invasion bolcheviste, en particulier celle du rabbin Schapiro, de Plock;

(5) La fin du régime de mise hors la loi des juifs, en vertu duquel on leur refuse des concessions de débits de boisson, de tabac et de denrées, on leur interdit de participer à l'affermage des terrains dominiaux, on leur barre l'accès des fonctions publiques et on les exclut de l'avancement dans l'armée;

(6) La suppression des mesures restrictives de la liberté des juifs dans leur vie intellectuelle, sociale et économique, qui tendent à dissoudre les associations juives ou à leur refuser l'autorisation légale, a réquisitionner leurs lieux de réunion;

(7) La fin des mesures vexatoires prises contre la presse yiddisch et hébraique, contre l'emploi de ces langues dans les réunions, au théâtre et sur les affiches;

(8) Le maintien des écoles juives, laiques et religieuses, dans leur forme actuelle jusqu'à l'adoption d'un réglement fixant le régime de l'enseignement dans les écoles des minorités de race et de religion;

(9) La suspension de la réforme agraire, réalisée au détriment des cultivateurs juifs, dont les biens ruraux ont été confisqués, bien qu'ils les aient gérés dans les conditions exigées par la loi;

(10) Un traitement égal pour les juifs lors de la constitution de conseils, de commissions, etc., ainsi des conférences ou sont conviés des représentants de la presse, etc.

Appendix II

The Agreement of 1925
(*Extract from 'Paix et Droit', September* 1925)

. . . la section du Comité politique du Conseil des ministres a décidé, dans sa séance du 11 juillet 1925, de présenter au Conseil un certain nombre de motions, que nous croyons éminemment utile de résumer, d'après la note communiquée par le gouvernement à la presse polonaise.

(1) Le Conseil des ministres recommande au ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique de présenter un projet de loi uniforme sur l'organisation des Associations cultuelles juives sur tout le territoire de la République, ainsi que sur le Conseil religieux juif.

(2) Le Conseil des ministres autorise le ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique à présenter un projet d'ordonnance au Conseil des ministres sur l'extension au Palatinat de l'Est de l'ancienne occupation russe des décrets sur les changements d'organisation des communes cultuelles juives sur le territoire de l'ancienne Pologne russe du 7 février 1919 (*Journal des Lois*, No. 14-175).

(3) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi ce dernier consentira à démocratiser les communes juives sur le territoire de l'ancienne occupation autrichienne au moyen de modifications y relatives des statuts des communes cultuelles (paragraphes 28 et 29 de la loi du 21 mars 1890. *Journal Autrichien des Lois*, No. 57).

(4) Le Conseil des ministres recommande au ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique de préparer un projet de loi sur l'emploi des langues hébraique et juive dans les cérémonies du culte des communes cultuelles juives en analogie avec les prescriptions réglant l'emploi des langues ruthène et blanc-russienne dans les discussions des corps autonomes locaux.

(5) Le Conseil des ministres accorde en principe son consentement pour que les langues hébraique et juive soient autorisées, en conformité des lois existantes, dans les réunions publiques.

(6) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi celui-ci introduira, dans un certain nombre d'écoles primaires de l'État dans les localités ou le pourcent de la population juive est considérable, le repos hebdomadaire le samedi ainsi que l'enseignement des sciences hébraiques jusqu'à concurrence de 10 heures par semaine.

(7) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi

il publiera une ordonnance sur la fréquentation des 'heder' (écoles confessionnelles juives) qui satisfont aux prescriptions scolaires de l'Etat. Cette fréquentation sera considérée comme satisfaisant à la loi sur l'enseignement obligatoire.

(8) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi il allouera des subventions aux écoles professionnelles juives qui les auront spécialement méritées.

(9) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi il octroiera des droits publics à un certain nombre d'écoles juives primaires, secondaires ainsi que normales, ou l'enseignement est donné en hébreu ou en yidisch, et qui mériteront cette mesure par le niveau de leur enseignement, niveau conforme aux exigences de la loi.

(10) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi il permettra aux enfants de religion juive dans les écoles publiques de l'Etat d'être libérés de l'obligation d'écrire le samedi.

(11) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique comme quoi il facilitera aux enfants de religion juive la fréquentation des cérémonies du culte le samedi. Le ministre des Affaires militaires permettra cette fréquentation aux soldats de religion juive en dehors des heures de service.

(12) Le Conseil des ministres prend note de la déclaration du ministre des Affaires militaires comme quoi il publiera une ordonnance rendant possible le paiement aux soldats de la confession mosaique d'un supplément de subsistence qui leur permettrait de s'approvisionner en dehors de la caserne, conformément au rite. Cette ordonnance doit être publiée sans porter atteinte aux prescriptions fondamentales sur le service militaire.

Appendix III

Some Statistics of the Jewish Population in Poland[1]

Occupation	*Jews*	*Percentage of all employed Jews*	*Percentage of Jews to non-Jews*
Agriculture, etc.	89,987	9·5	0·9
Mining and Industry—			
Iron, steel, etc.	14,420	1·5	15·7
Textiles	24,408	2·6	14·8
Fur and tanning	11,043	1·2	43·6
Timber	19,728	2·1	16·8
Food	45,783	4·9	30·0
Clothing	138,747	14·8	41·7
Building	13,277	1·4	12·7
Miscellaneous	30,011	3·2	10·8
Commerce and Insurance—			
General Commerce	288,685	30·7	73·8
Hotel Industry	17,124	1·8	23·1
Accessory trades to commerce	14,781	1·6	81·4
Miscellaneous	4,025	0·4	11·5
Communications and Transport—			
PTT	457	0·0	1·7
Railways and Tramways	1,479	0·1	0·8
Other Transport	11,789	1·3	42·5
Accessory Trades	11,082	1·2	67·8
Public Employment, Liberal Professions, etc.—			
Public Services, Magistrature and Bar	5,618	0·6	0·2
Health	7,278	0·8	17·6
Public Institutions	1,779	0·2	11·9
Religion	5,245	0·6	17·1
Education	17,969	1·9	19·4
Science, Literature, Art	370	0·0	12·3
Entertainment and Sport	2,261	0·2	24·4
Army, Fleet, Air Force	15,393	1·6	4·4
Domestic Service	46,121	4·9	16·7
Unemployed, etc.	15,734	1·7	8·4
Independent	51,472	5·5	22·2
Uncertain	33,419	3·6	13·6
	939,485	100·0	6·8

[1] Distribution of Jews according to Census of 1921 (taken from Gliksman).

Appendix IV

Student Statistics

Institution	1921–1922 *Total*	*Jews*	*Jewish percentage of total*	1927–1928 *Total*	*Jews*	*Jewish percentage of total*
Warsaw University	7,446	2,364	31·7	9,289	2,187	23·5
Cracow „	4,515	1,339	29·6	6,741	1,916	28·4
Lvov „	4,703	2,226	47·3	5,742	1,899	33·1
Vilna „	1,700	370	21·7	3,036	871	28·7
Poznan „	3,265	47	1·4	3,900	12	0·3
Warsaw Tech. Univ.	3,750	686	18·2	3,652	377	10·3
Lvov „ „	2,138	297	13·8	1,981	288	14·5
Agricultural Coll.	761	5	0·6	887	16	1·8
College of Mines	282	3	1·1	494	1	0·2
Veterinary College	303	40	13·2	437	25	5·7
College of Fine Arts	155	13	8·3	204	21	10·3
Institute of Dentistry	500	352	70·4	410	79	19·3

Faculties at Vilna, 1927–1928

(Given as an example of the distribution of Jewish students at the beginning of the period of collapse)

	Total	*Jews*	*Jewish percentage of total*
Arts	545	203	37·2
Law and Social Science	719	207	28·8
Mathematics	404	191	47·3
Agriculture	76	21	27·6
Medicine	626	186	29·7
Pharmacy	187	43	23·0
Fine Arts	119	20	16·8
	2,676	871	32·5

Appendix V

ORT IN POLAND

(*Taken from* Jewish Reconstruction Work: '*Figures and Facts, 1930–1936*'. *Ort-Union*)

I. VOCATIONAL TRAINING

No.	*Town*	*Trades*	*Trainees*
		A. Day-schools for Juveniles	
1.	Warsaw	Dressmaking	117
2.	„	Needlework	46
3.	„	Children's garments	64
4.	Brest-Litowsk	Mechanical locksmiths	112
5.	„	Cabinet-making	42
6.	„	Dressmaking	100
7.	Bialystok	Dressmaking	166
8.	Grodno	Dressmaking	108
9.	Piotrkow	Mechanical locksmiths	79
10.	„	Cabinet-making	19
11.	Krzemienec	Dressmaking	145
12.	„	Mechanical locksmiths	76
13.	Kovel	Dressmaking	135
14.	Wladimir-Wol	Dressmaking	153
15.	Sarny	Cabinet-making	57
16.	Rowno	Dressmaking	186
		B. Workshops for Adults	
17.	Warsaw	Dressmaking	287
18.	„	„	
19.	„	Corset-making	180
20.	„	„	
21.	„	Needlework	45
22.	„	Millinery	46
23	„	Children's garments	65
	odz	Knitwear and glove-making	56
	„	Corset-making	124
26.	„	Circular hosiery knitting	71
27.	„	Auxiliary work in hosiery-making	
28.	„	Circular knitting	44
29.	„	Weaving	32
30.	„	Auxiliary trades to weaving industry	
31.	„	Dressmaking	48
32.	„	Needlework	31
33.		Manicure	49

No.	*Town*	*Trades*	*Trainees*
34.	Lodz	Hairdressing and waving	21
35.	Bialystok	Corset-making	10
36.	„	Dressmaking	20
37.	Wilno	Plumbing	17
38.	„	Cement work	12
39.	Lublin	Children's clothing	76
40.	Kalisz	Cement work	18
41.	Rowno	Corset-making	7
42.	Wladimir-Wol	Corset-making	30
43.	Wloclawek	Corset-making	17
44.	„	Dressmaking	80

C. Finishing Workshops for Artisans

45.	Warsaw	Boot and shoe cutting	40
46.	„	Cutting men's garments	61
47.	„	Cutting ladies' garments	38
48.	„	Female cutters for ladies' garments	130
49.	Wloclawek	Cutting men's garments	14

D. Preparation Courses for Artisans' Diplomas

50.	Warsaw	Various trades	213
51.	Lodz	„ „	25
52.	Bialystok	„ „	65
53.	Grodno	„ „	41
54.	Rowno	„ „	17
55.	Radom	„ „	30
56.	Wloclawek	„ „	54
57.	Sosnowiec	„ „	51
58.	Piotrkow	„ „	100
59.	Kalisz	„ „	75
60.	Wilno	„ „	35
61.	Baranowicze	„ „	120
62.	Bedzin	„ „	113
63.	„	„ „	
64.	Danzig	„ „	109

E. Technicum at Wilno

65.	Wilno	General engineering	219
66.	„	Electrotechnical and wireless	

A. Farmers' Co-operative Associations

No.	*Name of the Co-operative*
67.	Ignatowka (District Wolhyn.) incl. Ignatowki, Sofiewka, Josefowka, Sosno.
68.	Ossowo 1 (District Wolhyn.) incl. Ossowo, Wiszki.
69.	Ossowo 2 (District Wolhyn.).
70.	Zoluck (District Wolhyn.) incl. Zoluck, Ozarki.
71.	Rafalowka (District Wolhyn.).
72.	M.-Sieliszcze (District Wolhyn.).
73.	Jezorani (District Wolhyn.) incl. Jezorani, Warkowicze.
74.	Dubinowo (District Wilno).
75.	Stolowicze (District Nowogrodek).
76.	Siedlce (District Lublin) incl. Siedlce, Ostrowek, Krzeslin, Tabenki, Popramnia, Bajdi, Plewki, Sucharzbry, Mardi, Katun, Brzerzedkow, Holzbja, Ostoy, Wzow, Krzimasi, Krinica.
77.	Bialystok (District Bialystok).
78.	Grodno (District Bialystok).
79.	Pinsk (District Polessie).
80.	Ivaniki (District Polessie).

B. Other Settlements

81.	Stara Rafalowka (District Wolhyn.).
82.	Czartorysk (District Wolhyn.).
83.	Wladzimirec (District Wolhyn.).
84.	Poniewicz (District Wolhyn.).
85.	Luck (District Wolhyn.).
86.	Kowel (District Wolhyn.).
87.	Sarny (District Wolhyn.).
88.	Rowno (District Wolhyn.).
89.	Ozdiuticz (District Wilno).
90.	Wilno (District Wilno).
91.	Suvalki (District Bialystok).
92.	Filipowo (District Bialystok).
93.	Raczki (District Bialystok).
94.	Wizoni (District Bialystok).
95.	Punsk (District Bialystok).
96.	Przedborz (District Radom and Piotrkow).
97.	Kaminsk (District Radom and Piotrkow).
98.	Graiec (District Warsaw).
99.	Makow-Mazowecki (District Warsaw).
100.	Szelkow (District Warsaw).

Co-operatives, Consultation Offices, Training Factories

No.	*Town*	*Kind of Enterprise*	*Persons Employed*
101.	Lodz	Weaving Co-operative I . .	35
102.	,,	Weaving Co-operative II .	30
103.	,,	Consultation office for industrial workers . . .	00
104.	Warsaw	Consultation office for artisans .	00
105.	Konin	Knitwear training factory .	26
106.	Kalisz	,, ,, ,, .	20
107.	Makow-Mazow	,, ,, ,, .	25

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

CHAPTER ONE: THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND THE PROMISES TO THE ARABS

From the mass of material written on the history of Zionism and the Balfour Declaration, it is only possible to select a few publications which have contributions of particular value, either because of their author, or because of the standpoint they represent.

On the evolution of the national idea in Jewish history, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Zionismus*, by Dr. N. M. Gelber (Phaidon Verlag, Wien, 1927) gives extremely useful data; *The History of Zionism*, by N. Sokolow (Longmans, 1919), and *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, by A. M. Hyamson (Jewish Historical Society, 1939 and 1941) supplement it with the story of British interest in the project throughout the nineteenth century. There is a competent resumé of the material in *The Holy Land under Mandate*, by F. F. Andrews (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1931).

For the war period there is further material in Andrews (op. cit.), and an extremely valuable essay by Gelber in *Zehn Jahre Balfour Deklaration* (a symposium published by the Austrian Zionist Committee, 1927). Light is thrown on the negotiations in England by H. Sidebotham in *British Imperial Interests in Palestine* (Macmillan, 1937). There is an important chapter in *Zionism*, by Leonard Stein (Benn, 1926). A full account from a strongly American standpoint is given by H. M. Kallen in *Zionism and World Politics: A Study in History and Social Psychology* (Heinemann, 1921). The role of Balfour and the political implications of the Declaration are given by Blanche Dugdale in *Arthur James Balfour: Years 1906–1930* (Hutchinson, 1936). The Peace Conference is treated in Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (Gollancz, 1938), vol. ii; in D. H. Miller, *My Diaries* (Appeal Printing Co., New York, 1924), vols. iii and iv, and in *The Jewish National Home*, edited by Paul Goodman (Dent, 1943), (statements by S. Wise and F. Frankfurter). For the relation of the whole question to the situation in Syria and the Near East, and to our various promises in that area, H. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi (Oxford University Press, 1924) is indispensable. The Arab side is presented by G. Antonius in *The Arab Awakening* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938). In addition, certain

Command Papers give essential British Documents: the most important is Cmd. 5957, 1939, *Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein.* With this should be studied Cmd. 5974, 1939, *Report of a Committee set up to consider certain correspondence* . . . In addition there is Cmd. 5964, 1939, *Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the Year 1918 in regard to the Future Status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire.*

CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MANDATE

For the political history of Palestine, the following Command Papers are indispensable. For the general bibliography on Palestine see Note for Chapter III.

Cmd. 5957. Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca. July 1915—March 1916.

Cmd. 5974. Report of a Committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915–1916.

Cmd. 5964. Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the Future Status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Cmd. 1785. Mandate for Palestine, together with a Note by the Secretary-General relating to its application to the Territory known as Trans-Jordan.

Cmd. 1540. Palestine. Disturbances in May 1921. Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Correspondence Relating thereto. (The Haycraft Commission.)

Cmd. 1700. Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization. (The Churchill White Paper is Document No. 5.)

Cmd. 1989. Palestine. Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency. Correspondence with the High Commissioner for Palestine.

Cmd. 3530. Report of the Commission on Palestine Disturbances of August 1929. (The Shaw Commission.)

Cmd. 3582. Palestine. Statement with regard to British Policy.

Cmd. 3686. Palestine. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development. (Hope Simpson Report.)

Cmd. 3692. Palestine. Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. (The Passfield White Paper.)
The Macdonald Letter. Text in *The Holy Land under Mandate*, by F. F. Andrews, vol. ii, p. 394 (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1931).

Cmd. 5479. Palestine Royal Commission Report.

Cmd. 5513. Palestine. Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Cmd. 5854. Palestine Partition Report. (The Woodhead Commission.)

Cmd. 5893. Statement of Policy.

Cmd. 6019. Palestine Statement of Policy. (The Macdonald White Paper.)

Cmd. 6180. Palestine Land Transfers Regulations. Letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

CHAPTER THREE: THE NATIONAL HOME

In addition to the material mentioned in the bibliographies of the two previous chapters, which cover the beginnings of the Mandate and the most important Blue Books and White Papers dealing with the subject, the following books are given as a selection of a number of different standpoints of the National Home. *The Constitution of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, and the *Constitution of the Zionist Organization* have been published by the Offices of the two bodies concerned; in other cases the publishers' names are given.

ANDREWS, F. F., *The Holy Land under Mandate*, 2 vols. (Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1931).

BENTWICH, NORMAN, *Fulfilment in the Promised Land* (Soncino Press, 1938).

—— *Jewish Youth Comes Home* (Gollancz, 1944).

—— *Judaea Lives Again* (Gollancz, 1944).

BOEHM, ADOLF and POLLAK, ADOLF, *The Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael). Its History, Function and Activity* (Head Office of the Jewish National Fund, N.D.)

BURSTEIN, MOSHÉ, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900* (Tel Aviv, 1934).

FEIWEL, T. R., *No Ease in Zion* (Secker & Warburg, 1938).

GOODMAN, PAUL (Edit.), *The Jewish National Home* (Dent, 1943).

GRANOVSKY, A., *Land Policy in Palestine* (Bloch, New York, 1940).

HANCOCK, W. K., *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. i, pp. 432–485 (Oxford University Press, 1921).
HERRMANN, LEO, *National Capital in the Jewish National Home* (Keren Hayesod, 1941).
HIMADDEH, S. B., *The Economic Organization of Palestine* (American University of Beirut, 1938).
HINDEN, RITA and HOROWITZ, D., *Economic Survey of Palestine* (Jewish Agency, 1938).
KISCH, F. H., *Palestine Diary* (Gollancz, 1938).
LOWDERMIEK, W. CLAY. *Palestine, Land of Promise* (Gollancz, 1944).
MAIN, ERNEST, *Palestine at the Crossroads* (George Allen & Unwin, 1937).
REVUSKY, ABRAHAM, *Les Juifs en Palestine* (Payot, 1936).
RUPPIN, ARTHUR, *Three Decades of Palestine* (Shocken, 1936).
SERENI, ENZO and ASHERY, R. E., *Jews and Arabs in Palestine* (Hechalutz Press, 1922).
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. (Edit.), *Survey of International Affairs*, vols. for 1925, 1930, 1934, 1936, 1937 and 1938 (see relevant articles), (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London).
ULITZUR, A., *Two Decades of Keren Hayesod. A Survey in Facts and Figures, 1921–1940* (Keren Hayesod, 1940).

CHAPTER FOUR: THE JEWS OF RUMANIA BEFORE 1914

I know of no books which give an impartial survey of the Jewish question in Rumania during the period before 1914. We have to deal with a literature of controversy.

General Background

BELLESSORT, A., *La Roumanie Contemporaine* (Description of a Tour through the Country), (Librairie Académique, Perrin et Cie, 1905).
EVANS, IFOR L., *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge University Press, 1924).
JORGA, N., *A History of Roumania, Land, People, Civilization* (Translated by J. McCabe), (Fisher Unwin, 1925).

Books Written from the Anti-Jewish Standpoint

LAHOVARY, JEAN, *La Question Israélite en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1902).
VERAX (M. D. ROSETTI), *La Roumanie et les Juifs* (I. V. Socecu, Bucarest, 1903).

Books Written from the Pro-Jewish Standpoint

ABBOTT, G. F., *Israel in Europe* (Macmillan & Co., 1907).

BERNSTEIN, S., *Die Judenpolitik der Rumanischen Regierung* (Kopenhagener Bureau der Zionistischen Organization, 1918).

LAZARE, BERNARD, *Les Juifs en Roumanie* (Cahiers de la Quinzaine, 1902).

PLOTKE, JULIUS, *Die Rumanischen Juden unter dem Fursten und Konig Karl* (Frankfurt, 1901).

SINCERUS, E. (E. SCHWARZFELD), *Les Juifs en Roumanie depuis le Traité de Berlin* (1878) *jusqu'à ce jour. Les Lois et leurs Conséquences* (Macmillan & Co., 1901).

CHAPTER FIVE: THE JEWISH QUESTION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

The question of Minorities is dealt with in Volume V of the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley. From the Jewish standpoint, three works are necessary. The attitude of the British delegation is given in the *Report of the Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, etc.* (London, 1920); the attitude of the American Jewish Delegation, together with a very valuable study of the growth of the National Idea in modern Jewish history, is given by O. Janowsky in *Jews and Minority Rights (1898–1919)* (Columbia University Press, 1933); and the attitude of the European Zionist Jews is given in *La Question de Minorités à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919–1920, et l'action juive en faveur de la protection internationale des Minorités*, by N. Feinberg (Paris, Rousseau, 1929). In addition there is a useful general study of the position and rights of the Jews as a minority in *Die Juden Osteuropas in den Minderheitenverträgen* by Dr. Kurt Stillschweig (Berlin, Jastrow, 1936).

CHAPTER SIX: THE JEWS OF POLAND UP TO 1939

BASKERVILLE, BEATRICE C., *The Polish Jew* (His Social and Economic Value), (Chapman & Hall, 1906).

DUBNOW, S. M., *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Time to the Present Day*, 3 vols. Translated by I. Friedlander (Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916).

DYBOSKI, ROMAN, *Poland* (Benn, 1933).

GLIKSMANN, G., *L'Aspect Economique de la Question Juive en Pologne* (Editions Rieder, Paris, 1929).
MACHRAY, ROBERT, *The Poland of Pilsudski* (Allen & Unwin, 1936).
MARYLSKI, ANTON VON, *Geschichte der Judenfrage in Polen* (Berlin, 1918).
MOTZKIN, L., *La Campagne Antisemite en Pologne* (Cahiers du Comité des Délégations Juives, Paris, 1932).
SEGAL, S., *The New Poland—the Jews* (New York, 1938).
The Cambridge History of Poland from Augustus II to Pilsudski (1697–1935). Symposium. (Cambridge University Press, 1941.) Mainly for historical background.
Files of Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Files of *Paix et Droit*, monthly publication of the Alliance Israélite Universelle.
Files of *The Times*.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE JEWS OF THE U.S.S.R.

The standard work on the Jews of Tsarist Russia is *The Jews of Russia and Poland*, by Simon Dubnow, English translation, 3 vols. (Jewish Publication Society of America, 1920). For this period two other useful works are *Les Juifs de Russie*, Recueil d'articles et d'études sur leur situation légale, sociale et économique (Paris, L. Cerf, 1891). *Juifs Russes*, le Bund et le Zionisme, etc., by Elie Eberlin and Georges Delahache (Cahiers de la quinzaine, 6^{me} série, 6., 1905).

For the war of 1914–1917, *Les Juifs et la Guerre*, by André Spire (Payot, 1917), contains a valuable collection of documents. On the civil war and the pogroms in the Ukraine there are a number of collections. Most of the material will be found in *Les Pogroms en Ukraine sous les gouvernements ukrainiennes 1917–1920*. Edit. Leo Motzkin (Comité des Délégations Juives, 1927).

On the Jews of the U.S.S.R. there is not a great deal of reliable material written in other than Russian or Yiddish. For the Soviet attitude to the Jews as a nationality, Stalin's *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1936) is of the greatest importance. There are two articles by Jacob Lestchinsky in the *Contemporary Jewish Record* for September and November 1940 which have valuable bibliographical notes; and there is *The Jews and other Minor Nationalities under the Soviets*, by A. Yarmolinsky (Vanguard Studies, 1928). There is

a certain amount of material in different numbers of the *American Jewish Year Book.* A useful novel of the N.E.P. period is *Les Juifs regnent en Russie!* by Gregoire Simon; Collection Témoignages (Rieder, 1931).

Sufferance is the Badge, by A. L. Sachar (Knopf, 1940), contains a chapter on the U.S.S.R. which fairly expresses the combined admiration and alarm of a religious, democratic Jew at the Soviet transformation.

CHAPTER EIGHT: ANTISEMITISM BEFORE 1914

Any study of the political use of antisemitism must begin with the great article by Lucien Wolf, in the 11th or 13th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, which first surveyed the whole of the field. It has been republished in *Essays in Jewish History*, Lucien Wolf (Jewish Historical Society, 1934). The earliest studies of the subject appeared, like the basic literature of modern antisemitism, in France with *Israel parmi les Nations*, by A. Leroy Beaulieu in 1893, and *Antisemitisme, son histoire et ses causes*, by Bernard Lazare in 1894. To this period also belongs *Das Wesen des Antisemitismus*, by Graf Coudenhove (1901).

From the immense mass of modern literature it is only possible to select a few books.

GRAEBER, I. and BRETT, S. H. (Editors), *Jews in a Gentile World.* Symposium. (Macmillan, New York, 1942.)

PARKES, JAMES, *An Enemy of the People: Antisemitism* (Penguin, 1945).

SAMUEL, MAURICE, *The Great Hatred* (Gollancz, 1943).

VALENTIN, HUGO, *Antisemitism* (Gollancz, 1936).

For studies of particular aspects, it is again necessary to select from the immense mass of literature.

AUSTRIA: Bloch, Joseph S., *My Reminiscences* (Vienna, 1923).

FRANCE: Charensol, G., *L'Affaire Dreyfus et la Troisième République* (Ed. Kra, Paris).

—— Lecanuet, R. P., *Les Signes avantcoureurs de la Séparation* (Alcan, 1930).

GERMANY: Elbogen, Ismar, *Geschichte der juden in Deutschland* (E. Lichtenstein, Berlin, 1935).

RUSSIA: Tager, A. B., *The Decay of Tsarism: the Beiliss Trial* (Jewish Publication Society of America, 1935).

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion

BERNSTEIN, H., *The Truth about the 'Protocols of Zion'* (Covici Friede, New York, 1935).

GWYER, JOHN, *Portraits of Mean Men* (Cobden Sanderson, 1938).

ROLLIN, HENRI, *L'Apocalypse de notre Temps*, Paris, Gallimard, 1939. (I learnt of the existence of this important book too late to make use of it in the text.)

ROSENBERG, ALFRED VON, *Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion und die jüdische Weltpolitik.* (This gives the Nazi view.) (Deutsche Volksverlag, Dr. E. Boepple, Munich, N.D.)

Hitler and the Protocols

BLANK, RUBEN, *Adolf Hitler, ses aspirations, sa politique, sa propagande et les Protocols des Sages de Zion* (L. Beresniak, Paris, 1938).

HEIDEN, KONRAD, *Der Führer* (Gollancz, 1945).

STEIN, ALEXANDER, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der 'Weisen von Zion'* (Verlagsanstalt 'Graphia', Karlsbad, 1936).

Nazi Antisemitism

HOOVER, CALVIN B., *Germany enters the Third Reich* (Macmillan, New York, 1933).

JANOWSKY, O. I. and FAGEN, M. M., *International Aspects of German Racial Policies* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1937).

MOWRER, E. A., *Germany puts the Clock Back* (William Morrow, New York, 1933).

WARBURG, G., *Six Years of Hitler, The Jews under the Nazi Regime* (George Allen & Unwin, 1939).

ZWEIG, ARNOLD, *Insulted and Exiled, The Truth about the German Jews* (John Miles, London, N.D.).

The Yellow Spot, A Collection of Facts and Documents relating to Three Years' Persecution of German Jews (Gollancz, 1936).

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